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Abstract 
Research governance in pharmacogenetic based drug development: why the principlist 
approach? 
 
The thesis will examine whether policy considerations based on the normative ethical 
framework of Principlism are adequate for drug development involving pharmacogenetics. 
In order to structure the analysis, the main research question will be based on the following 
three claims: (1) that the overriding deference to the principle of respect for autonomy in 
the current interpretation of Principlism has asserted a legacy of protectionism towards the 
research participant at the expense of ignoring pharmacogenetics’ primary ethical issues 
(which are concerned with equity, fair distribution and research prioritisation); (2) that the 
principle of justice in Principlism requires specification, and that this principle’s non-
specificity may be a reason for  over-compensatory application of respect for autonomy; 
(3) and finally, that current interpretations of  Principlism  represent moral values that are 
culturally dependant. Based on these claims, I argue that a pharmacogenetic research 
governance ethical framework ought to be representative of common moral values, which 
are culturally neutral, subscribe to a ‘minimal morality', and are not based on the current 
precautionary approach that is entrenched in Principlism. From this main argument, I 
appeal to the principle of justice as fairness from Rawls’s A Theory of Justice to provide 
specification for the principle of justice inherent in Principlism. As well as establish how 
the application of this ‘minimal morality’ in governance could be achieved through John 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus, arguing that this would minimise the variability seen in 
regulatory decision making. I argue that greater specification of the principle of justice 
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would ensure that this principle could effectively be exercised to alleviate 
pharmacogenetics’ actual ethical issues, which are not concerned with the inference of 
disease knowledge, as implied by ethical concerns regarding informed consent, privacy 
and confidentiality.  
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1. Chapter One : Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis addresses the specific ethical demands that pharmacogenetics - the study of inter-
individual variations in DNA sequence related to drug response - poses to research 
governance. 
 
Healthcare research has become a formalised, regulated institutionalised activity, that has 
increased in scale and, consequently, in funding. These increases in the scale and financing of 
research have led to an expectation of greater accountability towards the public and private 
sectors of society.  
 
In drug development, accountability (here provided by research governance) is an assured 
system of administration and supervision that manages healthcare research programs. 
Research governance provides assurances that participants and research staff are protected 
from research misconduct through a framework of regulatory guidelines and policies, such as 
the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and, in the US, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). These organisations have somewhat successfully governed traditional drug 
development1, providing approval for the introduction of new drug treatments on the basis of 
efficacy and safety assessment data generalisable to a whole population generated from 
clinical trials.  
                                                             
1 Drug development that does not have pharmacogenetic intervention, 
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However, with the introduction of pharmacogenetics, drugs are now based on individual 
genetically determined responses, presenting a situation where clinical trial data cannot be 
generalised for the whole population. This has raised ethical issues with regard to the 
distribution of the research outcomes (i.e. the resulting developed drug) to the patient 
population as a whole. I argue in this thesis that these ethical issues are primarily concerned 
with Justice.   
 
Like any other medical technology, pharmacogenetics remains a promising field, but the 
realisation of its full potential in the research of new drug treatments, and in turn clinical 
practice, has been impeded. This is partly due to questions concerning the scope and 
applicability of the technology, cost-effectiveness, and clinical utility, along with the diversity 
of regulations concerning DNA sampling utilised in pharmacogenetic studies. Such 
questioning potentially hinders the procurement of robust pharmacogenetic data from required 
international research programmes. Also, a diversity of regulations has materialised to combat 
a host of controversial ethical issues related to the research process and outcomes involving 
human tissue sampling for DNA (i.e. genetic information). These regulations are mainly 
concerned with informed consent and confidentiality issues, despite other ethical issues 
regarding justice being apparent on a societal level. Therefore, this thesis will focus on 
concerns about the lack of standardisation in regulation, and its reliance on the principle of 
respect for autonomy. Arguments presented will examine the basis for the diversity of 
regulations, and will highlight that this diversity is due to the inadequacy of the current 
interpretation of the ethical basis of current research governance (that being the normative 
ethical framework of Principlism). 
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Thesis content 
This thesis will question whether the ethical framework of Principlism underpinning current 
research governance is too broad a theory to deal with specific ethical justice issues for drug 
development involving pharmacogenetics. Arguments presented will be based on the 
following:  
 
1. That there is an overriding deference to the principle of respect for autonomy, as 
seen in the current ethical interpretation of the management of risk. 
2. The principle of justice needs to be specified when applied to genomic concerns. 
Its current non-specificity may be a reason for the over-compensatory application 
of the principle of respect for autonomy.  
3. Current interpretations of Principlism represent moral values that are culturally 
dependent. Pharmacogenetic research outcomes have a global impact, ergo 
Principlism or another moral guidance framework ought to be representative of 
common moral values which are culturally neutral. 
 
These claims will be presented and discussed via the following sub-arguments: 
 
[A1] That the ethical interpretation of the management of risks (the central role of research 
governance) based on Principlism is subject to the presence of value-laden perceptions of risk. 
This is one of the reasons why there are variations of interpretation in approval outcomes by 
the various research governance systems.  
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[A2] Whether an epistemic moral framework based on what should be believed in (due to the 
facts) rather than what ought to be done (as in a normative framework) would be more 
appropriate for pharmacogenetic based drug regulation, due to value-laden risk perceptions.   
 
[A3] That the introduction of genetic information has changed the assessment of risk-benefit 
in pharmacogenetic clinical trials, from one concerned with risks of harm to one of 
uncertainty. I therefore argue that genetic governance seems to be interpreting principles of 
uncertainty (using an epistemic interpretation based on value-laden perceptions of risk). 
 
[A4] That pharmacogenetic testing in drug development is only concerned with drug-related 
genetic variations in genes and not with genes which determine specific diseases, as noted 
with clinical genetic testing. 
 
[A5] The ethical issues that arise from pharmacogenetic interventions in drug development are 
more concerned with the fair distribution of pharmacogenetic outcomes such as drugs, and are 
therefore a matter of justice rather than autonomy. 
 
[A6] The current interpretation of Principlism has given rise to a dogma of protectionism in 
research governance, manifested in the precautionary approach that is currently engaged by 
governance when faced with a new biotechnology. 
 
 
These arguments will be presented as follows in the five main chapters of the thesis: 
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Chapter Two – The role of research ethics 
This chapter will provide background knowledge for the proposed claims of the main 
argument, which considers why Principlism, above other ethical theories, has become the 
ethical theory of choice in research governance. It will address how normative ethical theories 
such as Principlism attend to the question ‘How ought we to conduct our research?’; a 
question which is at the heart of research ethics. An analysis of the normative ethical theories 
employed in research will introduce the main argument of why Principlism has become the 
most dominant form of ethical reasoning in current drug research regulation. It will be argued 
that Principlism’s dominance is due to two main factors. Firstly, its ease of use - the principles 
are general guides which can be applied to most ethical situations; and, secondly, the 
increasing concern for human rights in research. The concept of the common-good will also be 
introduced with regards to drug development. This is defined as the production of 
‘generalisable knowledge’ (Emanuel, Wendler et al. 2000) for the improvement of health, as 
well as increasing the understanding of human biology.  
 
Chapter Three – Research Governance 
The role of research governance in drug development will be analysed, together with the 
underlying reason for the variations in governance that are seen. The analysis will focus on 
whether the introduction of genetic methodologies (such as pharmacogenetics) to the 
assessment of drugs in research has changed the role of research governance in this area. 
Arguments A1, A2 and A3 will be presented in the analysis.  A1 will introduce the argument 
that the ethical interpretation of the management of risk (the central role of research 
governance) is one of the reasons why there are variations of interpretation in approval 
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outcomes by various research governance systems. A2 will analyse whether an epistemic 
moral framework would be more appropriate for drug regulation,  meaning that data should be 
provided which is based on facts, rather than what ought to be done in order for the research to 
be acceptable and appropriate. Furthermore, this argument will be addressed by looking at 
how the role of healthcare governance has been affected by the introduction of genomics2. An 
affect observed and illustrated by the concept of ‘Governmentality’ (Foucault, 1979) . This 
concept was  formulated by the French philosopher Michel Foucault  to note the changes in 
power structures in governance from being a technocratic discipline with little or no input 
from public bodies, to being transparent, involving the public and industry. The concept of 
‘Governmentality’ adequately explains how genomic policies are shaped by industry and 
general public perceptions of genetic information rather than the government, thereby ushering 
in the age of ‘biopolitics’. Lastly, A3 looks at investigations of value-laden risk perceptions as 
derived from A2. This will outline why and to what extent the introduction of genetic 
information has altered the assessment of risk-benefit. Herbert Gottweis’3 (Gottweis 2005a, 
Gottweis 2005b, Gottweis 2005c)   observations will be utilised to illustrate this argument, as 
well as John Rawls’s concept of converging  influential intuitions into a coherent systematic 
set of normative beliefs known as ‘reflective equilibrium’ and its later development of 
‘overlapping consensus’. Concepts first introduced in A Theory of Justice first published in 
1971 (Rawls, 1999) and later developed (mainly as overlapping consensus) in ‘Political 
Liberalism’ (Rawls, 2005), overlapping consensus will be introduced in this chapter as an 
ethical methodology used to show how the language of emotions (of which intuition is one), 
can be successfully integrated into genetic governing policy. 
                                                             
2 Genomics is the study of the DNA of organisms, which includes the field of pharmacogenetics. 
3 Professor of Political Science, University of Vienna. 
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From this discourse, the need to establish a more appropriate normative or non-normative 
ethical framework for pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials will be highlighted by elucidating 
the appropriate moral features for regulatory assessment. 
 
Chapter Four – The Ethical Implications of Pharmacogenetic drug development 
Clarification on the role of pharmacogenetics in the area of drug development will be covered 
in this chapter.  
 
The chapter will first highlight the need for an agreed definition of pharmacogenetics to clarify 
the aims of this biotechnology for the relevant agents, to minimise the misconceptions of its 
role in research. Defence of the requirement for an agreed definition will lead to an analysis of 
what the benefits of pharmacogenetics are to particular agents (such as the patient and 
industry), and, in turn, how this affects research governance. I will also elaborate on the way 
in which pharmacogenetics is employed in the drug development process, particularly in the 
area of the clinical trial (an area of research which utilises human participants). A4 will 
establish the argument that pharmacogenetic testing in drug development is only concerned 
with drug-related genetic variations, and not specific disease genes. In providing clarity on the 
role of this biotechnology as a risk assessment tool with relevance to clinical trials, the actual 
ethical issues will become apparent.  
 
The latter half of the chapter will then focus on the aspects of pharmacogenetics which are 
utilised as risk assessment tools, thus introducing the argument (A5) that the ethical issues that 
would arise from pharmacogenetic interventions in drug development should be concerned 
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more with the fair distribution of pharmacogenetic outcomes.  In my arguments on the actual 
ethical issues, I will note that they are primarily a matter of justice, due to the stratification of 
the research participant population into genetic groups. This argument will be defended by 
developing the argument (A4) introduced earlier on in chapter four, through noting that ethical 
issues should include the equitable distribution of research knowledge and research priorities, 
rather than simply the inference of disease knowledge (as implied by concerns regarding 
informed consent, privacy and confidentiality). Ethical implications in notably well-researched 
areas of pharmacogenetic drug development will be illustrated, in order to provide a defence 
for the main argument of whether Principlism exercised in pharmacogenetic research 
governance provides an adequate ethical underpinning for the resolving of the following 
issues: research prioritisation; division of patients into sub-groups; clinical trials and the 
returning of genetic information. 
 
Lastly, a critique of the current market-driven approach of  patent rights in drug development 
will be undertaken, in order to further illustrate the failings of the current interpretation of 
Principlism. This critique will highlight the fact that these failings have led to inequalities of 
access to pharmacogenetic outcomes among economically diverse nations, and ultimately to 
the individual, (rather than autonomy-based) breaches to research participants. From this 
discourse, a proposal will be made. This is that the ethical implications for pharmacogenetic 
research outcomes are primarily concerned with the inequity of distribution, and so require a 
moral framework which takes into account social responsibility concerned with beneficence 
(the balancing of benefits against risk and costs, or, in other words, solidarity) and justice. 
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Chapter Five – The Application of Principlism in Pharmacogenetic Research Governance  
A review of the evolution of regulatory and ethical guidelines based on the normative ethical 
framework of Principlism will be conducted, prior to analysis of argument A6 (which is 
concerned with the precautionary approach to research governance). The pertinent ethical 
codes and guidelines that are utilised in drug development involving human participants (such 
as the Nuremberg Code, The Declaration of Helsinki, and The Belmont Report) will be 
reviewed. This review will provide background information about how these codes are 
currently employed in the research governance of pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials. It will 
then consider how they have evolved into more specific pharmacogenetic guidelines, such as 
the position paper on the terminology in pharmacogenetics by the Committee for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use (CHMP)(CPMP 2002), and the report ‘Pharmacogenetics: ethical 
issues’ by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2003). A critique 
will be presented on Good Clinical Practice (GCP), the formalised international quality 
standard utilised in drug development research governance. GCP epitomizes the industry’s 
considerations on what ethics is, and how research governance appears to be exercised at an 
ethical level. The review of these guidelines and policy documents will highlight the 
significance of argument A6, which states that the current interpretation of Principlism has 
given rise to a dogma of protectionism in research governance. In addressing this argument, 
Rosalind Rhodes’s article ‘‘Rethinking Research Ethics’ (Rhodes, 2005) will be critiqued, as it 
presents a view of how this dogma has occurred, and puts forth an agreement about the 
existence of protectionist policies in research. However, a counter-argument will be presented 
that notes that her assessment is flawed, particularly in the area of the prioritizing of informed 
consent. It will be noted that such a flawed assessment does not provide clear moral criteria 
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for the ethical conduct of clinical research, but instead creates further confusion about the role 
of autonomy in research ethics. 
 
Chapter Six – Rawls’s ‘Overlapping Consensus’: a possible way forward?  
In this chapter, argument A5 (that the required ethical approach to address ethical breaches 
concerned with justice rather than individual liberty should be based on the fairness and 
distribution concerns evident in pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials) will be defended. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that such an ethical approach should not, in essence, be 
culturally dependant, but should instead subscribe to a ‘minimal morality’ as put forth by 
Tuija Takala4. Defined as an approach which takes into account both reasons and emotions in 
order to formulate regulations that strike some sort of balance between ‘everyone’s sense and 
sensibilities in bioethical decision making (Takala, 2003). My argument will develop into the 
claim that, if such an ethical approach features Rawls’ overlapping consensus (a method that  
seeks to find a balance between considered judgements and intuitions of particular cases, 
providing an approach which enables decision making in a pluralist context with different 
stakeholders who often endorse different or possibly conflicting cultural and moral 
frameworks), then multi-layered regulations required for pharmacogenetic drug development 
will give rise to consistent moral guidance. The global theme of governance’s remit required 
for pharmacogenetic-based drug development will also be continued in this chapter’s 
examination of the need for ethical guidelines that transcend cultural boundaries.  
 
                                                             
4 Professor (Docent) in Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland. 
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The analysis of the argument will primarily be concerned with an overview of how justice is 
applied in healthcare contexts in order to provide a background for how justice is viewed in 
healthcare and, consequently, in clinical research. A critique of the concept of justice will be 
conducted by reviewing the basic requirements and principles that constitute distributive 
justice in order to highlight the definitional framework of this concept. The concepts from 
Susan Cozzens’ work on assessing justice models in science and technology policy will be 
applied, as they emphasize the requirement of achieving ‘the common good’(Cozzens, 2007). 
Furthermore, an evaluation of the utilization of David Thomasma’s established rules 
(Thomasma, 1997b) will be conducted in order to provide worthy moral guidelines when 
setting up a ‘global research ethics framework’. These rules, which are not necessarily 
culturally dependant, take into consideration the pursuit of the ‘common good’ as one of the 
aims of research ethics. Here I argue that the acknowledgement of the common good in 
pharmacogenetics research allows for the production of more effective drug treatments, or 
more insight into treatment options for conditions that seriously impair autonomous and social 
functioning, without unfairly placing the burden of research participation on those who are 
unable to benefit from these knowledge outcomes. Furthermore, I will address how appealing 
to the societal value of research within a socioeconomic context as exampled by Thomas 
Pogge’s Health Impact Fund and the Global Fund  promotes research committed to the 
common good by addressing the issue of research prioritisation as highlighted in chapter four. 
 
My argument will develop into the claim that the principle of justice as fairness as exercised in 
the Rawlsian method of overlapping consensus would provide the appropriate moral guidance 
system for pharmacogenetic ethical issues. I will propose a possible application of the 
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Rawlsian Justice model to pharmacogenetic research governance. This can be done by 
utilising from Rawls’s the principle of justice as fairness and overlapping consensus as a 
coherent systematic framework of normative beliefs (a feature of genetic governance 
discourse as discussed in chapter three) into a proposed procedural–substantive model for 
regulatory policy decision making in pharmacogenetic research governance. Furthermore the 
development of such a moral guidance system into a procedural approach i.e. a method of 
decision-making given unresolved moral disagreements as put forth by Daniels and Sabin 
(Daniels, Sabin 2002) will be defended.  
Discussions on these concepts will highlight the equal primacy of social justice in 
pharmacogenetic research ethics – interpreted as fair distribution of pharmacogenetic research 
outcomes – with that of the principle of respect for autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
This research considers the features required for a universal moral theory, which may be 
multi-layered in approach, and can be applied to the regulation of pharmacogenetic clinical 
trials. By presenting the case that there is room for further harmonisation and clarity of 
regulatory frameworks that govern this technology in terms of the ethical basis of governance, 
this thesis forms the basis for a critical evaluation of whether Principlism alone can still be the 
predominant ethical framework for pharmacogenetic research governance. It is my ultimate 
intention to argue for the ethical evaluation of pharmacogenetic drug development in terms of 
a Justice -based model within recognised ethical parameters, and not just based on choice and 
need.  
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Therefore, recommendations for policy concerned with promoting social responsibility or the 
‘common good’ in pharmacogenetic-based drug development will be proposed, to ensure that 
ethical considerations in pharmacogenetic clinical trial regulation shift their focus from the 
protection of specific groups (such as the research participant), to the function of ensuring that 
research is undertaken with reasonable risks and benefits to the community (global or 
otherwise). Such a recommendation would highlight that an ethical framework that considers 
research participation for the common good makes certain that the benefits of research are 
equally shared amongst populations. This in turn will promote international research 
governance policies of universal worth, which strive to either achieve equality or reduce 
inequality.  
 
Finally, this thesis intends to encourage the regulatory research community to be confident in 
considering the moral value of research outcomes again, instead of falling back into a 
protectionist mode of protecting the vulnerable that has arisen since the mid 1940’s. The 
emergence of an ethical framework focused on ensuring justifiable research outcomes - rather 
than just the protection of the ‘vulnerable’ research participant - will minimise opposition to 
the introduction of this new technology in drug development, especially if the research 
participant is active in assessing the considerations of risk. 
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2. Chapter Two: The Role of Research Ethics in Clinical Research 
2.1 Introduction 
Ethics in research tends to address the fundamental question: ‘How ought we to conduct our 
research?’ to which you might add, in the context of clinical research; ‘in order to ensure the 
interests of society or the researcher do not override those of the individual participating in the 
research’. To address this question, normative ethical theories are appealed to. These are 
theories that prescribe, imply or explain certain standards (norms) of conduct that are 
considered justified or required to ensure research participants are not put at more than 
minimal risk of harm by participating in research. Therefore, the normative ethical theory of 
Principlism will be critiqued in this chapter, especially with regards to how it has become the 
dominant normative ethical framework applied to clinical research. My analysis will centre on 
how this normative theory has become prevalent due to the challenges of applying other 
theories in the clinical research context. Moreover, I will introduce the argument that a 
normative ethical theory for pharmacogenetic-based clinical research should also promote the 
pursuit of ‘the common good’ in research, rather than being concerned solely with providing 
modes of conduct to ensure non-exploitation of the research participant. In this context, the 
‘common good’ refers to the requirement of pharmacogenetic-based clinical research to 
produce ‘generalisable knowledge’ regarding drug responses, with the aim of improving 
health by developing diagnostics for drug response and/or increasing understanding of human 
biology.  
 
Therefore, section 2.2 will provide an analysis of the main ethical approaches that could be 
considered for pharmacogenetic-based clinical research, and will highlight why Principlism is 
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used widely in research governance. The latter will be analysed further in section 2.3. In 
section 2.4, an introduction to the argument for how the pursuit of the common good could be 
considered as important as Principlism in the moral underpinning of pharmacogenetic research 
governance will be scrutinised.  
 
2.2 Research Ethics in Drug Development 
In relation to clinical research (particularly drug development), research ethics has focused on 
safeguarding individuals from either harm or a failure to respect their autonomy. However, 
research ethics is not merely concerned with ensuring individuals are protected from 
exploitation and other forms of harm; it also considers factors external to the study process, 
such as whether a certain piece of research should be conducted in the first place, or what 
should be done with the findings once the research is complete. This part of research ethics 
contemplates the moral and methodological aspects of research that may manifest as tensions. 
This section outlines the main ethical concepts that could be used to alleviate these ‘tensions’, 
focusing on why Principlism has been given prominence in pharmacogenetic-based clinical 
research.  
 
2.2.1 Ethical Tensions 
 
So, what are these ethical tensions and how do they arise? In the context of ethical decision 
making in clinical research, such tensions arise when the exercising of research ethics occurs 
at the expense of the medical care ethic. Since clinical research is similar to medical care in 
that they are both performed by physicians within clinical settings, they often use comparable 
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diagnostic and treatment interventions. Tensions surface due to conflicts surrounding the aims 
of the medical care ethic, which is to promote the well-being of individual patients by 
considering that the potential benefits of diagnostic and therapeutic measures prescribed to 
patients outweigh the risks. This is known as the duty of therapeutic beneficence (Litton, 
Miller 2005), as opposed to the clinical research setting, which may utilise techniques and 
procedures to test scientific hypotheses that sometimes do not aim to benefit the individual 
research participant (Litton, 2006). Therefore, it is unsurprising that tensions emerge when 
physicians act as investigators in clinical research. This is due to the fact that, in an 
investigative capacity, physicians who undertake research do so without knowing if the 
intervention being examined will be beneficial.  
 
The medical care ethic is regarded as the ‘goal’ of a physician who aims to provide the best 
medical care for individual patients. Such a goal is governed by the ethical principles of 
respect for well-being; namely, beneficence (the ethical duty to promote the health of patients 
or at least provide palliative treatment), and non-maleficence (the ethical duty to cause no 
harm based on the ‘Hippocratic Oath’). Both principles provide ethical justification for the 
medical risk to which a patient is exposed by rationalising the prospect of compensating 
medical benefits (Rhodes, 2005). However, it has been noted that strict adherence to the 
medical care ethic would make research impossible. This is because interventions in research 
would be considered prohibitive, as the risks posed to subjects are not outweighed by the 
benefits to them individually (Litton, Miller 2005; Rhodes, 2005, p.21). Therefore, in order to 
enable the physician (as an investigator) to overcome tensions regarding the ethical principle 
of respect for well-being in the context of clinical research, or the presumed difficulty of 
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exercising beneficence within the clinical research setting (Miller, Brody 2003), the physician 
is required to be in a state of equipoise or clinical equipoise. This is a state of genuine 
uncertainty, expressed by the physician, as to whether one treatment option in a clinical trial is 
superior in order to avoid violating his/her therapeutic obligation to the patient as a research 
participant. Therefore, the following ethical considerations for research protocols have been 
established to ensure research adheres to an ethical framework (in this case, Principlism), 
regardless of whether or not the therapeutic obligation (as the duty of therapeutic beneficence 
is sometimes referred to) is upheld:  
 
1. Have ‘social, scientific or clinical value’ that justifies exposing subjects to potential 
harm. 
2. Must have scientific validity - the research must be methodologically rigorous. 
3. Must select participants fairly, on the basis of scientific objectives and not, for 
example, because of vulnerability or privilege. 
4. Must minimise the risks to individual participants, and yield potential benefits to those 
participants and/or society that outweigh or are proportionate to the risks. 
5. Must be reviewed and approved prospectively by a committee of independent and 
qualified evaluators. 
6. Must be conditioned, to the greatest possible extent, on the voluntary and informed 
consent of participating subjects. 
7. Must ensure enrolled participants are shown respect, which includes protecting their 
privacy, monitoring their well-being and providing opportunities to withdraw from the 
research project (Litton, Miller 2005). 
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The framework outlined above is based on the ethical principles established in the Declaration 
of Helsinki (practical interpretation of Principlism) in relation to the rights, safety and well-
being of patients. More information on how this framework (as the minimal risk standard) and 
the Declaration are employed will be provided respectively in chapters three and five. This 
framework is generally considered necessary and sufficient by regulatory bodies for making 
clinical research ethical (Emanuel, Wendler et al. 2000), and is further enshrined in GCP 
(Good Clinical Practice) guidelines, which are the pharmaceutical industry’s practical 
interpretations of ethical guidelines. Furthermore, the framework’s requirements are regarded 
as universal, albeit with a caveat that they must adapt to health, economic, cultural and societal 
conditions, as well as the technological conditions in which clinical research is conducted 
(Emanuel, Wendler et al. 2000, p.2072). However, in spite of this, I argue in chapter three that 
in the context of pharmacogenetics-based clinical research, this framework is not workable 
when it comes to considerations on subject selection, informed consent and privacy (as noted 
in points 3, 6 and 7). Since this framework does not provide explicit guidelines for dealing 
with the interdependent qualities of pharmacogenetic information, which focus on the 
distribution of research knowledge and research prioritisation and are a matter of the principle 
of justice, and become apparent as a result of the stratification of research participants into 
genetic groups. Rather, the framework provides explicit guidelines for ethical issues 
surrounding privacy, confidentiality and discrimination. These are concerns of the principle of 
respect for autonomy, which I will argue in chapter four as important considerations for 
instances in which pharmacogenetics is used as a tool for disease susceptibility. To which I 
will highlight that, in drug development, pharmacogenetics is used as a risk assessment tool 
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(as a diagnostic aid), thereby providing information directly related to a participant’s likely 
response to a specific medicine, and not the presence of a disease.  
 
2.2.2 Main Ethical Concepts 
 
Ethical theories provide the basis for justifying specific ethical decisions, such as the pursuit 
of the common good, which will be argued later in this chapter as an ethical decision that 
should be at the forefront of pharmacogenetic research ethical decision making. Moreover, 
ethical theories are helpful in practical situations, such as the aforementioned ‘tensions’ and 
when faced with difficult issues; in these circumstances, it can be helpful to review the issue in 
light of various ethical theories. Allowing for the application of an ethical theory to an ethical 
issue is a helpful means of creating a framework of justifications for decisions and actions 
made in light of these theories, and is preferable to using a step-by-step procedure or formula 
(as in an algorithmic approach). In the next section, I argue that this approach has been 
observed in the application of Principlism. Suffice to say, ethical theories in research ethics do 
not rely on a scientific justification basis in application. 
 
As mentioned previously, the main ethical approaches in clinical research (which have been 
appealed to for the ethical justification of decision making) tend to be based around normative 
ethics. These ethical theories involve arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong 
conduct. The most predominant ethical theories in clinical research are either consequentialist, 
duty-based or principle-based theories. I will now provide a brief outline to support why 
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Principlism – a principle-based theory - has become the theory of choice in pharmacogenetic 
research governance. 
 
Consequentialist Theories  
 
Consequentialism is a collection of moral theories, of which utilitarianism is the most 
important in research ethics. Central to consequentialism is the idea that the morally right 
action is that with the best foreseeable consequences. In other words, an action is right only if 
it promotes the best consequences. 
 
Under utilitarianism, our actions should maximise utility (defined in terms of happiness, 
maximization of goods valued by rational persons or preference satisfaction) for the greatest 
number of people. Utilitarianism also values actions based upon utility-maximizing 
consequences (Loue 2000, p.61). It is a ‘person-neutral’ theory of ethics, whereby an agent’s 
own happiness counts for no more (and no less) than that for any other person. Therefore, this 
theory is neither self-centred nor bound by self-interest. Consequently, research under 
utilitarian ethics is considered justified if there is a strong likelihood that it would contribute to 
improvements in the human condition, either as research participants or future patients. 
However, a criticism of this type of thinking is that it may not always be possible to quantify 
risks or benefits in such a clear-cut manner, in order to determine whether or not a project 
should proceed (given ethical or  regulatory approval) (Schüklenk 2005, p.6). This is because 
it is not possible to measure the key components of utilitarianism, such as happiness and 
preference-satisfaction (or similar), in a single measure. Moreover, it has been argued that 
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utilitarianism appears to condone immoral acts if they maximise utility; therefore, greater 
importance is placed on outcomes, rather than intentions, in the ethical evaluation of actions. 
An example of this is the continuation of a high-risk trial, which has been denied ethical 
approval, but succeeded in demonstrating a correct hypothesis that resulted in the production 
of quality of life, health-improving or life-saving drugs (Loue 2000, p.63). 
 
Duty-based Theories 
 
Duty-based moral theories, which are sometimes called ‘deontological’ (from the Greek deon, 
meaning duty), are ethical theories that focus on duties, rather than consequences, in relation 
to ethics. Central to these theories is the belief that there are certain acts which are wrong in 
themselves, regardless of their foreseeable consequences. Actions are considered to be right 
not by looking at consequences, but by exploring the nature of the actions. For example, one 
duty might be that we must not lie to one another. In deontological thinking, it may be wrong 
to tell a lie even if the consequences of doing so would yield a better outcome compared with 
the consequences of telling the truth. 
 
For deontological theories to be practical, the morally-relevant duties must be specified in 
such a way that: 
 
‘…we should be able to derive a set of absolute duties by way of utilising pure reason. The 
motive for our action matters: it should always be that we want to act ethically and that we act 
the way we act, because it is our moral duty to do so…’(Schüklenk 2005, p.5) 
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Therefore, duties that are specified are phrased or cited as acts; such as, not lying, not 
violating various rights, (like the right not to be killed, injured, or coerced) and not imposing 
certain sacrifices on someone as a means to an end. 
 
The German enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant introduced the duty-based ethical 
theory, and developed maxims to tell us what we ought to do. The categorical imperative is 
central to Kant’s moral philosophy. This is an absolute non-negotiable rule (as agreed by a 
hypothetical community of rational people), which transforms a rule into a moral rule. The 
Categorical Imperative was postulated in three different ways, known as maxims. The first 
maxim noted that a moral principle has to be a principle for all. The second maxim stresses the 
liberal principle that people should not have their individual freedom compromised for some 
other end, particularly for the good of society. In other words:  
 
‘…do not treat other people as mere means to your ends…’ 
(Korsgaard, 1992) 
In this maxim, the word ‘mere’ is crucial because, in many everyday transactions, we use 
others as a means to our own ends; for example, we use doctors as a means of restoring our 
health. What is meant by using someone as mere means is trying to get him or her to do things 
for our own purposes, which they would not choose to do if they were fully informed. We do 
not manipulate the doctor if they are carrying out their job voluntarily, but it is possible to 
manipulate others by deceiving them, which is one aspect the maxim tells us we must not do. 
Lastly, the third maxim, which notes that we must always treat any other person ‘to your 
ends’, is more obscure; what does it mean to say we should treat someone ‘to your ends’? A 
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modern Kantian interpretation is that we should not merely respect others as rational persons 
with aims and purposes of their own, but that we should also make some attempt to help others 
to achieve some of those aims (Green, 2001). In clinical research, such a maxim provides the 
ethical basis for obtaining informed consent, the process where competent research 
participants agree voluntarily to take part in a research project once they are provided with 
sufficient information, including the risks and benefits of the research project. Therefore, the 
research participant has a stake in the research objectives, and is not being utilised solely for 
the researcher’s purposes (Schüklenk 2005, p.5).  
 
A modern interpretation of an aspect of deontology, which I will argue to be of prime 
importance with regards to the research participant, is demonstrated in John Rawls’s A Theory 
of Justice (Rawls, 1999). His theory was an account of distributive justice (how money and 
goods should be distributed between people in a society), formulated by considering which 
society we would choose behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (see section 6.3.3). In other words, the 
derivation of ethical principles by rational persons who had no information about the 
particular person or persons they represented. Rather, they make choices based on their goals 
and preferences. Conversely, Kant determined his ethics by considering what rational people 
would consistently choose, regardless of their individual desires, preferences or goals. I will 
discuss Rawls’s account of distributive justice later on in the thesis, and demonstrate how it 
can work in combination with Principlism to provide a more robust ethical underpinning for 
pharmacogenetic research governance. 
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Principle-based Ethics 
 
Utilitarianism and duty-based ethics are abstract moral theories, and in resolving ethical 
issues, it is not always necessary to consider moral theory at that level of abstraction. 
Therefore, a number of principles pertinent to many situations in medicine, and endorsed as 
important in the noted moral theories, have been identified and applied when there is an 
ethical problem. The most notable principlist ethical framework is that of Tom Beauchamp 
and James Childress, whose book ‘Principles of Biomedical Ethics’ (Beauchamp, Childress 
2009) first appeared in 1979. This has been refined and reworked continually over the years in 
response to objections, so that it is now inclusive of features of the moral world that it had, 
initially, ignored. This resulted in an influential principle-based theory designed to help clarify 
key moral issues. Central to this theory is the existence of governing principles that declare 
obligations. The four principles identified are: respect for patient autonomy; beneficence (the 
promotion of what is best for the patient); non-maleficence; and justice. Principlism is the 
term often used to refer to the theory of four standard, or prima facie, principles. Prima facie 
moral duties ‘at first sight’ (duties which are understood by reference to what we should do if 
no other such duties were present) were introduced by W D Ross (Snare, 1974). Ross noted 
that in any specific situation where there is a clash between different duties, we must decide in 
light of the circumstances whether it is morally more important to follow one duty or another; 
this is a matter of judgement. There is no ranking of duties, and the truth of a moral principle 
or duty is known by understanding and thinking about the principle in relation to a particular 
situation. Furthermore, our moral intuitions assist us in recognising the prima facie duties 
(Snare, 1974), and ethical conflicts are seen to arise when two such duties come into conflict. 
For example, what should one do if the only way not to betray someone is by lying? To 
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address this conflicting situation, one must distinguish between actual moral duty and prima 
facie. Therefore, prima facie principles can be overridden by other, weightier, competing 
concerns. In other words, they are not absolute.  
 
Thus, ethical theories provide the basis for justifying specific ethical decisions. For clinical 
research, the ethical theories that are appealed to are more practical principle-based theories, 
such as Principlism, since these theories are not abstract and are ‘easy to use’. However, it has 
been identified that the central focus of these theories is to ensure the interests of society, or 
the enthusiasm of the researcher, do not override those of the individual. This core focus has 
existed to the detriment of appealing to the common good in the application of the new 
technology of pharmacogenetics in clinical trials. In the final section of this chapter, I will 
introduce the argument that the requirement of appealing to the common good is as important 
as ensuring the safety of research participants. But first, more detail will be provided on how 
and why Principlism became the most dominant form of ethical reasoning in clinical research. 
 
2.3 Research Ethics and Principlism 
Modern research ethics were borne out of recognition of the core principles centred around the 
priority of individual rights and welfare over society’s interest in pursuing medical knowledge 
(Kimmelman, 2005); namely, the prima facie principles of Principlism. In this thesis, the 
theory of Principlism (as according to Beauchamp and Childress) will be outlined in order to 
highlight some of its shortcomings in its current interpretation as the research ethics theory for 
the governance of pharmacogenetics-based clinical research.  
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Principlism is noted as a set of considered judgements on universal morality in healthcare 
(Beauchamp, Childress 2009, p.25). In this, universal morality is a collection of very general 
norms to which everyone who is committed to morality subscribes (Herissone-Kelly, 2011). In 
the setting of clinical trials involving human participants, these considered judgements or core 
principles emphasise respect (of autonomy) for a person to choose whether or not to 
participate. These principles also stress the importance of beneficence (the acknowledgment 
and acceptance of the constraints and potential risks by participants), and justice, that some 
vulnerable persons should not be considered as a participant for a trial unless under strict 
conditions to protect them (Salek 2002, p.72). Derived from the principled approach of the 
Nuremberg Code and Belmont Report, and further developed by the Declaration of Helsinki 
(Loue 1999, p.58) (all of which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five), Principlism 
was one of the first contemporary attempts to ground a method of bioethical decision-making 
in something other than an abstract moral theory. The idea was that, despite disagreement 
about moral and religious theories, we could all agree on certain principles. All one had to do 
was identify the ‘universal morality’, and extract a set of middle level principles. Universal 
morality is not a singular morality, but a set of standards of action or rules of obligation that 
are applicable to all persons in all places. These standards judge human conduct (Beauchamp, 
Childress 2009). Examples of these universal norms include: do not kill; tell the truth; and do 
not steal. Furthermore, the notion of international human rights has been noted as an example 
of a universal norm. 
 
Principlism was one of the first notions of morality without a theory (i.e. a theory or method of 
resolving bioethical issues without relying on a foundational moral theory), and intends to 
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provide general rules or recommendations to a number of specific cases, based on ‘what is the 
right action’ in any particular medical situation. It is not the only moral framework available 
for such a purpose, but it is one that clearly addresses the individual (Thomson 1999, p.123); 
i.e. rights-based morality.  
 
Rights-based morality has increased in consideration since World War Two, due to the 
enhanced concern for human rights. Moreover, alongside rapid advances in technology, there 
has also been an increase in the rejection of the attitude that healthcare providers have sole 
authority over healthcare provision. This has impacted more noticeably on the lives of those in 
Western society and has resulted in notions of personal autonomy, as reflected in Principlism. 
However, as clinical research and practice continue to develop (as in the case of 
pharmacogenetic drug development), it must be recognised that an unreflective approach to 
Principlism (an approach that accepts the principles as a given without inquiring into the 
deeper reasoning and theories that ground them) may be unable to cope with or identify 
complex and unknown future ethical problems. 
 
Principlism was first identified by the Belmont report, which noted three basic principles, 
identified as 
 
…general judgements that serve as a basic justification for the many particular ethical 
prescriptions and evaluations of human action… 
 (Jonsen, Veatch et al. 2000).  
The principles identified were:  
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 Respect for persons - ‘The principle…divides into two separate moral requirements [1] the 
requirement to acknowledge autonomy, and [2] the requirement to protect those with 
diminished autonomy’ 
 Beneficence - expressed as two general rules of beneficent actions; ‘[1] do not harm; and 
[2] maximise possible benefits and minimise possible harms.’  
 Justice – ‘…equals ought to be treated equally’.  
(Beauchamp, Childress 2009) 
 
Since the Belmont report, Principlism has been further developed into a ‘four principle 
approach’, particularly by Beauchamp and Childress in the USA, whose account of 
Principlism is the most utilised ethical framework for clinical trial ethical regulation. 
 
Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles are: 
 Respect for Autonomy - ‘…a norm of respecting the decision-making capacities of 
autonomous persons…’ 
 Non-maleficence – ‘…a norm of avoiding the causation of harm…’ 
 Beneficence – ‘…a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing benefits against 
risks and costs…’ 
 Justice – ‘…a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks and costs fairly…’ 
 
These principles aim to act as general guides for healthcare professionals facing ethical issues 
when treating their patients. These general guides, from which specific rules or judgements 
can be made, are derived from a universal morality (rather than having a philosophical or 
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theoretical derivation). The notion of a universal morality has yielded a number of criticisms 
with regards to the universality of the framework, which has been described as ‘distinctly 
American in character’ (Holm, 1995). Furthermore, Soren Holm5 goes on to state: 
 
‘…it should come as no surprise  that the content of this theory will be influenced by its basic 
premises, and therefore influenced by the morality and culture of the society from which it 
originates…’(Holm 1995, op cit 31) 
 
It should be noted that the premise of the four-principles approach is based on shared morality 
in a specific society, and that these ‘specific societal premises’ make light of the claim of the 
four-principles approach as a universal morality theory. This raises the question that, in order 
to establish a universal morality theory, an internal set of norms must be evident that are 
considered acceptable cross-culturally. This has not been apparent for the principles of respect 
for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, which have been criticised as being 
too individualistic, rights focused, rationalistic and narrow in their understanding of religious 
and cultural frameworks, in addition to not being globally acceptable (Herisson-Kelly 2003,  
p.76; Clouser, Gert 1990). For example, the principle of beneficence is:   
 
‘…only operative if it can be discharged without significant risk…’ 
(Holm 1995, p.334) 
This implies that in order to act beneficently, we are requesting: 
 ‘…something which is beyond the capability of most moral agents…’ 
                                                             
5 Professor of Bioethics , The University of  Manchester 
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(Holm 1995, p.334)  
Therefore, to act beneficently, one must note that an element of self-sacrifice is required. This 
is considered an unpopular undertaking for our individualistic, rights-based society. 
Furthermore, the principle of respect for autonomy (again, regarded as ‘universal’) is actually 
not found in Buddhist cultures, due to this philosophy’s metaphysical assertion of ‘non-self’. 
In Western culture, we understand autonomy as freedom6 or self-determination; that is, 
determination by one's self. However, in Buddhist cultures, if there is no conception of ‘self’ 
then freedom needs to be understood differently. They note that the greatest freedom comes 
from losing self-preoccupation and assuming responsibility for all things; not only immediate 
family, but also the community and beyond. This does not mean that the four principles or 
ethical principles per se must be consistent with the religious perspective of the country in 
which the research will be conducted, but it should acknowledge those features of existence 
and culture that unite human beings, without overruling the very real differences. Features that 
are not necessarily culturally dependent but are inherent in the global ethics framework 
developed by David Thomasma7, which, I argue in chapter 6, should be considered for 
pharmacogenetic research governance. Since this ethical framework maintains the 
considerations of the pursuit of the ‘common good’ as one of the aims of research ethics. 
 
                                                             
6 Freedom is a crucial issue for the sense-of-self because it understands the basic problem of a lack of autonomy. 
Throughout the ages, Western civilisation has pursued questions of free will and liberty, to the extent that the 
pursuit of freedom might be considered a dominant myth of modernity. For example, starting with the Greek 
"emancipation" of reason from myth, then since the Renaissance, there has been progressive religious freedom 
(the Reformation), then political freedom (the English, American, French revolutions), followed by economic 
freedom (the class struggle), racial and colonial freedom, and most recently sexual and psychological freedom 
(psychotherapy, feminism, gay rights, deconstruction as textual liberation, etc.). Each of these endeavours has 
succeeded each other for the ultimate stake inherent in all of the right of the self to determine itself. Excerpt taken 
from Loy, David. 1993. "Indra's post-modern net."(Loy 1993)  
7 Editor Emeritus Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics 
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Prima facie principles (developed by Ross and mentioned in section 2.2) refer to how a 
principle is binding unless it conflicts with another moral principle (Beauchamp, Childress 
2009, p.33). An example of the prima facie nature of principles is observed in a situation 
where research is permitted on anonymous human tissue. Such tissue may have been stored 
for some time, and the link between identifying the donor and stored material is often non-
existent. The tissue could be a by-product of surgical interventions (e.g. frozen serum), used 
without the individual’s consent (an application of respect for autonomy). The principle of 
respect for autonomy is overridden by the principle of beneficence, where the research in 
question benefits other patients8.  
 
It is understood that if the principles are interpreted and weighed sensibly, they provide an 
adequate response to all major bioethical concerns anywhere in the world (Takala, Häyry 
2007). However, there is a problem with this perception of prima facie, which has given rise 
to the criticism that the four principles lack ‘…explicit decision rules…’(Holm, 1995), since 
they are interpreted in different ways. A criticism further noted by Raanan Gillon9 is as 
follows:  
 
 ‘…Here we can all agree, for the approach has never claimed to provide such a decision 
mechanism, and some sort of justifiable decision procedures are badly needed…’ 
(Gillon, 1995)  
 
                                                             
8 However, this does not apply to genomics research, where the samples have not been completely anonymised, 
and can, therefore, be traced back to the patient. 
9 Emeritus Professor of Medical Ethics at Imperial College, London 
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Beauchamp and Childress agree with these criticisms, but go on to argue that no successful 
theory exists that can provide such a decision procedure. Moreover, they further note that,  
 
‘…we see disunity, conflict, and moral ambiguity as pervasive aspects of the moral life. 
Untidiness, complexity, and conflict are unfortunate features of communal living, but a theory 
of morality cannot be faulted for a realistic appraisal of them…’  
(Beauchamp, Childress 2009, p.107). 
 
The universal morality of the principles are described by Gillon as:  
 
‘…a common set of moral commitments, a common moral language and a common set of 
moral issues…’(Gillon 1994)  
 
This was adopted by Beauchamp and Childress, and incorporated into later editions of the 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics. There was also the concern that, by taking these four 
principles collectively, we might account for any dilemmas encountered by a healthcare 
professional. However, as a result of the criticisms levelled at the principles, Beauchamp and 
Childress introduced the processes of specification and balancing to enable the principles to be 
more applicable to practical situations.  
 
Specification was introduced as a method of resolving conflict between the principles, as 
Beauchamp and Childress noted that  
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…when moral conflicts occur, specification supplies an (ideal) of repeated coherence testing 
and modification of a principle or rule until the conflict is specified away… 
 (Beauchamp, Childress 2009, p.32) 
 
In other words, this involves specifying a principle in such a way that only one principle can 
be applied to a particular situation; thereby resolving any potential conflict. Indeed, Paul van 
Diest, a Professor of Ontological Pathology, argues that the principle of ‘solidarity’ 
(beneficence) is more important than the right of self-determination (respect for autonomy) 
over discarded material (van Diest 2002, p.648).  
 
Therefore, for specification to occur, it needs to be justified and not based on arbitrary or 
biased principles. Beauchamp and Childress note that specifications are justified:  
 
‘…only if it is more coherent with the whole set of relevant norms than any other available 
specification…’ (Beauchamp, Childress 2009, p.31).  
 
However, when specification fails to resolve conflicts between principles, the balancing of 
norms is employed. 
 
Balancing is the overriding of one principle or norm by another, and is similar to  
Ross’s account of prima facie obligation; that the principles are binding unless overridden by 
competing obligations. This implies that we have to apply balancing on a case-by-case basis in 
order to decide which principle is the most important.  
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As with specification, balancing is controversial, as noted by Beauchamp and Childress:  
 
‘… [Balancing] is a process of justification only if adequate reasons are presented …’ 
(Beauchamp, Childress 2009, p.34) 
 
They highlight that the following conditions must be met to justify the overriding of one 
principle by another, thus reducing the amount of intuition involved in the decision-making 
process: 
1. Better reasons can be offered for acting on the overriding norm than the infringed 
norm. 
2. The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of achievement. 
3. No morally preferable alternative actions can be substituted. 
4. The form of infringement selected is the least possible, commensurate with achieving 
the primary goal of the action. 
5. The agent seeks to minimise the negative effects of the infringement. (Beauchamp, 
Childress 2009, p.39) 
 
Yet, the process of overriding and balancing will not be able to determine which moral norm 
is overriding in some cases; consequently, intuitive judgements and subjective weightings are 
unavoidable.  
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The specification and balancing of the four principles substantiates the use of moral intuitions 
in Principlism as a function of ‘intuitive apprehension and intuitive reflection’ (Quante, 2002); 
basically, this is a way of qualifying the intuitions or ‘considered judgments (Beauchamp, 
Childress 2009, p.20). This highlights the argument that principled ethical reasoning is based 
‘upon an a-rational core’ (Tomlinson, 1998), an appeal to ‘moral common sense’ (Tomlinson 
1998), and a methodology that delivers different intuitions due to the subjective nature of 
‘common sense’. In other words, judgements are balanced based on intuition, such as 
subjective reasoning (which is based on mere feeling), a feature prevalent in genomics 
research governance. This substantiates the realisation of the presence of mental dispositions 
in regulatory decision-making, especially in genomics research governance a point to which I 
will argue further in chapter three. 
 
The way in which the balancing and specification of the four principles is applied to 
pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials is illustrated by the case of population biobanks, which 
hold research participants’ genetic information. Here, the concept of the research participant as 
genetic information tests the focus of the person as a separate identity ‘whose interests - and 
records - can neatly be separated from those of their families’ (Kaveny, 1999), due to the fact 
that some genetic information by nature is shared. The well-established principles of non-
maleficence and beneficence are put into conflicting situations when returning genetic 
research results to participants. It is perceived that deciphering the genetic code may pose the 
risk of eroding a participant’s privacy. For example, some variants of the genetic code that 
predicts drug responses may also be a marker of disease predisposition (e.g. the apolipoprotein 
E4 allele, known to influence responses to cholesterol-lowering drugs (statins) are also 
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associated with an increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease). If such information were to fall into 
the hands of employers or insurance companies (and this is possible, since the debate 
continues about whether these parties should be given rights to assess genetic data), 
stigmatisation of the participant could occur. However, such fears can be more or less laid to 
rest due to regulations in the US, specified by the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act 
2008(US Congress, 2008). This legislation prohibits the use of genetic information by insurers 
or employers. The European Union took similar steps towards regulation in 2003, with the 
policy document Genetic information and testing in insurance and employment; technical, 
social, and ethical issues by the European Society of Human Genetics (Godard, Raeburn et al. 
2003). However, no formal law has been passed to date. In such situations where public policy 
positions in Europe and the US are based on the balancing of principles, it is an assertion of 
‘moral common sense’, which is employed, providing subjective reasoning for ethical 
dilemmas. Nevertheless, such an approach to taking feelings into account in bioethical 
decision making, has been proposed by Tuija Takala10, who supports the argument that 
bioethics should consider both reasons and emotions in order to formulate regulations that 
strike a balance between ‘everyone’s sense and sensibilities (Takala, 2003). Takala calls this 
setting a ‘minimal morality’, which can be accepted in a pluralistic society. What this 
‘minimal morality’ could comprise remains to be seen, but the principles of respect for healing 
and respect of dominion (the non-objectification of matter and persons to such an extent that 
both become objects for manipulation) as advocated by David Thomasma11 and featured as 
part of the basis of his global ethical framework would be a good starting point (Thomasma, 
1997) and will be critiqued further in chapter six.  
                                                             
10 Professor (Docent) in Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland. 
11 Editor Emeritus Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics 
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Principlism, the ethical ‘theory’ of choice in current clinical research ethics, derives from the 
abstract moral theories of consequentialism, and duty-based moral theories. Its ease of use is 
due to the approach of the principles as general guides, which can be applied to most ethical 
situations. The introduction and employment of aspects of specification and balancing help 
make this theory more malleable. Principlism has proved popular as a rights-based morality 
framework due to increased concern for human rights. In the healthcare setting, such concern 
is represented by the informed consent process (the practical application of the principle 
respect for autonomy). This principle has become an indelible component of medical ethics, 
dictating the appropriateness of the conduct of health care professionals towards their patients. 
Furthermore, respect for autonomy has emerged as the guiding principle in current ethical 
discourse, and its normative and emotional appeal now goes largely unquestioned, apart from 
the criticism of the questionable universal appeal of this ethical principle. The significance of 
this view of autonomy has been reflected equally in law and regulation with regards to the 
research participant. In later chapters, I will argue that this has presented a dogma of 
protectionism in policies towards research participants, rendering other issues of ethical 
assessment within research as secondary, such as justice, efficacy, risk, and considerations of 
performing clinical trials for the common good. This argument will be addressed further in 
chapter five, in relation to how Principlism is currently applied to pharmacogenetic research 
governance. However, the main focus of the thesis will be concerned with whether Principlism 
in its current interpreted form is adequate or requires further detailed specification of its 
principles to resolve ethical issues that arise in pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials.  
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2.4 The Common Good 
One must note that the goal of clinical research is to answer a scientific question, with the aim 
of producing ‘generalisable knowledge’ for the improvement of health, and to increase 
understanding of human biology (Emanuel, Wendler et al. 2000). This is known as the 
common good. I argue that pursuing the common good in this context is also an important 
normative justification factor in pharmacogenetic research. Pharmacogenetic outcomes, such 
as drugs and genetic information, are public goods, and are not the preserve of the individual 
[research participant]. However, in order to secure such knowledge and outcomes, research 
participants are often placed at risk of harm for the benefit of others. Furthermore, clinical 
research has the potential to exploit research participants, since they can be perceived 
inevitably as being ‘used’. However, this ‘use’ and risk of harm can be accepted if ethical 
requirements for clinical research aim to minimise the possibility of exploitation, by ensuring 
that research participants are not being used without their knowledge and consent, whilst they 
contribute to the common good. Furthermore, such ‘use’ is regarded as acceptable if research 
participants have a realistic opportunity to derive direct benefits from the outcome of the 
research projects in which they are involved (De Castro, Sy 2001). Therefore, in addressing 
how the common good in clinical research can be served, one also needs to discuss how the 
ethical requirement of non-exploitation of research participants can still be adhered to. 
 
There are four basic notions of the term ‘common good’ (Sulmasy, 2001): aggregative 
common good; the common common good; the supersessive common good; and the integral 
common good. The aggregative common good is the aggregate sum of all the goods of all the 
individuals in the social unit. It is aggregative because it sums up the individual goods and is 
  
 
46 
 
popular in cost-effective analysis. The common common good refers to goods we hold in 
common, such as air and water. The supersessive common good is believed to override all of 
the individuals who constitute the community, where the individual good of a few people 
becomes the common good of all, such as in an oligarchy or junta. Finally, the integral 
common good is the kind of good that comes explicitly from mutual human interaction and 
cannot be divided into equally aggregative parts. This is considered the most traditional sense 
of the common good where being in a community of relationships with other human beings is 
a good in itself, and the adoption of this notion of the common good into pharmacogenetic 
research governance will be argued in this thesis. 
  
The integral common good, herein known as the ‘common good’, is concerned primarily with 
the needs and interests of society as a whole, rather than only individual persons, their 
interests, or their needs. It is not the sum of individual goods, but rather a good worth pursuing 
in its own right. It is bound by the individual good rather than against it, since the individual 
usually flourishes in the context of a healthy wider community (Peterson-Iyer 2008, p.46). 
Such an interpretation of the common good is communitarian12 in outlook, in which 
individuals are a part of communities and this creates commitments. These are embedded in a 
multitude of social bonds and dependencies. Individuals can still pursue their own interests, 
but only in light of contributing to the realisation of the common good (Hoedemaekers, 
Gordijn et al. 2006). 
 
                                                             
12 Communitarianism is a social philosophy that maintains that society should articulate what is good (Etzioni 
2006). 
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In healthcare, the common good follows this communitarian definition, since it focuses on 
members of the larger community, rather than individual choice. An example of the common 
good under this interpretation would be guaranteed universal access to basic healthcare. In the 
context of pharmacogenetics research, which focuses on developing diagnostics for drug 
response or individually-customised drugs, the research participant contributes to the research 
project by contributing their data, not only for gain of  better treatment outcomes for 
themselves as individuals, but collectively for their genotype or ‘genetic community’. 
Moreover, due to the research leading to more effective diagnostics and drug interventions, 
this reduces the number of diseased persons and benefits society in terms of savings in 
healthcare costs. Furthermore, the common good can be served in the development of new or 
more effective drug treatments for diseases that seriously impair individual autonomous and 
social functions, such as Alzheimer’s disease or Malaria. This could not be the case for 
clinical research, on the other hand (whether it may or may not involve pharmacogenetic 
information), which focuses on performance enhancement, or conditions with only a minor 
disease burden.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The role of current research ethics in clinical research is to ensure ethical standards are 
maintained, by providing justified norms of conduct on what ought to be done. Furthermore, I 
also note that for pharmacogenetics-based clinical trials, this role should also extend to what 
ought to be done to pursue the common good in research.  
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The ethical theories that are appealed to for the justification of ethical decisions in clinical 
research are the more practical, principle-based theories, such as Principlism, which has 
become the most dominant form of ethical reasoning in current drug research regulation. This 
is due to Principlism’s ease of use - that of an approach of the principles as general guides 
which can be applicable to most ethical situations.  
 
In the next chapter, I will look at how Principlism is applied through the vehicle of research 
governance in drug development. The focus of the chapter will be on the main thesis question 
of whether the principles can be effective in resolving ethical issues that arise in clinical trials 
involving genetic information.  
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3. Chapter Three: Research Governance  
3.1 Introduction 
While the previous chapter established the reasons why Principlism is used widely in research 
governance, this thesis will now turn to explore what research governance for 
pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials actually comprises. The main focus of the argument will 
be on whether the current precautionary approach of governance is appropriate for such 
clinical trials.  
 
Research governance is the mechanism of regulation in research. It ensures the accountability 
of assured systems of administration and supervision which manage healthcare research 
programs (Shaw, Boynton et al. 2005). Governance is not the responsibility of any single 
institution or individual, but rather a system of supervision and administration exercised at 
regional, national and international levels. For example, in the European Union (EU), 
governance provides codes of practice, national and European law, alongside professional 
standards and values. For the UK, research governance is provided by the Research 
Governance Framework (RGF) (Department of Health, 2005), which is based on the EU 
Directive on Good Clinical Practice (2005/28/EC) (EMEA, 2005), and incorporates 
requirements of the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (UK 
Government, 2004) (MHRA, 2010b). The latter regulation controls how research is conducted 
to ensure the safety and efficacy of a medicinal product for human participants.  
Furthermore, the RGF sets out the responsibilities of individuals and organisations involved in 
research, including researchers, research ethics committees, local authorities, and 
pharmaceutical and other industries.  
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In many countries, different research governance systems have been established, with varying 
remits and agendas based on their specific social, healthcare and research environments. This 
has given rise to professional codes and guidance, which vary widely within and across 
countries. These variations have caused problems, such as delays in setting up clinical trials 
for participating countries following a common protocol, for example. Furthermore, these 
distinctions in national governance of research protocols have been found to have the potential 
to stifle the emergence of innovative technologies (Halffman, 2005), (Epstein,2008) . 
 
The sections of this chapter will address the underlying reasons for differences in governance, 
as well as the expectations of research governance in traditional drug development. I will also 
explore whether this changes once pharmacogenetics is introduced. The thesis will argue that 
variation in research governance is due to the ethical interpretation of the management of risk 
– the central role of research governance - and this will be discussed in section 3.2. This 
section will establish the concept of governance in healthcare, and how governance has a 
precautionary nature in managing the concept of risk with particular regard to drug 
development. Section 3.3 will examine further how governance is employed in a precautionary 
approach to research, which one could argue is not appropriate for pharmacogenetic clinical 
trials. In section 3.4, I will argue how the landscape of governance has changed with the 
introduction of genomics in drug development, from being one concerned with the language of 
scientific evaluation (that is, of risk evaluation) and precaution, to being concerned with the 
language of emotions, which is linked to uncertainty. Section 3.5 will develop further the 
argument on how the interpretation of the principles of uncertainty is an epistemic 
interpretation based on value-laden perceptions of risk. Herbert Gottweis’s observations on 
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this conversion (Gottweis, 2005b) will be used to illustrate this discourse. Furthermore, John 
Rawls’s theoretical concept of reflective equilibrium will be mentioned as a method for 
showing how the language of emotions can be utilised as a method for arriving at the content 
of required principles of an ethical guidance system. This will lead to the introductory analysis 
of Rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus a latter procedural development of reflective 
equilibrium that is more appropriate for the successful integration of ‘principles of 
uncertainty’ within genetic governing policy.  
From such discourse, background information will be provided for the establishment of the 
main argument’s primary and secondary claim; of the overriding deference to the principle of 
autonomy (as seen in the current ethical interpretation of the management of risk); and the 
non-specificity of the principles in particularly the principle of justice in Principlism. All of 
these may have contributed to the shrouding of the main aims of research governance for 
research protocols involving pharmacogenetics, as well as the variability of governance. 
 
3.2 Role of Research Governance 
This section will discuss firstly the mechanism of research governance within the healthcare 
context, in order to provide a background to the evolution of clinical trial governance. Then, 
discussions will be concerned with the management and interpretation of risk of harm, which 
is pivotal to research governance in relation to clinical trials, regardless of whether 
pharmacogenetics is integrated within the drug development process. 
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3.2.1 Concept of governance 
 
The concept of governance is concerned with rule-making, and was initially associated with 
the nation-state government (Bunton, Petersen 2005, p. 4). However, the term ‘governance’ 
has become concerned with systems of rule relating to all levels of human activity, from 
family relations to international organisations; thereby acknowledging that the world is 
influenced and structured by these interdependent systems, rather than by state rule alone 
(Rosenau, 2000). Governance takes into account the activities of other mechanisms and 
strategies of command, and this may manifest in the form of goals, directives and policies. 
However, these mechanisms and strategies focus more on the role of organisational networks 
at local, national and international levels and across societal divides, than on hierarchical and 
authoritarian rule13. An example of this has been seen in the West in the latter half of the 20th 
century, where public sector reform resulted in national government functions being 
transferred to lower regional levels, as well as supranational organisations. A further instance 
is observed in healthcare, where there has been a redistribution of responsibility from state 
healthcare systems to private service providers and individuals (who are expected to manage 
their own health by making careful choices and reducing lifestyle risks, which is a form of 
self-governance). Such an illustration has led to healthcare regimes, which have sought to 
encourage the empowerment of communities to have a role together with local and 
international bodies in maximizing health. This has resulted in governance in health being 
considered in broad terms of encompassing social systems, as well as the conduct of the 
individual’s life through self-governance. This gives rise to what has been regarded as the 
                                                             
13 Rosenau, in Governance in the twenty-first century, prefers the use of the concept of control or steering 
mechanisms to replace the notion of command. Such concepts provide focus for the central purpose of 
governance. 
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emergence of ‘Good’ governance for health. In this context, the ‘Good’ is interpreted in the 
ethical sense of utilitarianism (holding that an action, or in this case guideline, is right only if 
it produces the best outcome), or as complying with health guidelines that maximise welfare 
(Ott, 2010). Integrated public health policies that have arisen from such ‘good’ governance 
have been effective for increasing the health of the population, rather than just the health of 
individuals, especially amongst disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (Bunton, Petersen 2005, 
p.5).   
 
3.2.2 The management and interpretation of risk of harm 
 
In all aspects of drug development, governance is considered that which ensures high quality 
research and the maintenance of public confidence. This is achieved through the vehicle of 
risk assessment, a principled judgement that has created a tension between conducting ‘good’ 
governance based on maximising the production of the best outcomes, and governance 
concerned with the acceptability of the risk of the research project. Risk is associated with 
potential knowable harm, and risk assessment involves the identification, evaluation and 
estimation of the levels of risk in any given situation, in addition to making comparisons 
between standards that determine acceptable levels of risk (Risk Assessment, 2010). 
Furthermore, risk is concerned with the anticipation of the consequences of research, and the 
impact of the researcher’s actions. How risk is managed in research is influenced by the 
surrounding social and political environment. Such influence has led to differences in national 
and local styles of regulation and review (Rikkert, Lauque et al. 2005). Currently, the review 
of clinical trials involves the interpretation of intricate legislation, and assessment of the 
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potential benefits of clinical projects in terms of knowledge gained in proportion to the 
potential physical and or psychological harm it might cause. 
 
In the context of drug development, risks are interpreted as the probability that harm will be 
caused to a research participant (where harm refers to adverse events concerned with drug 
inefficacy or toxicity, as well as the consequences of genetic variation). In these instances, 
risks are most often interpreted in terms of calculation, measurement, probability and the 
prediction of adverse events (which are untoward medical occurrences in patients due to the 
administered medicinal product),  rather than notions of fate or chance (Shaw and Barrett, 
2006).  
 
In this context, risk is associated with mathematics and statistical probability (Drummond, 
2000, p. 177). When risk is interpreted as probabilities of harm, it is an example of an 
approach derived from our rational post-enlightenment view of the world, where potential 
harm is assessed using mathematical judgement to weigh up the potential risks and benefits 
(Shaw, Boynton et al. 2005). However, these judgements continue to be value driven, since 
they are based on the interpretation of scientific evidence regarding the risk of harm to 
research participants. Moreover, they are influenced by high-profile events that may provide 
cause for government or professional intervention. For instance, the Alder Hey organ retention 
scandal, which was evidentially within the legal and ethical codes of the time, resulted in 
changes in the way surgical and autopsy tissue are stored. This was a direct consequence of 
the controversial and high-profile debates it triggered (Shaw, Barrett 2006, p.14).  
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Furthermore, the concept of risk is historically and socially located, in that different people 
perceive it in various ways across diverse societies. Consequently, managing risk requires 
judgement and interpretation, while good14 governance, as perceived by regulatory authorities, 
provides a framework for action rather than being prescriptive. A framework based on 
structures and systems for assessing the risks of harm potentially inherent in research studies is 
undertaken as a process of review by governance bodies. These regulatory bodies ensure the 
risk of harm is proportionate to the potential benefit (represented in the risk-benefit 
assessment). They consider the concept of risk in terms of the physical, moral and emotional 
harm related to the drug interventions, associated tests and monitoring procedures encountered 
during a clinical trial. Therefore, the primary regulatory goal of pharmaceutical regulations is 
to promote and protect public health by fostering access to medicinal products and devices 
with a favourable risk-benefit ratio (Rid, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the scientific assessment of risk as probabilities of harm is preferred, since it is 
recognised that scientists understand issues in terms of scientific feasibility and risk; therefore, 
regulation is only justified if directed at a specific risk (Black 1998). These dissimilar views 
from regulatory bodies and the industry on risk assessment in clinical trial regulation are often 
a source of contention (Kielmann, Tierney et al. 2007). However, this can be bridged by 
facilitating the integration of scientific objectivity and the non-scientific view (some aspects of 
the regulatory body view), through recognising the different rationalities of both approaches 
(Black 1998, p.652). This integration would be facilitated by regulators or indeed bioethicists, 
who would translate the different rationalities of both parties by acting as interpreters. In doing 
                                                             
14 Here, ‘good’ is regarded in a functional rather than in an ethical context, as in adhering to the proposed 
guidelines. 
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so, they would be able to facilitate the negotiation of regulation and its integration (Black 
1998, p.660). It has been suggested that addressing the mutual incomprehension of both 
parties through this interpretive approach would be contrary to the ethos of an intergrationalist 
approach. But recognition of how both parties understand, identify and address issues should 
be acknowledged in the interpretation (Black 1998, p.660). How this would be achieved 
remains the subject of some debate and is a central challenge to regulation. But the proposal of 
Norman Daniel’s15 and James Sabin’s16 ‘Accountability for reasonableness’ (Daniels, Sabin 
2002) as a possible approach will be examined in chapter six.  
 
Nonetheless, in drug regulation, the scientific assessment of risk is represented by the risk-
benefit assessment and has as its ethical basis the Principlist ethical framework discussed in 
chapter two, which ensures that moral duties are upheld in research. This risk-benefit 
assessment consists of a four step model: (1) hazard identification; (2) exposure assessment; 
(3) dose-response analysis; and (4) risk characterisation (Goldstein, 2005).  
 
1) Hazard identification (where a hazard is defined as anything that could cause harm, as 
opposed to risk, which is the probability that harm will be caused by the hazard) is 
based on the toxicological principle of identifying the hazards of new chemicals 
through pathological and physiological evaluation such as animal studies.  
                                                             
15 Daniels is Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population Health in 
the Department of Global Health and Population at the Harvard School of Public Health in Boston. 
16 Clinical Professor of both Population Medicine and Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and Director of the 
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Ethics Program 
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2) Exposure assessment, which takes into account the concept of exposure efficiency. 
This relates exposure to source emissions by calculating the extent of eventual human 
uptake of material released from a source.  
3) Dose-response analysis, where the extrapolation of data from animal to human studies, 
and high dose to low dose effects is central. Moreover, the use of biological markers 
which link exposure with effect, particularly in the context of human susceptibility; 
thereby providing a potential mechanism for linking dose with response. 
4) Risk characterization, which takes into account risk communication and management, 
and it is here that risk perception is integrated into risk assessment. 
 (Goldstein, 2005) 
 
But, before risk assessment begins, guidelines are required to outline how the four-step risk-
assessment is performed. These policy guidelines help establish this uniformed approach in 
clinical trials; thereby providing an advantage to research of replacing default assumption and 
extrapolative approaches with actual data, thus leveling the playing field for stakeholders 
involved in the outcome of risk assessment (Goldstein 2005, p.151). In the current climate of 
bringing new drugs to market, this approach to risk assessment is seen as standard and known 
as the minimal risk standard or best interest standard, whose ethical basis is rooted in 
Principlism (Kopelman, 2004).  
 
3.2.3 The minimal risk standard 
 
The minimal risk standard, or best interest standard, as a normative approach provides moral 
guidance to regulatory and ethics committees on how research ought to be conducted, by 
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assessing potential harm that could arise in clinical trials. It is not applied universally to all 
research, but it is pivotal for risk assessment in paediatric research and studies involving 
vulnerable populations or where subjects are unable to consent. Discussions about this 
standard will illustrate the need for a consistent standard of risk assessment (which is not 
subject to value-laden assessment) for national and international studies that can be utilised by 
review boards (regulatory and ethical), investigators and the public.  
 
Minimal risk of harm in a study is a normative judgement that includes assessing the 
probability of physical and psychosocial risks, such as stigmatisation, breaches of 
confidentiality and threats to privacy. Furthermore, since risk-benefit evaluations combine 
qualitative descriptions, quantitative estimates and other perceptions, it is inevitably a rather 
imprecise and heavily value-laden assessment. 
 
The term ‘minimal’ risk is defined by the US federal regulations as when the: 
 
‘Probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research… [is] not 
greater in and of… [itself] than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the 
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests’ 
      45CFR 46.102(i) (OHRP, 2006) 
 
In a traditional clinical trial, the minimal risk standard considers the following potential harms:  
1) To the participant 
a) The participant’s rights 
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i) Entry into a trial without full informed consent 
ii) Failure to act on a participant’s request to withdraw from the trial 
iii) Failure to protect the privacy of participants 
b) To the participant’s safety 
i) Hazards of the intervention; i.e. adverse drug reactions (both expected and 
unexpected) 
ii) Likely risk/benefit ratio of the intervention(s) in the study population 
iii) Hazards of the assessment methods (e.g. biopsy, x-ray) 
 
2) To the integrity of the trial 
a) Due to the completion of the trial – recruitment and follow-up 
b) Due to the reliability of the results, based on: 
i) Study power17  
ii) Major violation of eligibility criteria 
iii) Fraud 
iv) Randomisation procedure 
v) Outcome assessment 
vi) Completeness and accuracy of other data 
vii) Adherence to the protocol18 
(Baigent, Harrell et al. 2008) 
                                                             
17 A statistical term based on calculating the number of research participants required to demonstrate an effect of 
the treatment at a certain magnitude(Sim, Wright 2002) 
18 Via following the set guidelines as set out in MRC/DH joint project to codify good practice in publicly funded 
UK clinical trials with medicines. Workstream 4:Trial Management and Monitoring. http://www.ct-
toolkit.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/35962/monitoring-procedures-workstream.pdf 
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If the risk of harm is considered minimal for all categories, then governance bodies such as 
ethics and regulatory committees are more inclined to provide approval for the research (or 
speed up the approval process). If the research contains more than a minimal risk, greater 
protection of the research participants’ rights and welfare is required, regardless of the study’s 
benefits. There has been a wide variation in how these risk categories have been interpreted 
and understood by research governance bodies. This variation has raised concerns about 
whether the minimal risk standard is fulfilling its moral and social obligations; such as, respect 
for the partcipant’s rights and welfare (Kopelman 2004, p.352) and championing efficiency 
and social utility (Petersen, 2012). 
 
3.3 Precautionary Regulation  
In this section, I will argue that governance has been dominated by protectionist policies, 
which are unable to fulfil the role of providing adequate governance when applied to 
pharmacogenetic-based drug research. This argument is based on the reasoning that such 
protectionist policies are based on the precautionary principle, which interprets broadly any 
uniquely new activity as prohibitive, and seems to be the default principle of regulatory bodies 
when faced with a new biotechnology. 
 
The precautionary principle was originally intended for policy makers faced with 
environmental issues, such as marine pollution. It has become the ideological vehicle for the 
risk assessment industry and, as such, is very general. Its contribution to governance is that the 
regulation of new products or technologies assumes them to be hazardous unless proof can be 
provided otherwise, by engaging in a form of risk assessment acceptable to regulatory bodies 
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(Salter, Jones 2002). The imposition of this principle on regulators and legislation gave rise to 
further litigation in the US, and an increase in the cost of assessing risk in regulation in Europe 
(manifested in penal terms). Furthermore, the evaluation of risks became dictated by belief 
and an absence of scientific rules of evidence. This served to fuel public anxieties, which have 
the potential to halt progress of a technology at any time (Scruton 2004). 
 
Definitions of the principle have been found to be vague and confusing; thereby facilitating 
inconsistent interpretation (Lierman, Veuchelen 2005; Cohen 2001; Engelhardt Jr., Jotterand 
2004). For example, the 1998 Wingspread Statement provided a definition of the principle, in 
which it interprets any activity as prohibitive: 
 
‘…when an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships 
are not fully established scientifically…’       
         (Lazzarini, 2001).  
 
In 2000, the European Commission provided the following definition: 
 
‘…where preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds 
for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal 
or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen for the 
Community…’       (Lazzarini, 2001) 
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This demonstrates that the principle could be used to hinder technological progress, due to its 
potential prohibitive stance and extreme variability in interpretation. This can be noted in the 
Italian government’s justification of preventing the sale of GM food by taking literally the 
following line: 
 
‘…no human technology should be used until it is proven harmless to humans and the 
environment…’  
(Cited from the European Commission 2000, communication on the principle 
Lazzarini 2001).  
 
In turn, this replaced scientific standards with unsubstantiated claims and burdened innovators 
with the impossible requirement to prove positive benefits in the absence of any possibility of 
harm. Such a situation has called for a definition in the EU, which views the precautionary 
principle as a risk regulation instrument that permits the adoption of preventative measures in 
the face of scientific uncertainty (Khoury, 2010). However, despite this lack of clarification, 
the current definition, as given below, implies that a technology should not be released, or 
continue to be released, into an environment until there is compelling evidence that it will not 
cause harm (Abraham, 2002). Moreover, the burden of proof is placed on demonstrating that 
the technology does not inflict serious short-term or long-term damage on those who would 
like to introduce or maintain it.  
 
The Precautionary Principle as defined by UNESCO is as follows: 
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When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically 
plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm. Morally 
unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the environment that is  
 threatening to human life or health, or 
 serious and effectively irreversible, or 
 inequitable to present or future generations, or 
 imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those affected. 
The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific analysis. Analysis should be 
ongoing so that chosen actions are subject to review. Uncertainty may apply to, but need 
not be limited to, causality or the bounds of the possible harm. 
(Weiss, 2007) 
 
In the context of pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials, it would be the regulatory authorities 
and stakeholders who would select test options, such as the level of reported adverse drug 
reactions (ADRs - an indicator of whether a drug was safe and efficacious) most sensitive to 
the hazards and damages selected; thereby ensuring the detection of potential risks. Risks may 
be interpreted as the probability that harm will be caused to a patient, which, in this context, 
refers to drug inefficacy or toxicity (ADRs). In pharmacogenetics, these risks are 
consequences of the addition of genetic factors, producing harm attributed to genetic 
variations in genes which are responsible for drug-metabolising enzymes, drug receptors, and 
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drug transporters. They are inherently unknown and arise from the complex pathways of drug 
metabolism and gene interaction (Severino, Chillotti et al. 2003).  
  
These chosen test options are then analysed by quantitative assessments (i.e. risk - benefit 
assessment), such as the minimal risk standard based on the following judgements (Engelhardt 
Jr., Jotterand 2004):  
a) Whether the drug is effective at low doses, even with insufficient controlled trial data; 
for example, analysis is made by extrapolating beyond the available controlled clinical 
trial data to utilizing data on the clinical experience of the use of a drug. 
b) Whether the safety data analysis is acceptable, basing further judgement on the 
analysis of ‘unique’ configurations of the data, such as comparing ‘low’ dose 
medication X to ‘high’ dose medication Y, rather than normal constructs of clinical 
trials, which tend to utilise the construct of like with like ‘low’ dose medication X to 
‘low’ dose medication Y. 
c) Whether the clinical trial safety data should override other safety data that is not 
obtained necessarily from the stakeholder. For example, data obtained from 
spontaneous reporting systems (SRS) from the FDA database in the US, or the Yellow 
card system in the UK. 
d) Whether there is adequate data to support the drug’s effectiveness. 
e) Whether warning signals, like ADRs from SRS or yellow card, should be included, due 
to the fact that, sometimes, the drug is administered at higher doses and for longer than 
expected, giving rise to SRS similar in profile to ADRs reported from earlier clinical 
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trials of the drug. These earlier clinical trials investigate the optimum conditions of a 
drug and tend to include the higher drug doses and longer treatment regimes.  
 
 
Recently, the precautionary principle has been applied to medical issues and has been 
interpreted in two ways: as a normative, action guiding principle (as in Principlism) 
characterised by what it urges decision makers to do; and as an epistemic (belief-guiding) 
principle, characterised by what it urges us to believe. A precautionary approach to risk 
assessment depends on the political prioritisation of public safety over and above some of the 
commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies; thus, it is linked to the socio-politics of 
technology assessment (Abraham, 2002). 
 
Suffice to say, the precautionary principle is exercised by allowing reasonable responses to 
credible and immediate threats in the absence of what would otherwise be sufficient 
information. Furthermore, the minimal risk standard’s value-laden content is belief dependent, 
albeit by ‘experts’, suggesting that the precautionary principle that is exercised in drug 
regulation has an epistemic interpretation. This provides information on what should be 
believed in (due to the facts), rather than what ought to be done, in order for the research to be 
morally acceptable; thereby, suggesting whether an epistemic moral framework would, in 
general, be more appropriate for drug regulation 
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3.4 Genetic Governance 
This section will debate whether value-laden perceptions of risk, i.e. epistemic interpretations, 
need to be taken into account in pharmacogenetic-based drug regulation. The discussion will 
concentrate on how the introduction of genetics has changed the landscape of governance, 
from being concerned with the language of scientific evaluation, to assessing belief states. 
Additional analysis will demonstrate how the introduction of genetics has further entrenched 
the change in governance from a top-down approach with government determining policy, to a 
bottom-up approach determined by the public and other agents such as industry. The argument 
taken by this thesis will call on the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of 
‘Governmentality’, which is concerned with government as conduct (problems of self-control, 
guidance for the family and for children, management of the household, directing of the soul) 
and not just management of the state or administration (Lemke, 2002). This concept refers to 
how the state exercises control over, or governs the body of its populace and provides a better 
understanding of the relationship between changing forms of knowledge and power.  
 
The introduction of genomics into public perception has presented an image of humankind as 
being determined by genes. This is known as genetic determinism, whereby genes alone define 
all aspects of an individual. For example, the genetic testing of embryos may indicate an 
increased risk of a trait, but such analysis does not tell us what traits the embryo would have as 
a person. This is because genetic diseases are generally caused by the interaction of many 
genes (known as polygenic), rather than the defect of a single gene (monogenic). Furthermore, 
environmental factors play a crucial role in whether a trait or condition is expressed. 
Moreover, the more complex the interaction of genes and environment, the less likely a correct 
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prediction of a disorder becomes. In addition, another popular public perception of genes is 
that they are considered objects of manipulation and transformation (Gottweis 2005a, p.197); 
thereby presenting the notion of scientists as ‘Playing God’. Such perceptions of genomics 
have created inaccurate observations of the goals of current genomic technologies. Inaccurate 
meanings have emerged as a result of DNA being identified with the self-understandings of 
the human person, provided for by both the classical world and the Christian tradition. 
Meanings and beliefs argued as a by-product of the cultural understanding of genetics and that 
have, in turn, determined how such biological material is utilised (Krueger, 2002). 
 
For governance, this means that the traditional reliance upon technocratic networks to provide 
the scientific identification of hazards and determination of risks for policy formation and 
implementation is currently an insufficient mechanism for legitimising the risk assessment 
process (Lemke, 2004). Therefore, governance is altering its stance by seeking methods of 
engagement with the public and non-governmental organisations in human genetics. 
Regulation of a biopolitical nature has ushered in the ‘biopolitical age’, bringing forth laws 
about genetic equality that outlaw discrimination based on one’s genetic makeup (Salter, Jones 
2002). Such biopolitics are an example of Foucault’s ‘Governmentality’ of emerging forms of 
knowledge and practice, which is regarded as an indicator of the rules and rationality of 
neoliberal democracies. 
 
3.4.1 Foucault’s Governmentality 
The concept of Governmentality, as conceived by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, 
will be drawn upon in this section, since it explains aptly how genomic policies are shaped by 
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industry and the general public, rather than the government. Apparently, the age of 
‘biopolitics’ has revealed flaws in the application of Principlism in research regulation 
(Winickoff, 2003). Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which he defined as the ‘art of 
government’, refers to government not only being linked to politics of the State, but also 
considers different forms of control, such as social-control and biopolitics (Foucault, 1979) . 
The State (according to Foucault) is concerned with moving on from a territorial 
administrative function and refers to the way in which people are taught to govern themselves, 
shifting power from a central authority, like a state or institution, and dispersing it among a 
population. This ‘art of government’ directs the purpose of government towards the welfare of 
the population, entailing the care and control of the population (Miller, 2008).  
 
Foucault noted the close relationship between ethics and governance, in that ethical judgement 
is implicated in the formation of the self and citizenship. He argues that individuals govern 
themselves through; ‘self-care, self-examination and self-discipline, training and exercise’ 
(Lemke, 2002). Therefore, governance relies on political strategies focused on regulating all 
aspects of human life in a given population. An example of this is the Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights adopted by UNESCO in 1997. This declaration 
established rights-based regulatory criteria, which recognised how human genetics research 
(and associated industries) should be conducted (Salter, Jones 2002, p.328). This implemented 
regulations based on the tracking and management of risk, which, in the field of drug 
development, is the prediction of potential adverse drug reactions. However, this has resulted 
in the establishment of global or super-national systems for regulating potential risks, such as 
the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) and the European Agency for 
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the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA). These transnational governance organisations 
provide a system of multi-level governance, which consists of multi-tiered governmental and 
non-governmental, geographically overlapping structures. This moves political negotiation 
from a local (public) to a transnational level (Gottweis, 2005c), which, in turn, ushers in a 
drugs regulation system ruled by judgements from experts who are well protected from public 
scrutiny. For drug development involving genetic information (such as pharmacogenetics), it 
is questionable whether this can be politically contained similarly within an established 
regulatory arena that relies heavily on technocratic closed and non-transparent procedures, 
given the cataclysmic shifts in the neighbouring regulatory territories of food and agriculture 
(Salter, Jones 2002, p.327). 
  
Public perception of genetics has introduced an element of determinism and reductionism in 
governance. This has been proven as changing governance from having a top-down approach 
(with the government determining policy for the ‘good’ of research) to a bottom-up approach 
that involves the public and other agents. In the field of drug development, governance has 
returned to being a technocratic discipline, with little or no input from public bodies. 
However, the introduction of pharmacogenetics in drug assessment may bring forth public 
challenges to policy recommendations, especially if these policies are viewed in the current 
deterministic light. 
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3.5 The Concept of Uncertainty 
In this section, I will argue how the introduction of genetics has changed the landscape of 
governance, from one that is concerned with the language of scientific evaluation and 
precaution, to focusing on the language of emotions. I will also argue how governance is 
observed as interpreting principles of uncertainty (value-laden perceptions of risk, or epistemic 
interpretations), rather than principles of a normative precautionary nature, which are 
concerned with the assessment of risk. I will refer to Herbert Gottweis’s observations on 
governance (as changing from risk perception to uncertainty in this genetic era (Gottweis 
2005b)).My argument will first cite John Rawls’s ‘ theoretical concept of reflective 
equilibrium, a methodology for  showing how the language of emotions can be utilised to 
arrive at the content of required principles of an ethical guidance system.  Then I will 
introduce Rawls’s procedural development of reflective equilibrium, the concept of 
overlapping consensus, which will be fully discussed in chapter six. From these discussions, 
an initial assessment will be made of the application of the normative framework of 
Principlism prevalent in current research governance. Such an assessment will make known 
the relevant moral test options or features of the regulatory assessment of pharmacogenetic-
based clinical trials. In making these features known, I aim to highlight the requirement of 
appropriate moral guidelines for consideration in drug research governance involving genetic 
information. 
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3.5.1 Pharmacogenetic profilng and risk assessment 
Traditional pharmaceutical products, i.e. those not generated from pharmacogenetic 
intervention, do cause unavoidable harm. Such harm is due to the drug either not producing 
the desired therapeutic effect, or causing an undesired ADR. Such dangers appear to be 
tolerated by society, as the alternative would be to remove the drug from the market; thereby 
denying all potential benefits for patients who are willing to accept the risks. Therefore, 
unpreventable ADRs are legally deemed to be no one’s fault, and viewed as the unfortunate 
but necessary cost of scientific uncertainty (Lindpaintner, 2002). If you note that the criterion 
of accepting  ADRs is the high level of certainty of the drug’s benefits, this demonstrates how 
other risk assessments based on a beneficent or utilitarian basis are favoured over the minimal 
risk standard; i.e. where the benefits are apparent and there are no real alternatives (Giroux, 
2005). However, since pharmacogenetics in drug development is still in its infancy with 
regard to marketable products, this premise is challenged by the perception of a condition of 
low certainty. Very few marketable benefits have been produced, which begs the question; 
why accept the risks? For example, in the regulation of stem cell research, a biotechnology 
which is also in its infancy, the use of embryos for research and therapy poses a problem for 
regulatory risk assessment. The basis of this ‘problem’ is the perceived moral value placed on 
embryos, fuelling the arguments about whether the research is ethical. The embryo used in 
research is a means to an end19, which goes against deontological norms. This gives credence 
to a prohibitive stance to such research, which is further perpetuated by the fact that the 
                                                             
19 The embryo is perceived as an actual or potential human being entitled to special protection, rather than as a 
pure biological entity. A key factor in accepting or rejecting this line of research. 
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‘fruits’ of this research are not currently accessible. However, allowances have been made for 
certain aspects of stem cell research, such as cell nucleus replacement, as there is an argument 
that this particular line of research is necessary as it is the only way to obtain knowledge about 
a disease.  
 
The stem cell research scenario provides an example of an approach to formulating a decision 
about whether a line of research should be deemed ‘necessary’. Decisions are made based on 
the strong consequentialist argument of the moral imperative to reduce human suffering 
(Holm, 2002). This illustrates how policy can be formed in areas where the following factors 
are in place: agreement about the value of the goal of research; scientific uncertainty about 
whether this research can achieve its goal; and disputes about the ethical evaluation of the 
research (Holm 2002, p.507). 
 
Pharmacogenetic profiling of patients can be used as a potential risk assessment parameter; 
however, as genes do not act in isolation and drugs are often involved in complex metabolic 
pathways in the cell (before they are converted to active or inactive forms, which determine 
the drug’s effectiveness and safety profile), unknown inherent risks will arise. Therefore, 
pharmaceutical products derived from pharmacogenetic technology will not lose their risk-
producing profile. Furthermore, since the product potential has not been fully realised, the 
inherent uncertainties of this new technology may not be acceptable. In other words, it is 
difficult to apply the minimal risk standard to this technology due to the numerous 
  
 
73 
 
uncertainties. These are argued to be due to the ‘nature’20 of genetic information, and are 
apparent in the following areas of the minimal risk standard: 
 
1) To the participant: 
a) The participant’s rights: 
i) Entry into trial without fully informed consent - intentional non-disclosure due to 
the limitlessness timeframe and information which can be obtained from a tissue 
sample; whereby the research participant never fully receives the total 'picture' on 
what the research project is undertaking 
ii) Failure to act on a research participant’s request to withdraw from the trial – due to 
anonymisation; it may be impossible to withdraw data since there are no traceable 
identifiers 
iii) Failure to protect the privacy of research participants - Further non-disclosures due 
to the controversy of revealing sensitive health information unbeknown to the 
subject, possibly to third parties 
b) To the research participant’s safety: 
i) Hazards of intervention i.e. ADRs, expected and unexpected – due to polygenic 
effects of the drug 
ii) Likely risk/benefit ratio of the intervention(s) in the study population 
iii) Hazards of assessment methods (e.g. biopsy, x-ray). 
                                                             
20 A ‘nature’ which is based on the ‘uniqueness’ of genetic information known as ‘genetic exceptionalism’, rather 
than the objective relations of this information among genomes, genes, individuals, persons and species (Ross 
2001, Lazzarini 2001). 
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2) To the integrity of the trial: 
a) To the completion of the trial – recruitment and follow-up 
b) To the reliability of the results 
i) Study power 
ii) Major violation of eligibility criteria 
iii) Fraud 
iv) Randomisation procedure – may not be applicable due to increased predictability 
of the drug, or due to research participants with known genomic profiles for drug 
efficacy will be used. Unethical to have someone on placebo or a known lesser 
acting pharmacogenetic drug 
v) Outcome assessment 
vi) Other data – completeness and accuracy 
vii) Adherence to the protocol (Baigent, Harrell et al. 2008).  
 
This illustrates that, with regard to the research participant, the minimal risk standard would be 
difficult to apply due to the implications of genetic information; therefore, it may not be an 
adequate form of risk assessment for this technology. Subsequently, another standard must be 
found; primarily, to satisfy regulatory quantitative measures. Such a standard should not 
necessarily be subjected to value judgements or intuition. The presence of these mental 
dispositions or attitudes, which are both unreliable and reliable, has led to various 
interpretations of the minimal risk standard and, in turn, the inconsistent application of ethical 
and regulatory assessment and subsequent approval.  
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3.5.2 Rawls’s Reflective Equilibrium and Overlapping Consensus 
Intuitions are mental dispositions that are considered reliable indicators of corresponding 
normative truths, or propositions about which mental states are correct or rational (Wedgwood 
2006, p.70). As beliefs, intuitions differ from value judgements, which are evaluative beliefs 
based directly on emotions and due to this emotional aspect value judgements  can be 
considered to be unreliable (Wedgwood 2006, p.78). In looking at intuition there is no way to 
distinguish between reliable and unreliable mental dispositions, but as beliefs, these mental 
dispositions can be revised by utilizing John Rawls’s ‘ epistemological theory of reflective 
equilibrium’  (Daniels, 1979).  Reflective equilibrium is a process of mutual adjustment of 
principles and considered judgements. It is essentially a three-step process whereby one (1) 
identifies a group of considered judgments about justice, for example,  (intuitions about justice 
that strike one as relatively secure, such as that slavery and religious persecution are unjust), 
(2) attempts to explain and justify these considered judgments by discovering what (relatively 
more abstract) principles of justice can serve as their foundation, and (3) addresses any lack of 
fit between the principles one has arrived at and considered judgments about justice other than 
the group from which one started. Rawls’s notes that  
 
‘…it is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgements coincide and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgement conform and the premises of their 
derivation…’ 
(Rawls, 1999, p.20) 
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Through this approach, we collect as many intuitions as possible and fit them into a coherent 
systematic set of normative beliefs. These beliefs receive their outline from normative 
propositions that can be explained. Normative propositions, which cannot be explained, are 
rejected; thereby giving rise to a coherent overall set of normative beliefs. The rejecting of 
normative propositions is based on empirical psychological explanations, which cast doubts on 
the reliability of the proposition. 
 
 
Reflective equilibrium succeeds if the initial intuitions are sufficiently reliable, and if further 
reflection on them would lead closer to the truth. Therefore, the approach seeks to stimulate 
coherence between moral judgements, principles and background theories, and takes into 
account the moral judgements of the agents involved in regulation; thereby leaving room for 
critical reflection on these judgements (van Zwart, 2010). This Rawlsian method does not 
focus on one single comprehensive doctrine to provide guidance for moral dilemmas, but 
seeks to find a balance between intuitions, general principles and theories. These considered 
intuitive judgements therefore, rest on factual inquiry, comparison of consequences, and mid-
level rules, systematic derivation from general moral principles is excluded. 
 
Rawls’s ‘overlapping consensus’ is considered to be a less demanding development of 
reflective equilibrium. It is less demanding because individuals who take part in the process do 
not have to go through an exhaustive and searching process of reflection in order to test their 
judgements. The fact that they have reached agreement constitutes the principal test of their 
conclusions.  
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The idea of an overlapping consensus was to develop a concept of justice, which could be 
agreed by all, by recognising the permanent plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable moral 
frameworks (Doorn, Neelke 2010). Rawls’s notes two main points about the idea;  
The first  
‘…is that we look for a consensus of reasonable (as opposed to unreasonable or irrational) 
comprehensive doctrines…’  
The second  
‘…the public conception of justice should be, so far as possible presented as independent of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines…’ (Rawls, 2005, p.144).  
 
 
 How overlapping consensus could provide a way of moving towards a consensus on 
regulatory matters, about which we may be intuitively divergent as suggested in the next 
section, will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.  
  
3.5.3 The Concept of Uncertainty in regulatory assessment 
In the meantime, the presence of these mental dispositions has led to variability in regulatory 
assessment, as addressed previously. A variability that has arisen in the management and 
interpretation of the risk of harm, due to influences from the surrounding social and political 
environment. These differences, which have been magnified further due to the introduction of 
genomics in research, emphasise shifts in the language of scientific evaluation towards the 
weighing up of belief states, as stated in Herbert Gottweis’s article Governing genomics in the 
21st century: between risk and uncertainty (Gottweis, 2005b). This provides further 
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explanation on how governing styles have been influenced by the introduction of genomics; 
whereby the focus of human risk scenarios has shifted from one of concern for the external 
technological risks of genetic engineering for humans (i.e. are genetically modified organisms 
hazardous to humans), to the management of internal body risks through genetic technology 
(i.e. how can health risks be managed by genetics) (Gottweis 2005b, p.183). 
 
Gottweis stated that this shift has given rise to the language of emotions, and a refocus from 
appealing to reason, to other levels of argumentation concerned with the language of 
compassion and empathy. As seen with patient advocacy groups and public inquiries, tools of 
‘compassion and empathy’ are becoming standard policy instruments, which serve the purpose 
of linking genomics with society through a language of reflection. 
 
This language of reflection is a tool used primarily in the political arena to convey 
uncertainties or lack of sureness. Uncertainty is encapsulated in the precautionary principle 
(meaning that it is concerned with holding back what cannot be assessed) (Gottweis 2005b, 
p.187), and emerges from situations of incomplete scientific information. With 
pharmacogenetics, the risks are inherently unknown because of the complex pathways of drug 
metabolism and gene interactions. Therefore, a standard based on the concept of uncertainty 
would be more appropriate for regulatory quantitative measurement, especially for 
pharmacogenetic-based drug development, because the concept of uncertainty is a prevalent 
feature of any new technology, and is more widespread than the concept of risk (Gottweis 
2005b).  
 
  
 
79 
 
Uncertainty can be observed as minimising the importance of statistical and expert models of 
risk management and an absence of agreement, an example of which is cited in Gottweis’s 
article, which notes the following effect of the utilization of uncertainty in policy for BSE21: 
 
‘…The effort to ‘manage’ the sensitive issue of BSE triggered a shift toward a new 
mode of governance, in which openness and transparency were key commitments. The 
British Food Standards Agency (FSA) was created following the BSE-crisis. It was 
designed to introduce elements of deliberative governance, transparency, openness, 
argumentation, reciprocity and authenticity in a concrete setting and to deal with 
widespread distrust in the existing procedures. The rise of new sites of policy-making 
also offered new opportunities to cultivate capacities for self-rule and generate 
multiple spaces within which self-rule can develop…’ 
(Gottweis 2005b, p.188) 
 
Furthermore, Gottweis makes the comment that in genomic policing: 
 
‘…These[genomic] policies are presented as difficult decisions, which demand 
caution, deliberation and credibility, but also compassion; the decisions cannot be 
taken lightly, and they should only take place under the guidance of trustworthy people 
and institutions that command respect and authority. The style of these policies is 
decentralized; there is no centre for these new argumentative strategies that emerge in 
a variety of locations, from patient groups to government ministries…’ 
                                                             
21 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), known commonly as mad cow disease, is a fatal neurodegenerative 
disease (encephalopathy) in cattle that causes a spongy degeneration in the brain and spinal cord. 
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(Gottweis, 2005b, p.189). 
 
In this context, uncertainty is articulated as emotional discourse, whereby emotions are a form 
of social action. This gives rise to the mobilisation of ethical expertise and governmental 
bodies, which employ a new genre of discourse that places emphasis on trust and proof of 
credibility. 
 
Therefore, in using the concept of uncertainty to assess harm, we would be appealing to the 
essence of the precautionary principle, which speaks of society not waiting until it knows all 
of the answers before attempting to protect against significant harm. In employing the concept 
of uncertainty, we would be implying that the benefits of a technology are assumed to 
outweigh its risks; unless there is compelling evidence that serious harm would be done. The 
burden of proof would fall on those who believed that the technology was unsafe, implying 
that the test options selected would highlight the benefits of the technology rather than the 
hazards. Consequently, if we are looking to perform pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials 
with poorly understood consequences - and we have no more than quantitative outcome 
estimates - we should perhaps be circumspect about these trials. There is a possibility of them 
generating conditions with no precedent in the natural universe. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has established that the introduction of genomics in governance has given rise to 
the general public and industry shaping genomics-related policy-making. This has led to the 
entrenchment of a global (or at least a super-national) system of regulating the potential risks 
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connected to such new technology; hereby, such regulation is based on the minimal risk of 
harm in research projects. This is a precautionary approach, and could be restricting for the 
development of this technology. Furthermore, this category of risk management, despite being 
perceived as calculable, has been demonstrated as being value driven or influenced by belief 
states. Moreover, this has yielded variability in regulation and interpretation. However, the 
presence of these value-laden risk perceptions have presented considerations as to whether 
they should be taken into account when setting up robust regulatory mechanisms, especially in 
the assessment of genomic technologies such as pharmacogenetic drug development 
regulation. 
 
In examining an example of a risk-assessment methodology, such as the minimal risk 
standard, it was found to be inadequate for providing information on what ought to be done in 
research involving pharmacogenetic information. However, as a methodology based on 
‘measurement of utility’, it does provide facts that indicate in what we should believe. Indeed, 
since it has been established that the risks are still present but are inherently unknown in 
pharmacogenetic research outcomes, attention has been paid to the perspective that uncertainty 
is a prevalent concept in this type of research. Subsequently, risks still need to be assessed for 
pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials. However, in a way, that allows the selection of moral 
test options or features for regulatory assessment, thereby highlighting the benefits of this 
technology, rather than the hazards. A possible test option for consideration is Rawls’s 
‘overlapping consensus’ a procedural development of ‘reflective equilibrium’, since it 
contemplates certain aspects of mental dispositions. A further reason for considering Rawls’s 
approach is that its presence in governance as overlapping consensus would encourage agents 
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to consider the benefits of this technology, by providing a platform for the adequate balancing 
of benefits against hazards. Furthermore, by appealing to the concept of uncertainty through 
overlapping consensus, we would again focus on the benefits of a technology rather than the 
risks; unless there is compelling evidence that serious harm could be done. Those who 
believed that the technology was unsafe would have to tackle the burden of proof, and this 
would help to establish credibility and trustworthiness in research governance, rather than 
governance resorting to a defensive stance. 
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4. Chapter Four: The Ethical Implications of Pharmacogenetic 
Drug Development  
4.1 Introduction 
Before I introduce the argument concerning the ethical issues that are apparent in 
pharmacogenetic drug development, further information will be provided about what is 
pharmacogenetics, and why there is an interest in this biotechnology. Therefore, section 4.2 
will address the need for an agreed definition of pharmacogenetics, in order to clarify the aims 
of this biotechnology to relevant agents, and minimise the misconceptions of its role in drug 
development. Section 4.3 will establish the benefits of this biotechnology to particular agents 
(such as the patient and industry), focusing on the possible motivations and interests of these 
agents which could affect research governance. Section 4.4 will address how 
pharmacogenetics is integrated into the drug development process, particularly in the area of 
the clinical trial (an area of research which utilises human participants). Information in this 
section will highlight how pharmacogenetic tests in drug development are only concerned with 
drug-related genetic variations, and not specific disease genes. This in turn will contribute to 
the general argument in the latter half of this chapter, which looks at why results from 
pharmacogenetic testing do not have the same ethical concerns for informed consent, privacy 
and confidentiality as genetic tests relating to susceptibility genes or carrier status. My 
argument here will be concerned with how ethical issues which arise from risk assessment 
pharmacogenetics occur due to the fact that the outcomes of pharmacogenetics (i.e. drugs) 
give rise to ethical issues that operate at a general level. In other words, pharmacogenetics 
introduces a new domain of information (Møldrup 2002, p.34). As noted in the preceding 
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chapter, the concept of information (in this case genetic information) puts forth potential 
ethical issues concerned with informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, due to the 
‘public’ nature of this information (Gostin, 1995) . In the latter half of this chapter, it will be 
argued that this premise is true only when pharmacogenetics is employed in the same way as a 
genetic screening tool for disease susceptibility. This section will also address the argument 
that pharmacogenetic’s ethical concerns are more attributed to matters of justice, especially 
when pharmacogenetics is employed as a risk assessment tool.  
 
Section 4.5 will debate the oft cited ethical issues concerned with informed consent, privacy, 
confidentiality and discrimination, which have been attributed to pharmacogenetics in the 
literature. This will lead to further discussions on the relevant ethical implications of drug 
development outcomes when pharmacogenetics is utilised in clinical trials. I will term these 
ethical implications as actual, to distinguish them from perceived claims for the purpose of 
this discourse. In this section, it will be argued that the apparent ethical issues are a result of 
the stratification of the research participant population into genetic groups, giving rise to 
ethical issues concerned with the equitable distribution of research knowledge and research 
priorities, rather than inferences of disease knowledge as implied by concerns regarding 
privacy and confidentiality. 
 
To address this argument, this section will discuss the ethical implications of concern in the 
following areas. These areas have been highlighted in pharmacogenetic-specific research 
governance guidelines, such as the position paper on terminology in pharmacogenetics by the 
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Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP)22 (CPMP, 2002), and the report 
Pharmacogenetics: ethical issues, by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2003), which will be discussed further in chapter five. 
 
 Research prioritisation – the targeting of disease areas, which have a high economic 
return as opposed to societal need. 
 Division of patients into sub-groups – due to genetic profiling, giving rise to 
stratification of the patient population according to genotype. This ushers in the aspect 
of ‘orphan’ populations (groups of patients with a rare genetic profile where there is no 
drug available), and the possibility of entrenching further existing inequalities in 
healthcare based on race or ethnicity. 
 Clinical trials and the returning of genetic information – potential misuse and 
misunderstanding of the clinical relevance, scientific validity and clarity of this 
information by the research participant, as well as international research programs. 
These create concerns surrounding the distribution of research outcomes between rich 
and poor countries.  
 
The analysis of the actual ethical issues that arise with this biotechnology will contribute to the 
thesis by enabling the development of an appropriate ethical framework for research policy, or 
at least appropriate moral points to consider. It will be argued that moral guidelines should still 
be based on the Principlism framework but with the principle of justice specified preferably by  
                                                             
22 When the CHMP was formerly the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) 
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an egalitarian Justice model such as Rawls’s , and that such an ethical framework should 
recognise the pursuit of the common good.    
 
This discourse will introduce the argument that ethical issues arising from pharmacogenetic 
interventions in drug development are more concerned with the fair distribution of 
pharmacogenetic outcomes (such as drugs), and are therefore a matter of justice and not 
autonomy. It will also introduce the argument that pharmacogenetic tests in drug development 
are only concerned with drug-related genetic variations in genes, and not with genes which 
determine specific diseases, as noted with clinical genetic testing. From this, the central 
argument of the inadequacy of the current ethical guidance gained from Principlism will 
become apparent.  
 
4.2 A Definition of Pharmacogenetics 
Pharmacogenetics is generally known as the study of inter-individual variations in DNA 
sequences related to drug responses; its role in drug development is to create less hazardous 
drug treatments, and find new drug treatments. This section will address the requirement for a 
recognised definition of pharmacogenetics, as a definition of pharmacogenetic terminology is 
apparently yet to be universally clarified.  
 
An attempt was made by the EMEA, which proposed the following terminologies for usage in 
clinical trials (CPMP, 2002):  
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Pharmacogenetics is the study of inter-individual variations in DNA sequence related 
to drug response.  
 
Pharmacogenomics is the study of the variability of the expression of individual genes 
relevant to disease susceptibility as well as drug response at cellular, tissue, individual 
or population level. The term is broadly applicable to drug design, discovery, and 
clinical development. 
 
These initial definitions were proposed to facilitate communication between regulatory 
authorities, ethics committees, investigators, and research participants, and have been fully 
adopted by the prominent UK policy initiative, Pharmacogenetics: Ethical Issues by the 
Nuffield Council of Bioethics Nuffield (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2003). This will be 
discussed further in chapter five. This policy document has greatly contributed to establishing 
the current ethical view of pharmacogenetic’s role in clinical trials. Since this initiative, the 
following further definitions of pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics have been put forth, 
again with regard to clinical trials (European Medicines Agency (EMEA) 2007):  
 
Pharmacogenetics (PGt) is a subset of pharmacogenomics (PGx) and is defined as:  
The study of variations in DNA sequence as related to drug response. 
 
Pharmacogenomics (PGx) is defined as:  
The study of variations of DNA and RNA characteristics as related to drug response. 
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These definitions have been adopted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and are encapsulated in Good Clinical Practice (GCP) 
guidelines (Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 2008). However, only those agents (namely 
the industry and regulators) who have knowledge of and follow GCP know of these 
definitions. Outside of industry and regulatory bodies, there is still no universally accepted 
definition. Instead, the terms pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics tend to be used 
interchangeably. Despite this situation, there is emerging consensus on the differences 
between the two terms as follows:  
 
 Pharmacogenetics 
o Differential effects of a drug – in vivo – in different patients, dependent on the 
presence of inherited gene variants. 
o Assessed primarily genetic (SNP)23 and genomic (expression24) approaches. 
o A concept to provide more patient/disease-specific health care. 
o One drug-many genomes (i.e. different patients) 
o Focus: patient variability 
 
 Pharmacogenomics 
o Differential effects of compounds – in vivo or in vitro – on gene expression, 
among the entirety of expressed genes. 
o Assessed by expression profiling. 
                                                             
23 The single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are a specific pair of nucleotides observed at a single 
polymorphic site. They are considered as ‘tools’ which indicate sites on the genome where variability occurs. 
24 Genomic expression approaches concerned with disease targeting not disease susceptibility 
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o A tool for compound selection/drug discovery. 
o Many “drugs” (i.e., early-stage compounds) – one genome [i.e., “normative” 
genome (database, technology platform)] 
o Focus: compound variability (Lindpaintner, 2002).  
 
An accepted definition of terms would help to cement an understanding of this biotechnology 
in drug development for all. Such a consensus between these terms is further substantiated by 
the industry, which tends to use the following working definitions: 
 
‘…pharmacogenetics refers to people including gene identification and “right medicine for 
the right patient”. Pharmacogenomics refers to the application of tools including, but not 
limited to, the functional genomics toolbox of differential gene expression, proteomics, yeast 
two-hybrid analyses, tissue immuno- and histopathology, etc…’(Roses, 2000) 
 
Nonetheless, this follows the initial CHMP (CPMP, 2002) definitions – which will also be 
discussed further in chapter five. These have formed the basis of prominent policy guidance 
documents for industry and regulatory bodies’ definitions, and hold up quite well with the 
above consensus:  
 
Pharmacogenetics definition 
 CHMP; inter-individual variability  
 General Consensus; focus on patient variability 
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Pharmacogenomics definition 
 CHMP; variability of expression of individual genes in drug response.  
 General Consensus; focus on drug effects on gene expression. 
 
Consequently, these definitions will be utilised throughout this thesis, especially as neither 
term has a definitive definition. The term pharmacogenetics will be the pejorative term as it is 
considered to be the primary ‘tool’ of pharmacogenomics.  
 
I note that the advantage of having a clear definition of what pharmacogenetics is will 
contribute to the clarification of the actual ethical impact of this biotechnology on drug 
development. Furthermore, in highlighting an actual workable definition, and the apparent 
ethical issues of pharmacogenetics, the focus would fall on pharmacogenetic’s true aim of 
revealing a drugs’ effect on gene expression. This would allow a better understanding from 
governing bodies of the remit of pharmacogenetics in research protocols. 
 
4.3 Why the interest in Pharmacogenetics? 
The potentially positive outcomes of improved drug safety and efficacy (as advocated by the 
industry) have attracted great interest from the media and public. In this section, the use of 
pharmacogenetics in producing safer and more efficacious drugs (and the central aim of 
pharmacogenetics, which is the minimizing of undesirable medical effects) will be addressed. 
This section will cover what the ‘promises’ are to the agents concerned, such as the public and 
industry, and the potential implications of these promises to research governance. Promises 
are, for industry, concerned with decreased drug development costs due to the streamlining of 
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clinical trials, and the resurrecting of drug compounds which were abandoned because of their 
safety profile. As an aside, this means further financial benefits to the health service, due to 
less wastage in drug prescribing, and the avoidance of the clinical consequences of detrimental 
drug effects. 
 
4.3.1 Promises for the patient 
A drug is rarely effective and safe for all patients. A physician has to determine the dose of a 
drug by compromising between ‘not being too high’ and ‘not being too low’. This variability 
has been shown to be an important (if not a leading) indicator of therapeutic failure, and a 
major risk factor represented by an adverse drug reaction (ADR) in individuals or a 
subpopulation of patients. So what are ADR’s? An ADR is the consequence of a variety of 
factors, including the inherent pharmacological action of the drug, patient physiology, 
inappropriate prescribing and poor patient compliance.  An ADR, as defined by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO): 
 
‘…in the general medical and pharmacological fields, denotes a toxic physical or (less 
commonly) psychological reaction to a therapeutic agent. The reaction may be predictable, or 
allergic or idiosyncratic (unpredictable).In the context of substance use, the term includes 
unpleasant psychological or physical reactions to drug taking…’ (Babor, Campbell et al. 
1994) 
 
The ADR is seen as a major problem in drug development and clinical practice (Meyer, 2002) 
and in the US, serious adverse drug reactions are noted to be the fourth and sixth leading 
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causes of death in hospital patients (Lazarou, Pomeranz et al. 1998).  In the UK, it has been 
estimated that approximately 7% of patients are affected by ADRs, and one in ten of all NHS 
bed days are used by patients with ADRs, costing approximately £380 million a year. In 
cancer chemotherapy, ADRs are estimated to increase overall hospital costs by 1.9% and drug 
costs by 15% (Marsh, McLeod 2004). Furthermore, the drugs most frequently associated with 
ADRs are diuretics, opioid analgesics, and anticoagulants. In conclusion, approximately one in 
seven hospital in-patients experience an ADR, which is a significant cause of morbidity, 
increasing the length of the stay of patients by an average of 0.25 days per patient admission 
episode (Davies, Green et al. 2009). These figures highlight that the current regimen of ‘one 
dose fits all’ may not be ideal for patients, or cost effective for the health service.  
 
Until the thalidomide disaster focused the attention of governments and doctors on what 
produces ADRs to drug treatment, research into what caused ADRs was predominately 
concerned with epidemiology, and the mechanisms involved in producing ADRs to various 
medications. This resulted in the notion that ADRs were caused by the interaction of both 
environmental and genetic influences (Meyer, 2002). Today, however, the focus is on genetic 
factors, and how these factors explain the predisposition of certain individuals to developing 
ADRs to drugs, rather than from environmental influences. 
 
Therefore, ADRs are an indication of the effectiveness of drug therapy. Still, it must not be 
forgotten that other factors could also produce lack of drug efficacy in an individual patient, 
such as the nature of the disease (e.g. an infective microorganism, which is resistant to a 
prescribed antibiotic). Furthermore, factors such as the inherent pharmacological action of the 
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drug, patient physiology, inappropriate prescribing and poor patient compliance may 
contribute to an unsatisfactory outcome of drug therapy. Despite these factors, there 
sometimes remains no clear reason as to why in some patients, conventional doses of 
appropriate medications are ineffective. This is where the expectations of pharmacogenetics 
come in. Pharmacogenetics provides a physician with the ability to determine the factor of the 
underlying genetic cause of variable responses. This in turn aids the accurate prescribing of 
the right drug to the right patient, at the right time. In order to enable this objective, 
pharmacogenetics must be integrated within the drug development process. 
 
4.3.2 Promises for the Industry 
For the industry, the ‘promise’ or expectation is the unique ‘selling’ point of pharmacogenetics 
potential ‘candidate gene approach’ to discovering novel targets, which are protein products 
not necessarily concerned with disease risk that can be used as drug targets. These targets are 
then used as molecular diagnostic tools (a type of risk assessment testing) to individualise and 
optimise drug therapy, eventually replacing the ‘one-size-fits-all’ paradigm of current clinical 
practice and drug development. Medicines arising from this risk assessment testing would give 
rise to medicines for subsets of patients based upon their pharmacogenetics – the concept of 
personalised medicine (Christensen, 2002). A prediction that each of us may one day have a 
bar code that identifies our genotype (which would help with healthcare decisions) has 
ushered in the ‘designer drug’ concept in pharmacogenetics (Koch, 2012). 
 
Another possible advantage is that pharmacogenetics offers the opportunity for the 
streamlining of the drug development process. At present, it costs approximately $800 million 
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to develop a new drug, and up to 15 years to get from target identification to regulatory 
approval. 75 per cent of this cost can be attributed to target failures25 along the way, but with 
the introduction of genomics i.e. pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics, this amount could 
be reduced to $500 million, with approximately 15 per cent of time saved (Tollman, Guy et al. 
2001).  
 
Also, the selecting and recruiting of participants by genotype could increase the success of 
clinical trials (Alcalde, Rothstein 2002). Usually, research participants are categorized by their 
race and ethnicity, but such an approach has come under criticism due to questions regarding 
the validity and appropriateness of race-based categorisation in research, especially when race 
is considered a social and not a biological construct (Rothstein, Epps 2001). This point will be 
discussed in section 4.6, along with the implications of the use of ‘race’ in research initiatives.  
 
The approach of pharmacogenetics to pharmaceutical research creates the idea of a bright 
future for medicine, with the creation of drugs which are safer and more effective. 
Developments in pharmacogenetics have focused on how individual genotypes26 may impact 
on drug metabolism, response, adverse effects and clinical outcome. These developments have 
shown that pharmacogenetics may have a substantial impact on the drug development process; 
particularly the following areas, which will now be briefly addressed: (1) drug safety, (2) 
market segmentation, (3) differentiation and (4) the concept of personalised medicine.  
                                                             
25 The late attrition in drug development of drugs which have been found to have intolerable or unacceptable risk 
profiles. 
26 Genotype – a sequence of nucleotide pair(s) found at one or more polymorphic sites in a locus (location on the 
chromosome or DNA molecule corresponding to a gene or physical or phenotypic feature) on a pair of 
homologous chromosomes ( chromosomes derived from father and mother) in an individual.  
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Drug Safety 
It is perceived that the use of pharmacogenetic techniques will prevent or limit adverse events 
by preventing drug exposure to affected genetically defined subgroups. This could affect drug 
development in two ways. Firstly, by rescuing drugs from unmarketable status which have 
created adverse drug reactions (ADRs), and whose dose-related toxicity is linked to a genetic 
variant in a drug metabolising enzyme 
In such instances, diagnostic screening tests could be developed to identify patients who are at 
risk of particular ADRs. For these patients, the drug would then not be given, or would at least 
be prescribed at an altered dose, thereby remaining a therapeutic option in low risk groups 
(Ginsburg, Konstance et al. 2005). Secondly, pharmacogenetic assessment could be used in 
the post marketing of drugs to assess safety issues. Currently, once a drug has been marketed, 
physicians report possible ADRs to the manufacturer or the regulatory authority (MHRA, 
2010c) (via the Yellow card scheme in the UK)27. However, this scheme is susceptible to 
underreporting, thereby delaying the recognition of ADRs of a drug (Holtzman, 2003).  
 
Market segmentation 
Current medical practice bases disease recognition on a collection of clinical signs and 
symptoms i.e. clinical phenotype, which is very subjective and incurs a high level of 
inaccuracy. Yet, our understandings of disease processes are increasing, due to causative 
biological systems (for example, we know that hypertension is the outcome of underlying 
                                                             
27 The Yellow card scheme is run by the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) and the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) - a government agency which is responsible for ensuring the 
efficacy and safety of medicines and medical devices. The scheme is used to collect information from health 
professionals and patients on suspected adverse drug reactions (ADRs).  
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pathophysiologic mechanisms such as sodium re-absorption or rennin-angiotensin system). 
The industry could produce pharmacogenetic-based drugs, which target these underlying 
processes rather than the clinical phenotype. The financial implications of such a strategy will 
not be discussed here, but suffice to say, it has its critics, who are worried that the implications 
of segmentation could cause a reduction in sales and revenue (Christensen 2002, Tollman, 
Guy et al. 2001, Ginsburg, Konstance et al., 2005) (Pharmacogenomics-based drugs give hope 
to pharma industry. 2008), due to the costs of research and development. However, a smaller 
market based on identifiable patients likely to respond to a drug, together with decreased costs 
in drug development, would potentially (Ginsburg, Konstance et al. 2005, p.2333): 
 
i. Increase the rate of adoption of the drug. 
ii. Identify further patients who would not have been candidates for the drug but were 
tested positive. 
iii. Increase drug compliance due to improved efficacy.  
 
Differentiation 
Pharmacogenetics challenges the current pharmaceutical industry ‘block buster’ business 
approach model. This model targets therapies to the broadest population that might benefit, 
relying on statistical analysis of this population’s response to predict therapeutic outcomes in 
individual patients. Block buster’s being medicines with peak annual sales in excess of 800 
million GBP and usually address the general population or large subsets of it. This model 
encourages the ‘me too’ (drugs which are chemically related to the prototype) product, which 
have the advantage of rapid development and improved clinical benefits over the original 
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drug, giving rise to market exclusivity. With pharmacogenetics, companies would have a 
broader product portfolio with smaller drug brands, rather than the blockbuster approach 
(Service, 2004). Products would be clearly differentiated by specific genotype, thereby 
providing a sustained competitive advantage.  Rather than the current situation of not-so-
innovative me-too drugs, which are developed based on the argument that these drugs offer an 
improvement on the efficacy of the prototype, Pharmacogenetic-based drugs would show 
different qualities mainly due to different profiles of adverse effects, and would be effective in 
patients resistant to the prototype, also they would improve compliance in long-term 
treatment, and potentially be less expensive than the prototype (Garattini, 1997).  
 
The Concept of Personalised Medicine  
 
Currently, drug therapy is targeted to the broadest patient population. Patient groups are 
considered to be homogenous, and are treated as such, regardless of potential disparities in 
drug response. At present, pharmacogenetics has focused on the monogenic (single gene) traits 
of the genetic polymorphisms28 that influence drug metabolism. This current state of one-
drug-one-gene will eventually develop into one in which multiple genetic (polygenic) 
determinants of drugs effects will be defined and used to individualise drug therapy.  
 
Pharmacogenetics’ potential is in discovering novel targets that can fall into two categories: 
those that identify disease–related genes, and those that are protein products that can be used 
as drug targets. For drug development, the latter category is of prime importance. However, 
                                                             
28 Genetic polymorphisms  - DNA sequence variations on the human genome  
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both these targets could be used as molecular diagnostic tools to individualise and optimise 
drug therapy, eventually replacing the ‘one-size-fits-all’ paradigm of current clinical practice, 
and thereby creating the concept of personalised medicine for subsets of patients, based upon 
their pharmacogenetics.   
 
Therefore, pharmacogenetics has attracted great interest and expectation due to its ‘promises’ 
of improved drug safety and efficacy. This represents a big benefit for the public as a whole, 
as well as industry, due to the health-economic implications of pharmacogenetics. However, 
despite these benefits, the development of pharmacogenetic tests for existing drugs or new 
drug compounds is currently quite slow (Garrison Jr, Austin 2006), but is on the increase 
(Shin, Kayser et al. 2009). The reason for this is not entirely due to the ethical implications of 
this biotechnology (which will be covered later in this chapter), but is also because of industry 
perceptions of poor financial viability due to market fragmentation and litigation concerns 
from unforeseen detrimental medical occurrences (Cuticchia, 2009). 
 
4.4 Drug Development and Clinical Trials 
As previously mentioned, the industry’s interest in pharmacogenetics is for developing new-
targeted therapies (personalised medicine), the development of diagnostic tests to already 
licensed medicines (i.e. genotyping patients before treatment), and improving the process of 
drug discovery and development. This section will discuss the latter application of 
pharmacogenetics in the drug development processes, particularly in the area of the clinical 
trial. The intention of this information is not just to provide background for pharmacogenetic’s 
actual role in drug development, but to shed light on why information from pharmacogenetic 
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testing does not have the same implications for privacy, confidentiality and discrimination as 
genetic tests relating to susceptibility genes or carrier status.  This section will illustrate how 
pharmacogenetic tests are only concerned with drug-related genetic variations and not specific 
disease genes, and how the genetic testing aspect of pharmacogenetics has led to 
misconceptions of its actual function. 
 
A traditional clinical trial programme with any new drug passes through the following four 
main strategic phases which begin after drug discovery (pre-clinical research), and continue 
until market approval (usually after phase III):  
 
 Phase I: Initial safety trials on a new medicine. An attempt is made to establish the 
dose range tolerated by healthy volunteers for single and for multiple doses. Phase I 
trials are sometimes conducted in severely ill patients (e.g. in the field of cancer) or in 
less ill patients when pharmacokinetic issues are addressed (e.g. metabolism of a new 
antiepileptic medicine in stable epileptic patients whose microsomal liver enzymes 
have been induced by other antiepileptic medicines).  
 Phase IIa: Pilot clinical trials to evaluate efficacy (and safety) in selected populations 
of patients with the disease or condition to be treated, diagnosed, or prevented.  
 Phase IIb, sometimes referred to as pivotal trials, which are well controlled trials to 
evaluate efficacy (and safety) in patients with the disease or condition to be treated, 
diagnosed, or prevented. These clinical trials usually represent the most rigorous 
demonstration of a medicine's efficacy. 
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 Phase IIIa: Trials conducted after efficacy of the medicine is demonstrated, but prior 
to regulatory submission for drug approval. Clinical trials are conducted in patient 
populations for which the medicine is eventually intended. Phase IIIa clinical trials 
generate additional data on both safety and efficacy in relatively large numbers of 
patients, in both controlled and uncontrolled trials. These trials often provide much of 
the information needed for the package insert and labelling of the medicine. 
 Phase IIIb: Clinical trials conducted after regulatory submission of a new drug 
application (NDA) for the US, for example, or other dossier, but prior to the medicine's 
approval and launch.  
 Phase IV: Studies or trials conducted after a medicine is marketed to provide 
additional details about the medicine's efficacy or safety profile. Different 
formulations, dosages, durations of treatment, medicine interactions, and other 
medicine comparisons may be evaluated. New age groups, and other types of patients 
can be studied. Detection and definition of previously unknown or inadequately 
quantified adverse reactions and related risk factors are an important aspect of many 
Phase IV studies. If a marketed medicine is to be evaluated for another or new 
indications, then those clinical trials are considered Phase II clinical trials.  
 
In general, pharmacogenetic testing is integrated into the earlier phases of drug development 
such as Phase I and II, to assess the effect of genetic variation. It is used to ensure that 
research groups contain a balance of relevant genotypes, and that the later phases of trials, 
such as Phase III and Phase IV, can be targeted to good responders. As a risk assessment tool, 
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it is concerned with genes that code for proteins that modulate the following processes29, 
which are known to vary in a population or individual (McCarthy, 2000): 
 
 amount and rate of medicine absorption 
 rate of drug metabolism and elimination 
 drug concentration at the drug target 
 variation at the drug target, e.g. differences in the number of receptors or receptor 
morphology 
 second messenger mechanisms30 
 
These variations have an effect on an individual’s response to a medicine, and are attributed to 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) profiles (a form of genome variation). These SNPs 
correlate to a specific response to a treatment, as identified in Phase II trials. They help with 
selecting research participants most likely to benefit from the treatment in Phase III trials, 
thereby allowing typically large Phase III studies to be smaller and more efficient (Shi, 
Bleavins et al., 2001). 
 
4.4.1 Pharmacogenetics: a risk assessment tool 
As noted in the previous section, pharmacogenetics is used to exclude drugs where there is a 
wide variation in response according to common genotypes. Its application is as a stratification 
                                                             
29 Otherwise known as the drug pharmacodynamics which are concerned with the desired effects of a drug i.e. 
whether someone responds or not; and the drug pharmacokinetics, which are concerned with the course of the 
drug from intake to elimination  
30 Molecules that relay signals from receptors on the cell surface to target molecules inside the cell, in the 
cytoplasm or nucleus (e.g. Adrenaline). 
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tool, argued to be not dissimilar to other laboratory tools or tests, such as drug concentration 
monitoring and liver enzyme analysis.  Moreover, these are tests which provide information 
directly related to a participant’s likely response to a specific medicine (Renegar, Rieser et al, 
2001).  
 
With the introduction of pharmacogenetics in phase I clinical trials, dose escalation could be 
performed separately on cohorts of research participants of a relevant SNP. Phase II trials 
would determine the SNP profiles to be used to identify research participants who show 
efficacy for a particular drug, or even to identify adverse events. This tests the hypothesis that 
a certain polymorphism might result in greater efficacy and or less toxicity. Indeed, test 
populations of research participants would be categorised in order of respondents versus non-
respondents, or tolerant versus intolerant patients. All such categories could be used to fathom 
a genetic signature that might be of use in future trials. 
 
The use of these SNP profiles would lead to drug approval limited to patients of that SNP 
profile, giving rise to segmented drug markets which are based on stratification of patient 
groups, potentially defining some groups as ‘untreatable’ or ‘difficult to treat’. This has 
brought forth the argument that pharmacogenetics ushers in new inequalities based on 
genetically defined groups, where potentially some groups could be screened out of the drug’s 
development during Phase II, giving rise to an ‘orphan population’ (i.e. individuals with very 
rare disorders lacking in treatment options).  However, orphan medicine legistration in Europe 
and the US has attempted to address such inequalities, and has encouraged pharmacogenetic 
based research and development in the orphan markets by providing incentives under the EU 
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Orphan Medicinal Products Regulation (141/2000) (Ceci, Felisi et al. 2002) and the US 
Orphan Drug Act (amended in 2005) (Grabowski, 2005) (Koch, 2012) .  
 
Pharmacogenetic Phase III studies could confirm the hypotheses generated from Phase II 
trials, by utilising research participants who have been pre-screened and have a favourable 
predictive pharmacogenomic profile. This in turn will enrich the research population, thus 
avoiding those research participants with unfavourable pharmacogenomic profiles, and in 
effect allowing for a smaller, faster and less expensive trial. Furthermore, pharmacogenetic 
assessment could be used in Phase IV trials, in the post marketing setting of drugs, to assess 
safety issues. Here, patients who have received prescriptions could have blood spots stored on 
filter paper in an approved location. As ADRs are documented, DNA could be extracted from 
these blood spots for patients with particular drug-related ADRs, and compared with well-
matched patients who took the drug but did not experience an ADR. The abbreviated SNP 
profile for these ADRs could then be added to the SNP profile of the drug to provide further 
information on efficacy (Roses, 2000). 
 
As noted previously, pharmacogenetics has focused on the monogenic (single gene) traits of 
the genetic polymorphisms that influence drug metabolism. This current state of one-drug-
one-gene will eventually develop into one in which multiple genetic (polygenic) determinants 
of drugs effects will be defined and used to individualise drug therapy. However, at the 
moment, this ‘one-gene-one-test’ situation has put pharmacogenetic analysis in the same class 
as genetic disease susceptibly testing, which is arguably inaccurate. 
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4.4.2 Pharmacogenetic analysis – A form of genetic disease susceptibility testing? 
By discussing the validity of the argument regarding the pharmacogenetic test and the clinical 
genetic test having different ethical concerns, one can develop the antithesis that if 
pharmacogenetic genotyping does indeed become a medical diagnostic tool for the clinician, it 
may be subjected to the same ethical concerns as clinical genetic testing (van Delden, Bolt et 
al. 2004). To aid this argument, one needs to examine how misconceptions of the aims of 
pharmacogenetic analysis arose. 
 
In current literature, there is a suggestion that breaches of privacy, confidentiality and 
discrimination are of equal ethical concern for both pharmacogenetics and clinical genetic 
testing (Rothstein, 2003). A possible reason for this may be due to the fact that both 
pharmacogenetics and clinical genetic testing use presymptomatic genotyping, and this 
application has well documented ethical concerns, including breaches of privacy, 
confidentiality and discrimination. However, it must be noted that pharmacogenetic 
(presymptomatic) genotyping is not primarily a diagnostic approach. It is performed to 
identify phenotypic variation in the reaction to therapeutic substances. This provides 
information about risk to adverse drug reactions, and the genetic information provided only 
highlights genetic characteristic information on the medicinal response. Therefore, no 
collateral information on family members concerning any genetic disease is made available. 
Nevertheless, this has been disputed on the basis that some of this genetic information is 
hereditary (Netzer, Biller-Andorno 2004).  
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Pharmacogenetic analysis does indeed require a form of genetic testing to help assist in both 
accurate risk/benefit outcomes of drug response, and increasing understandings of the 
molecular basis of disease. But, the main objective of genetic testing utilised in 
pharmacogenetics is to provide understandings of the probability or possibility of observing a 
specific therapeutic response of genes or genetic markers to a drug. This is in contrast to 
genetic testing for disease prognosis and diagnosis (disease genetic testing), the objective of 
which is to identify causative gene mutations or polymorphisms for disease susceptibility 
genes, which, although they alter the risk of disease, may have no effective interventions. 
Bearing these distinctions in mind, one would assume that any moral concerns arising from 
both pharmacogenetic analysis in drug development and disease genetic testing would be of a 
distinct nature or magnitude. However, from the literature that can be gathered, there are no 
distinct ethical concerns particularly attributed to the objectives of pharmacogenetic analysis, 
and as previously mentioned in this section and in chapter two, the ethical concerns attributed 
to disease-related genetic testing are mainly cited as follows: 
 
 Possibility of discrimination and stigmatisation 
 Loss of privacy  
 Loss of confidentiality 
 
Furthermore, a number of articles discuss pharmacogenetic analysis as a tool of potential in 
disease susceptibility testing (to be known henceforth as susceptibility testing) (CPMP 2002; 
Alcalde, Rothstein 2002; Garrison Jr, Austin 2006). But, genetic testing for disease 
susceptibility is also known as predictive genetic testing, and tests asymptomatic persons for 
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future health problems.  In susceptibility testing, genetic material is analysed to identify 
particular mutations or polymorphisms that increase the probability of disease development. It 
is different from disease diagnostic testing, since it is used to identify risks in those without 
symptoms; disease diagnostic testing is used to confirm diagnosis in those who are ill. In 
susceptibility testing, biological variation is directly disease-related, and of pathological 
importance. The differential response to a drug is therefore related or matched to the presence 
or prominence of the pathological mechanism it targets in different patients, i.e. the molecular 
differential diagnosis of the patient. This implies that the drug is only appropriate for those 
patients who carry the clinical diagnosis, where the dominant molecular cause of contributing 
factors of the disease match the mechanism of action of the drug in question. For example, 
Herceptin (Trastuzumab), a humanised monoclonal antibody which acts against the HER-2-
oncogene31 Herceptin breast cancer treatment, is prescribed based on the level of HER-2 
oncogene expression in the patient’s tumour tissue, and patients with a high expression of 
HER-2 protein (her-2 oncogene) are prescribed the drug (Marsh, McLeod 2004). Differential 
diagnosis at this level provides a refined diagnosis, and a prerequisite for choosing the 
appropriate therapy (Christensen, 2002). This is an example of a genetic polymorphism 
influencing disease risk and drug response. An indication of the possible overlap of 
pharmacogenetics and disease genetics which gives rise to ethical implications for 
pharmacogenetics (Ginsburg, Konstance et al. 2005, Garrison Jr, Austin 2006, Burris, Gostin 
2002) in identifying the target as the disease itself. But it must be noted that the target 
identified is only one of a number of contributing factors of the disease (which tends to be 
polygenic) and not necessarily the disease itself.  
                                                             
31 Over expression of HER-2 oncogene, a breast cancer marker, is associated with rapid tumour growth, increased 
risk of recurrence after surgery, poor response to conventional chemotherapy and shortened survival. 
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Furthermore, the perceived overlap of genetic testing with pharmacogenetic analysis may be a 
factor in the misapprehension of what the actual ethical issues of this biotechnology are. As 
noted from Figure 1, which summarises how the phrase `genetic testing’ is used as a general 
term to cover different types of genetic analysis (which actually have quite distinct ethical 
implications). This indicates that current policy for clinical trial regulations may be based only 
on the disease-orientated nature of genetic testing, and not on taking into account the risk 
assessment nature of genetic testing predominant in pharmacogenetic analysis.  
 
 
Clarity in the area of pharmacogenetic analysis has been sought by a number of policy 
guidelines, such as the CHMP guidelines on pharmacogenetics (CPMP, 2002), which gave us 
the CHMP working definitions for pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics (to be discussed 
Figure 1; 'Genetic testing' is used in a number of different settings. 
(McCarthy, 2000) 
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further in chapter five). In this policy, one of the aims was to distinguish pharmacogenetics 
from the area of genetic testing for disease, as well as to address the different levels of ethical 
concern apparent within pharmacogenetics analysis. The noted concerns centre on the fact that 
the outcomes of pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics, i.e. drugs, give rise to issues that 
operate at a general level. This differs from disease genetic testing outcomes, which tend to 
operate at a personal level, where the individual is the main focus. In other words, due to the 
therapeutic and genetic-specific nature of pharmacogenetic analysis, drugs based on 
pharmacogenetic information become public genetic information markers of an individual’s 
genetic predisposition. Therefore, issues of stigmatisation, discrimination and fair distribution 
of pharmacogenetic benefits become more apparent. 
 
So, the idea of pharmacogenetic testing being a form of genetic testing has contributed to the 
current confusion about pharmacogenetic testing in clinical trials. This has resulted in the 
incorrect categorisation of pharmacogenetic analysis in drug development research 
governance. The implication of this incorrect perception, I argue, is the misrepresentation of 
ethical issues for pharmacogenetics, which are concerned with pharmacogenetics as a tool for 
disease susceptibility testing, rather than as a risk assessment tool.  
 
4.5 Perceived Ethical Issues 
This section will analyse the oft-cited ethical issues for pharmacogenetics employed in drug 
development. These are ethical issues which are concerned with breaches of the principle of 
respect for autonomy in Principlism, such as informed consent, privacy and confidentiality. It 
is hoped that from these discussions, this thesis will illustrate that although breaches of the 
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principle of autonomy give rise to issues in the areas of informed consent, privacy and 
confidentiality, this is only apparent when the notion of the self is as the ‘autonomous 
individual’; a concept which has given rise to a liberal, individualistic model of the self which 
is dominant in the rights-based morality of Principlism (Rhodes, 2010). However, this concept 
of the ‘autonomous individual’ is challenged by the fact that genetic information is not solely 
individual information, as disclosure of genetic information (indirect information) from an 
individual also exposes information about others with similar genetic profiles. Therefore, drug 
development pharmacogenetics provides ‘indirect’ information on the probability of observing 
a therapeutic response of genes to a particular drug, further substantiating that this is different 
to disease genetic testing, which provides direct information on disease susceptibility. 
 
4.5.1 Issues of Informed consent 
Informed consent—a concept that for decades has stood for the protection of individual choice 
regarding medical treatments or research—begins to break apart in pharmacogenetic drug 
development. The practical application of the principle of respect for autonomy is informed 
consent. Informed consent is important for providing reasonable assurance that a research 
participant has not been deceived or coerced into taking part in research. Ethical breaches of 
informed consent arise when genetic information or data is gathered and stored for testing 
purposes. Genetic data from tissue samples which are stored and utilised for future drug or 
genetically-based disease research are used for potentially a number of research purposes, 
many of which unrelated to the original purposes for which the data was gathered. Therefore, 
potential breaches of the following elements of informed consent become evident: 
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I. Threshold Elements (Preconditions)  
1. Competence (to understand and decide) 
2. Voluntariness (in deciding) 
 
II. Information Elements 
3. Disclosure (of material information) 
4. Recommendation (of a plan) 
5. Understanding (of 3. and 4.) 
III. Consent Elements 
6. Decision (in favour of a plan) 
7. Authorisation (of the chosen plan) 
(Beauchamp, Childress 2009, p.145) 
 
From the Threshold Elements, the increased commercial value of human tissue and financial 
gain to be made in pharmacogenetics could potentially have undue influence on the 
cooperation of research participants. From the Information Elements, intentional non-
disclosure due to the limitlessness timeframe and information, which can be obtained from a 
tissue sample, means that the research participant never fully receives the total ‘picture’ of 
what the research project is undertaking. Furthermore, how can a research participant be 
‘informed’ of the risks and benefits of participation when scientists and clinicians themselves 
may not be aware of all the potential uses of the genetic information gathered? Also, an 
element crucial in any valid transaction is the understanding of that information; in other 
words, the manner and context in which the information is provided. This influences the 
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adequacy of understanding, and can be done by using appropriate terminology, presented in an 
unbiased manner, with encouraging questions for ascertaining what the research participant 
understands. However, the relative understanding in the scientific and medical community of 
the implications of pharmacogenetics research is still quite low, and information provision is 
lodged with industry, so the industry’s perspective is by default put before participants in 
current pharmacogenetics research, which could be perceived as a bias. 
 
Therefore, for the research participant involved in pharmacogenetic clinical trials, ethical 
issues arising from breaches of the elements of informed consent are apparent and still relate 
to the individual.  However, protecting the individual is not the only consideration, since the 
research participant is no longer conceived as an individual existing in an isolated moment in 
time, but rather as a concrete historical person (Peterson-Iyer, 2008), whose genetic 
information will stretch forward in time and be of use to future others. 
 
4.5.2 Issues of privacy 
The use and consequent disclosure of genetic information has brought to the forefront issues 
concerning the protection of privacy. The concept of privacy has a number of definitions; in 
epistemology, privacy is defined as: 
 
 ‘…being known to, or knowable by, only one person…’  
(Bullock, Trombley et al. 1999, p.686) 
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Defined as an ethical right, privacy is the ability to control who has access to us and to 
information about us, as well as our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social 
relationships with different people. In this context, social relationships are those being 
between two people such as relationships between friends, between husband and wife or even 
between an employer and employee (Rachels, 1975). 
 
In a genetic context, it is defined as: 
 
‘…Limited access to a person, the right of an individual to be left alone, and the right 
to keep certain information from disclosure to other individuals…’ 
(Rothstein 2003, p.198)  
 
This definition includes the right of an individual to decide to receive certain information from 
a third party, as well as to share information with others. Privacy defined in this context is 
concerned with keeping information safe, and is noted as a legal right.  
 
Privacy is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Hulstead, Goldman, 
2002), and is a constitutional foundation for the concept ‘the right to know’. When individual 
‘A’ is said to have a right to know about her own or somebody else’s genetic constitution, this 
can mean at least three different things: 
 
1. ‘A’ has no duty to remain ignorant. 
2. Others have a duty not to interfere with ‘A’s’ quest for information. 
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3. Somebody has a positive duty to assist ‘A’ in her quest for information (Häyry, Takala 
2001). 
 
Similarly, when individual ‘B’ is said to have a right not to know about his own or somebody 
else’s genetic constitution, this can mean that: 
 
1. ‘B’ has no duty to know. 
2. Others have a duty not to inform ‘B’ against his will. 
3. Somebody has a positive duty to assist ‘B’ in remaining in ignorance. 
 
The issue of a subject’s right to know (or not know) is linked in part to the concept of 
autonomy, since an element of disclosure is required, which is provided through informed 
consent. However, as previously mentioned, the function of informed consent in research 
involving genetic information is subject to breaches of this required disclosure, due to the 
controversy of revealing sensitive health information.  Also, further breaches need to be 
considered in pharmacogenetics clinical trials, such as the limitlessness timeframe of 
information, which can be obtained from a tissue sample.  
 
However, realistic expectations about the information pharmacogenetics provides must be 
paramount, as analysis of a broad set of genetic markers may only show that a genotypically-
defined subgroup of patients with a certain disease have a higher probability of responding in 
a certain way to a certain drug. Therefore, pharmacogenetic analysis can be likened to the 
assessment of blood pressure, where raised blood pressure is an accepted risk factor for 
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cardiovascular disease, but does not imply that the patient will definitely suffer a specific 
cardiovascular event. This is also seen in genetic susceptibility testing.  Individuals make 
requests for specific tests, believing that the tests will reveal their possible risk of developing a 
disease. For example, in Alzheimer’s disease, individuals request tests for the polymorphisms 
APDE and PSI (gene for apolipoprotein and Presenilin respectively, whose presence indicates 
a risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease). These tests are not predictive, and are currently 
limited to those who already have symptoms of dementia (Benner, Shobe 2003, p.259).  
 
Therefore, the pharmacogenetic-based clinical trial provides information on risk, which is 
considered to be less than risks associated with genetic research for disease genes, due to the 
fact that patients already have the diagnosed disease at entry or already have an available drug 
for treatment. Moreover, the genetic information obtained is limited to the association between 
a gene, i.e. SNP, and reaction to a particular drug or class of drugs. It is used only for 
genotyping for inclusion to a trial, and is not applicable for research for new therapeutic 
targets. Hence, the overall risk is considered to be lower than genetic research for disease 
genes, but is perceived to be high due to the associations with genetic information. 
 
4.5.3 Issues of confidentiality 
Privacy has already been defined in the genetic context, as a right for certain information to be 
kept from disclosure to other individuals.  Confidentiality is considered to be  
 
‘… the right of an individual to prevent re-disclosure of sensitive information that was 
disclosed originally in the confines of a confidential relationship…’ (Rothstein 2003, p.198). 
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 In looking at confidentiality issues, we are examining the issue of ownership, where it could 
be said that an individual owns their own genes (Chadwick, 1998). Such ownership calls into 
question the fact that genetic relatives share these genes, and this can further question an 
individual’s right to confidentiality, especially where this information might affect the 
reproductive decisions of others. This interrelatedness is a platform for the involvement of 
communitarianism, a social philosophy that maintains that society should articulate what is 
good and in turn, should acknowledge the ‘common good’ by focusing on members of the 
larger community rather than the individual. However, since pharmacogenetic data in the drug 
development context does not provide collateral information, confidentiality should not be a 
major concern. 
 
Principlism puts the individual in focus through the principle of respect for autonomy, in 
which breaches of Principlism are interpreted in terms of autonomy violations, bringing the 
language of individual rights to the fore. However, this individualism is challenged in genetic 
considerations, due to genetic information not being solely for the individual. Therefore, 
informed consent, privacy and confidentiality concerns are still apparent for 
pharmacogenetics, but only of the same magnitude as disease genetic testing when employed 
in the same way as a genetic screening tool for disease susceptibility. But it has been 
established that pharmacogenetics is employed as a tool in clinical research for risk 
assessment, and not disease susceptibility. Such risk assessment is more concerned with 
highlighting and conferring the benefits of the outcome of research. Therefore, the next 
section will show what pharmacogenetic’s actual ethical issues are in relation to risk 
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assessment. It will be argued that these actual ethical issues are a matter of justice and not just 
autonomy, since they are concerned more with the fair distribution of research outcomes. 
 
4.6 Actual Ethical Issues   
In this section, I will argue that, due to the stratification of the research participant population 
into genetic groups, the apparent ethical issues in pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials are 
concerned with the equitable distribution of research knowledge and research priorities, rather 
than inference of disease knowledge (as implied by concerns regarding informed consent, 
privacy and confidentiality). In order to justify my argument, the following areas will be 
considered, which are of great importance in pharmacogenetic drug development: research 
prioritisation, division of patients into sub-groups and clinical trials, and the returning of 
genetic information. From such an analysis of the ethical implications of these areas, I will be 
able to analyse further if Principlism in its current execution in research governance is 
adequate.  
 
4.6.1 Research prioritisation 
I argue in this subsection that pharmacogenetics will create issues in research prioritisation if 
introduced into the current market-driven approach of drug development, as epitomised by the 
drug patent process. A governmental process which provides exclusive rights (sole production 
of the drug) to a holder for a designated period of time, typically 20 years. I claim that such an 
approach will lead to inequalities of access to pharmacogenetic outcomes between 
economically diverse nations and individuals. 
  
 
117 
 
 
As noted in section 4.4, the use of pharmacogenetics in drug development initially starts with 
the search for protein products that can act as drug targets, i.e. discovery genomics. But in 
discovery genomics, genomic identification does not provide information on a gene for a 
disease, but instead provides a collection of genes, which code for a protein that can act as a 
drug target. However, certain disease specific genes may also code for proteins which can act 
as drug targets, indicating the overlap between pharmacogenomics and disease genetics. It has 
been estimated that there are 10,000 novel protein targets for potential drugs (Hanke, 2000). If 
you consider that 500 targets have been discovered in the last 30 years from thousands of 
laboratories throughout the world, then to follow-up on this large number of protein targets 
would incur huge expense and immense operational efforts, especially if traditional clinical 
trial methods were used. Therefore, prioritisation of research becomes an issue when 
considering which diseases or genotypes to target first. From the 1393 new chemical entities 
marketed between 1975 and 1999, only 16 were for diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, 
leishmaniasis, and trypanosomiasis, which affect millions of people each year in resource-poor 
settings with underdeveloped health care systems (Trouiller, Olliaro et al. 2002). Yet it is 
noted that ‘frequently’ occurring disease fields such as cancer and cardiovascular are 
producing the initial drug discoveries (Trouiller, Olliaro et al. 2002, p.2191). This is because 
these areas are able to recoup the development costs incurred from their target market, i.e. the 
industrialized world, where these diseases tend to be prevalent (Plump, Lum 2009). 
Nonetheless, with pharmacogenetic drug development, common genetic variants within an 
overall population will be the overarching fields of interest to industry, since they will be those 
which have the largest market potential.  
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Patent rights currently create a temporary monopoly for the inventor firms, enabling them to 
charge prices for their innovations that are many times higher than the marginal cost of 
production. These high returns are to recoup the incurred research and development (R&D) 
costs, and to further fund future R&D initiatives. However, two situations are conferred from 
this pricing strategy; firstly, patents tend to price some users out of the market and secondly, 
patents compel innovation-enabling drug companies to protect their investments in R&D 
(Outterson, 2009).  
 
The patent system was set up to encourage innovation and knowledge for the benefit of 
society, by creating privacy rights to protect inventors from others using their innovations at 
no cost. However, it has encouraged the development of ‘me-too’ medicines - medicines with 
a low index of innovation (a drug that is structurally very similar to already known drugs, with 
only minor differences), that produce small health improvements in a large number of people, 
giving rise to better financial rewards than developing innovative medicines that produce 
major improvements in a smaller number of people (Oprea, Braunack-Mayer et al. 2009, 
p.311). This is due to the cost-effectiveness view of pharmaceutical research; where 
governance of health technology assessment usually involves an evaluation of the incremental 
cost-effectiveness of the new therapy, compared to alternative treatments for the disease in 
question. Therefore, patent rights, due to their financial attractiveness, are instrumental in the 
market failure of the undersupply of pharmaceutical innovations (Sonderholm, 2009a). 
 
Moreover, the current patent system diverts industry research from the health needs of low-
income countries, whose economies cannot secure sufficient financial returns, to recoup 
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industry investment in the research. This impedes both health gains and economic 
development for both low-income and high-income countries, due to the subordination of 
global and national health and economic needs to commercial interests. This is expressed as 
the competition in the market between companies attaining high market shares for their 
products via the registration of patents in different global jurisdictions, fostering a low market 
incentive to develop innovative, effective and affordable drugs.  
 
 
Therefore, the current prioritizing of research is based on the measurement of payback of the 
research, burden of the disease or technology, and estimate of welfare losses (Claxton, 
Sculpher 2006). However, such a market-driven logic in R&D which considers research as a 
means for changing clinical practice needs to be shifted towards a needs-driven logic, based 
on societal value. Research based on societal value would promote research committed to the 
common good. 
 
So, the private sector must do more. There is currently an imbalance between private-sector 
rights and obligations under international agreements. The public sector—i.e. the main buyer 
of pharmaceuticals—provides the private sector with patent incentives for innovation, but has 
little say over the research agenda (as discussed in Section 3.4), which highlights that the field 
of drug development is more of a technocratic discipline with little or no input from public 
bodies. A neglected-disease research obligation would require industry to reinvest a 
percentage of pharmaceutical sales into neglected disease research and development, either 
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directly or through public programmes, such as a global fund, which will be critiqued further 
in chapter six. 
 
Therefore research outcomes such as drugs would be ethically reviewed by governance in 
light of how they contribute to social responsibility, with a focus on promoting health and 
economic freedom and avoiding discrimination. This would contribute to the promotion of 
collective health and economic rights in all countries through the recognition of global social 
justice, which has yet to occur within the current system of just providing humanitarian 
assistance to vulnerable countries.  
 
4.6.2 Division of patients into sub-groups  
As noted in section 4.3, the pharmacogenetic profiling of drugs has the potential to produce 
orphan populations or sub-groups. I will argue in this subsection whether pharmacogenetics 
would further entrench existing patterns of inequality and discrimination i.e. increase social 
risk, and whether this would be morally permissible.  Furthermore, the meaning of ‘race’ in 
research will be discussed, since this concept epitomizes the injustices of inequality and 
discrimination, which threaten to burden this research. 
  
With personalised medicine, research participants would be chosen according to genetic 
makeup for a clinical trial. However, as noted in the previous sub-section, industry will target 
common genetic variants within an overall population, since they have the largest market 
potential. From such stratification, there will always be a sub-group or ‘orphan population’ (a 
patient group with a rare genetic profile where there is currently no pharmacogenetic-based 
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drug available) due to this target group being too small and therefore considered non-
profitable in the current market climate32. For this group, the bulk traditional drug available 
would be prescribed.  
 
Due to this aspect of subdivision of the patient population, the development of 
pharmacogenetic based drugs has been noted to be analogous to the development of orphan 
drugs33, where it is envisaged that appropriate policies for pharmacogenetics would be realised 
from the understanding of the characteristics of the economic and policy impact of orphan 
drugs (Boon, Moors 2008). In the introduction of the Orphan Drug Act 1983 (US) and the EU 
Orphan Drug Regulation 2000, orphan drugs had the beneficial effect of allowing faster 
approvals of these drugs to the market, due to the registration of such drugs being based on 
reduced clinical trial sizes, the acknowledgement of the life-threatening nature of these 
diseases and the lack of alternative effective treatments. Such a realisation of these factors 
would contribute to alleviation of the issue of equity of access to pharmacogenetic-based 
drugs. This would aid the development of smaller economical markets and therefore increase 
pricing to recoup R&D costs (van Delden, Bolt et al. 2004, p.312; Smart, Martin et al. 2004, 
p.328). Furthermore, if pharmacogenetics leads to more efficient clinical trials, as noted in 
Section 4.4, then it is foreseen that lower development costs would be expected; hence, an 
overall decrease in pricing, especially if the current patenting system was reviewed in line 
                                                             
32 Assumptions are made if the drug is developed according to the current patenting system. 
33 Orphan drugs are medicinal products for rare diseases which are defined as life-threatening or chronically 
debilitating such as cystic fibrosis and phenylketonuria, which affect less than 2000 individuals in a given 
population (Europe US). They are labelled as “orphan” because drug companies are not interested in ‘adopting’ 
them as markets for new products. 
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with this pharmacogenetic expectation. As stated by Steve Burrill, CEO of Burrill & Co (a 
private merchant bank focused exclusively on life sciences companies): 
 
‘People used to equate rare diseases with small markets and small margins…But small 
markets don't necessarily translate to poor economics. 
(Goodman, 2001) 
 
This statement noted a change in thinking in relation to the development of orphan drugs, 
which can be attributed to the pharmacogenetic drug market where orphan populations can be 
focused upon to produce monopolistic niche markets. If regulated in the same way as orphan 
drugs (as in put through a fast tracked registration system according to therapeutic need and 
with reduced development times), a beneficial model system for understanding ‘neighbouring 
indications’ could be considered. Therefore, due to this ‘beneficent’ aspect of the orphan 
population, it could be morally permissible to have such sub-groups, if pharmacogenetic 
products were developed and registered in the same mode as for orphan drugs. This is because 
the development of drugs based on the orphan model would not be subjected to the value-
based, cost-effective models of R&D assessment, which would hinder development34. 
 
However, pharmacogenetic testing is still a matter of probability, which still puts some 
patients at risk from suffering adverse events whether they are in the general or orphan 
population. This raises the question: how much weight should pharmacogenetic information 
be given in the treatment decision process? It also highlights the issue of discrimination due to 
                                                             
34 Since the development of orphan drugs for rare diseases is considered to be expensive due to the small number 
of patients who would be eligible for treatment. 
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inappropriate denial of treatment because of genetic categorisation. When first analysing the 
question regarding the weight of pharmacogenetic information, we need to consider that 
treatment decisions tend to involve other factors such as patient condition, cost–benefit of the 
treatment and therapeutic alternatives. However, with the probabilistic nature of 
pharmacogenetics, refusal of treatment becomes problematic, especially when there is a weak 
genetic association and no therapeutic alternative. Since it cannot be guaranteed that the drug 
can be safely used in such patients or that they would benefit from such therapy, this raises the 
possibility of inappropriate denial of treatment due to their genetic categorisation. Professional 
judgements are still required for interpretation of patient categorisation and treatment options, 
emphasising liability issues for the clinicians and industry due to the responsibility of patient 
treatment outcomes and expectations. Liability issues of increased risk of inappropriate off-
label prescribing could be minimised if further obligations to these groups were sanctioned to 
improve post-marketing surveillance, and stiffen professional sanctions against inappropriate 
off –label use.   
 
Despite this, the study of rare conditions or ‘orphan’ conditions merits scientific study, since 
these conditions can provide medical insights and potential drugs for common conditions, as 
they are generated from single gene alterations. For example, patients with breast cancer may 
be subdivided into several (small) groups with different genetic profiles, giving rise to drugs 
targeted to these profiles, as well as providing further information on the nature of the disease, 
as illustrated by the breast cancer drug  Trastuzumab (marketed as Herceptin).  Herceptin was 
licensed for use in the UK in 2000 and is used to treat end-stage breast cancer in women 
  
 
124 
 
whose tumours produce too much of the protein HER2. Prior to treatment, the tumour tissue is 
tested to assess its HER2 status, and around 30% of patients are eligible for treatment.  
 
The categorisation of individuals into particular sub groups may give rise to circumstances of 
stigmatisation and social discrimination. An individual could be perceived as difficult to treat 
if they did not fall into a known treatment category, or where genetic stratification results in a 
clinically relevant difference such as a disease risk or prognosis. Such secondary information 
has social implications, as it is relevant to third parties such as the family, and prompts further 
questions about who could or should obtain test results and under what circumstances. 
Therefore, in the revelation of secondary information, pharmacogenetic information should be 
treated as a form of genetic test. 
 
These new categories of stigmatisation and social discrimination beg the question: have 
existing patterns of stigmatisation and social discrimination, such as ethnic or racial 
categories, become more entrenched with the genetic understanding of drug responses?  In 
addressing this question, the use of the concept of race in research will be deliberated, as will 
the impact of genomics on this concept and its ethical implications. References will be made 
to Joon –Ho Yu’s35 article Race-based medicine and justice as recognition: exploring the 
phenomenon of BiDil (Yu, 2009), which provides a refreshing outlook on this well cited 
example of a potential ‘race-specific’ drug.  
 
It has been noted that: 
                                                             
35 Senior Fellow at the University of Washington School of Medicine, Dept. Pediatrics, Div. Genetics 
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 ‘…pharmacogenetic information may alleviate, or it may entrench existing 
inequalities in healthcare based on race or ethnicity…’   
(Smart, Martin et al. 2004, p.335) 
 
This statement is based on the problem of using race as a factor in medicine, i.e. race-
conscious medicine, where public funds for treatments and research and development are 
based on race. The approval and marketing of BiDil is an example of ‘racially profiled’ 
(Smart, Martin et al. 2004) prescribing. This discourse will only outline the BiDil controversy 
in order to provide a background of how race could be used in pharmacogenetic research. 
However, it will be argued that the BiDil case will not necessarily become the norm for the 
way that pharmacogenetic-based drugs are introduced to the market, since one notes that the 
BiDil case is a symptom of health disparities. It could be further argued that drugs developed 
using pharmacogenetic techniques may actually have the possibility to eliminate racial 
disparities in health, as mentioned in Joon –Ho Yu article’s opening statement: 
 
 ‘…in the United States, health disparities have been framed by categories of race. Racial 
health disparities have been documented for cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, 
HIV/AIDS, and numerous other diseases and measures of health status. Although such 
disparities can be read as symptoms of disparities in healthcare access, pervasive social and 
economic inequities, and discrimination…’ (Yu, 2009) 
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However, the case of BiDil gives rise to controversy, due to the idea of demographically 
targeted treatment that could potentially result in the provision of better medical care for 
particular populations, but not for others. 
 
The drug BiDil was approved in 2005 by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the 
treatment of heart failure in patients who identified themselves as African Americans. 
Approval of the drug was based on the statistical re-review of the original V-HeFT trials (the 
Vasodilator-Heart Failure Trials), and a later A-HeFT (African American Heart Failure Trial). 
Evidence that the drug was effective in this group of patients was noted in the first V-HeFT 
trials and a race –specific methods patent was applied to treat heart failure in African 
Americans. This resulted in the A-HeFT obtaining further information on this drug in the 
African American population (Jordan, 2008). Corresponding evidence for the drug’s 
effectiveness in other self-identified racial groups, i.e. ‘Whites’ and ‘Hispanics’, was not made 
available at the time of approval. Also, it should be noted that BiDil did not result from 
pharmacogenetic research, but from the re-examination of statistical data. However, it has 
been stated that BiDil encouraged the use of pharmacogenetic technology to concentrate on 
the coding for racial phenotypes (Yu, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, the way that human difference has been conceptualised (such as in the concept 
of race) and used in health-disparities research has had profound moral consequences. The 
appreciation that there were continuing and widening disparities among black and white 
Americans in a number of diseases led to the enactment of the NIH (National Institutes of 
Health) Revitalization Act of 1993. This legislation required that all NIH-sponsored phase III 
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clinical trials include minorities and women in sufficient numbers, so that a valid subset 
analysis could be done (Shavers, 2007). 
 
 Yet with the introduction of genetic science, it has been shown that all humans are 1 per cent 
different from one another in terms of genetic structure, and only 15 per cent of this relates to 
race (Rothstein, Epps 2001). From this 15 per cent, intragroup variation is more predominant 
than intergroup variation, thus rendering the idea of a racial group as a homogenous race as 
obsolete. Bearing this in mind, in relation to BiDil, it would be an overgeneralisation to state 
that all African Americans would respond positively to BiDil. In subsequent pharmacogenetic 
analysis of BiDil response, individuals of a West-African descent have been shown to respond 
positively, but this does not indicate that persons from other African descents would also 
respond positively. Therefore, defining BiDil as an African American drug ignores the genetic 
breadth of African Americans. However, despite this information, African American 
community leaders capitalized on BiDil, using the opportunity to bring attention to African 
American health issues, even running the risk of inaccurately portraying race as biological. 
Such a portrayal has been strategic in affirming the use of race to ultimately transform the 
process of drug development, through a strategy based on a demand for justice (based on 
Nancy Fraser's bivalent theory of justice on asserting a demand for justice) and not just 
consequentialist benefit.  Fraser’s theory asserts that there are two types of injustice, based on 
misrecognition and maldistribution, which are rooted in cultural domination (subjection to 
alien standards of judgement) perpetuated by economic systems (Lovell, 2007). In the BilDil 
case, the affirmation of racial labels in the short term was used to seek recognition for a 
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disparity of health distribution. Therefore, this embraced the rhetoric of difference and 
emphasised the approach of different social groups harbouring different genes.  
 
For that reason, in pharmacogenetics research, the study of difference occurs at the DNA 
level, and variation at the genetic level puts forth new categories for comparison across human 
populations based on molecular difference, and not phenotypes such as race. Such 
interpretation would minimise the potential for unequal access to resources and opportunities 
based on racial or cultural lines. Therefore, research initiatives which overlook the fact that 
census categories used as descriptors of difference are indeed political, and instead confer the 
idea that these categories are scientifically meaningful would be rendered obsolete (such as the 
epidemiological studies funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which insist on the 
representation of minority groups to demonstrate representation of the population) (Lee, 
Mountain et al. 2001, p. 67). A disciplined focus on patterns of genetic variation, which is not 
influenced by prior racial categorisation of research participants, is therefore required to avoid 
reinforcing the destructive notion that biological races exist, in order to gain fuller 
understanding of health disparities (Lee, Mountain et al. 2001). 
 
4.6.3 Clinical trials and the returning of genetic information 
As noted earlier, pharmacogenetic screening of research participants to enable the linking of 
their responses to the tested drug would generally be performed in the early phases of 
research, such as Phase I.  Such screening would reveal information about whether a research 
participant was a responder or non-responder to the drug, i.e. reveal information about whether 
they are difficult to treat with a given drug therapy. This sub-section will argue that results 
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from a clinical trial which note this information should be returned to participants on a benefit 
to risk basis, based on the following criteria (Renegar, Webster et al. 2006) derived from the 
minimal risk standard utilised in research governance;  
 
 Clinical relevance 
 Privacy and Confidentiality 
 Competency of persons returning the results 
 
Clinical relevance 
 
Genetic information can be worrisome or even psychologically harmful, due to its perceived 
deterministic nature and potential implication for future healthcare. The decision on whether 
and how to return results must therefore consider the interests of the research participant, and 
balance this against the realities of the research results, which are, in fact, exploratory genetic 
results (exploratory information), which have not yet reached the point of general clinical 
acceptance (Renegar, Webster et al. 2006, p.31). In general, genetic research results are a 
broad category of information that include both validated and non-validated, highly and poorly 
predictive, probabilistic, and deterministic data. In drug development trials, genotypic 
information is often not readily interpretable, and even results that are widely recognised 
among geneticists do not necessarily lead to clear clinical interpretations (due to low or 
incomplete penetrance of the genotype), or practical implementation for patients. Also 
considerations must be made for the practicalities of expecting investigators to maintain 
contact with research participants, perhaps for extended periods of time, for the purpose of 
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offering participants access to updated information. A sensible solution is required for 
investigators, the industry, and regulators with regard to the limitations of access to 
information to the research participant.  
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
There are potential risks and benefits which need to be considered in terms of the receiving of 
results. Research participants should appreciate that most genetic research is undertaken to 
benefit society and not just individuals. Disclosure of individual genetic results, possibly 
negating the research setting’s confidentiality safeguards, may disadvantage the participant if 
such information is misused. As noted by the CHMP guidelines on pharmacogenetics which 
will be critiqued latter in section 5.4 (CPMP, 2002), the research participant’s clinical trial 
record is an important component of data for submission to regulatory authorities, which 
should be made accessible to the authorities to validate the evidence that is reported. 
Furthermore, this record may link a clinical outcome to a particular type of patient. Therefore, 
the use of data from a study involving anonymised samples might not be acceptable for the 
submission of a claim, since regulatory bodies would not be able to include such anonymised 
information due to the mere fact of not being able to trace the phenotypic features of this 
information. 
 
Competency of persons returning the results 
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Due to the fact–laden content of pharmacogenetic information, persons (usually the doctor as 
investigator) who are responsible for providing this data to participants, should be able to 
communicate the data in a manner (and at a level) which is informative and appreciative of the 
participant’s social and psychological standing. According to philosopher and bioethicist 
Julian Savulescu, a rational, non-interventional, and paternalistic manner should be employed, 
to avoid being just fact-providers (Savulescu, 1995). This means the doctor actually takes on 
the paternalistic role, and makes judgements on what information provided is in the best 
interest of the participant, while rejecting the idea that the participant cannot seek any further 
information if they so wish. 
 
Therefore, as the body of data on genotype-phenotype associations grows, the international 
research community, in partnership with key stakeholders, must be prepared to reach a 
consensus on when and how genetic research information (with all of the appropriate 
qualifiers and caveats to place it in a proper context), should be made available to research 
participants who desire it. Factors such as scientific validity, clinical relevance, and clarity of 
information provided to recipients need to be considered, as well as measures for maintaining 
confidentiality and preventing discrimination. 
 
It has been shown that the ethical issues of pharmacogenetics are more concerned with the 
equitable distribution of research knowledge and research priorities than inference of disease 
knowledge, as implied by ethical concerns regarding privacy, confidentiality and 
discrimination, which have been the main focus of research governance policy. Furthermore, 
the persistent references (as gathered from the literature) to these implied ethical concerns for 
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pharmacogenetics illustrate how Principlism has entrenched concerns and increased 
perceptions of unethical research for this technology, in terms of research participant 
liabilities. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Pharmacogenetics has attracted great interest because of the expectations of improved drug 
safety and efficacy. The main advantage for industry is providing the potential for more 
economical and faster (smaller) clinical trials. I have asserted that the role of 
pharmacogenetics in drug development is to act as a risk assessment tool for the production of 
more effective medicines with minimal adverse effects. This is achieved by using genetic 
information about patients, to maximise therapeutic benefits and minimise harmful side effects 
by prescribing drugs targeted to genomic patient populations. The nature of this technology 
has the potential to decrease drug development costs. However, in producing these benefits, 
pharmacogenetics would create subdivisions according to genotype in the patient population, 
ushering in the ‘cherry picking’ of ‘valuable’ subsets of the population for a clinical trial. 
Subsets where efficacy is likely to be proved, or less likely to be susceptible to ADRs. This 
also introduces the consideration that certain subsets would become economically ‘valuable’ 
to industry or governments.  
 
As a risk assessment tool, pharmacogenetics gives rise to ethical issues concerned with 
conferring benefits of the outcome of research such as the fair distribution of research 
outcomes, (i.e. justice) rather than autonomy, due to the stratification of the research 
participant population into genetic groups.  
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Therefore pharmacogenetic drug development ethical issues are concerned with equitable 
distribution of research knowledge and research priorities, rather than inference of disease 
knowledge.  Suggesting whether the current interpretation of Principlism exercised in 
pharmacogenetic research governance provides an adequate ethical underpinning for the 
resolving of these issues? In the next chapter, this question will be addressed. 
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5. Chapter Five: The Application of Principlism in 
Pharmacogenetic Research Governance 
5.1 Introduction 
The central question for this thesis is: why the Principlist approach for research governance in 
pharmacogenetic-based drug development? Preceding chapters have focused partly on 
answering this question, in addition to determining the adequacy of the current interpretation 
of Principlism in research governance of pharmacogenetics research in resolving the ethical 
issues arising from this research. Chapter two answered the question to some extent through 
the critique of why Principlism was considered over other notable ethical frameworks in drug 
research regulation. The chapter concluded that Principlism was selected due to its ease of use, 
as the principles were regarded as general guides that could be applied to most ethical 
situations. Furthermore, I noted that Principlism, being an ethical framework that is 
entrenched in rights-based morality, better serves concerns for human rights in healthcare, 
which is an important feature of current research governance.  
 
In chapter three, I argued that the exercising of human rights concerns occurs mainly through 
the practical application of the principle of respect for autonomy as the informed consent 
process, as well as the management of risk through risk assessment standards such as the 
minimal risk standard. Chapter four introduced the argument of whether Principlism provided 
adequate ethical guidance for the resolving of pharmacogenetics’ actual ethical issues. This 
argument will be developed fully in this chapter by critiquing the pertinent ethical codes and 
guidelines utilised in drug development involving human participants and applied currently to 
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pharmacogenetics drug development. This critique will focus on whether the exercising of 
Principlism through these approaches has rendered as secondary other issues of ethical 
assessment within research, such as justice.  
 
Consequently, section 5.2 will analyse how Principlism, through the dominant ethical medical 
guidelines of the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report, 
became the ethical framework of choice for research governance. The formalised international 
quality standard of Good Clinical Practice (GCP) will be critiqued in section 5.3, since this is a 
prominent example of how current research governance is exercised at an ethical level in drug 
development. Section 5.4 will be concerned with the application of pharmacogenetic-specific 
guidelines, such as the position paper on the terminology in pharmacogenetics by the CHMP 
(CPMP, 2002), and the report Pharmacogenetics: ethical issues published by the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2003). This will lead to section 5.5, 
‘Protectionism as Dogma’. Here, I will summarise my argument on the ethical interpretation 
of the management of risk, which is based on Principlism (as discussed in chapter three). I will 
argue that the current interpretation of  Principlism’s overriding deference to the principle of 
autonomy, namely the practical application of the informed consent process, has rendered this 
principle to merely a protective ‘tool’ for the research participant. In addressing this argument, 
I will be appealing to Rosalind Rhodes’s article Rethinking Research Ethics (Rhodes, 2005), 
since it presents a view of how this deference to the informed consent process may have 
arisen. From the presentation of this argument and review of current influential guidelines and 
policy documents utilised in pharmacogenetic research governance, I aim to demonstrate that 
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the current interpretation of Principlism is not sufficiently specific for providing adequate 
guidance in the area of justice concerns for pharmacogenetic-based research governance.  
 
5.2 Ethical Codes and Guidelines 
Ethical codes and guidelines in medical research and, consequently, clinical trials, emerged as 
a result of atrocities to which research participants were subjected. This section will discuss 
how the various dominant ethical medical guidelines, such as the Nuremberg Code, the 
Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report, were developed and eventually embraced 
Principlism as the ethical framework to protect the research participant. 
 
5.2.1 The Nuremberg Code 
A war crime gave rise to the most influential and widely quoted ethical code for biomedical 
research involving human participants; a code based on protection of the vulnerable from 
exploitation in research. This was known as the Nuremberg Code (National Institutes of 
Health, 1949). 
 
The Nuremberg Code (herein referred to as ‘The Code’) was the first international document 
to advocate voluntary participation and informed consent (Shuster, 1998). The document 
emerged from the US Military tribunal in the 1946-7 that was convened to investigate the 
atrocities of human experimentation performed during the Second World War. This was the 
first international research ethical guideline, and was intended to ensure that participants in 
medical research and research in general should not be vulnerable to abuse. The code was 
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established to address ethical breaches surrounding the notion of autonomy, such as 
autonomous choice. It stressed that it is important:  
 
‘…to respect autonomous agents [by] acknowledging their right…to make choices, 
and to take actions based on their personal values and beliefs...’ 
(Loue 1999, p.103)  
 
The Code (see Appendix (i) and summarised below) comprises 10 clauses that must be met to 
justify the involvement of human participants. These clauses describe the need for the 
protection of research participants from injury or death, with relation to autonomy rights: 
 
1. Must have voluntary consent of the human participant. 
2. Experiments should yield fruitful results for the good of society. 
3. Experiments should be based on animal trials, with results that justify the experiment. 
4. Experiments should be conducted to avoid unnecessary physical and mental injury. 
5. No experiment should be conducted to where death or injuries will reasonably occur. 
6. Degree of risk should never exceed the humanitarian importance of the problem. 
7. Preparations should be made to protect research participants against possibilities of injury, 
disability, or death. 
8. Experiments should only be conducted by scientifically qualified persons. 
9. Research participants should be allowed to end participation in the experiment at any 
stage. 
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10. Scientists in charge must be prepared to end the experiment, if a continuation is likely to 
result in injury, disability, or death. 
 
The first clause or principle is considered the most important and an ethical necessity, not only 
in research36, but also in medical treatment: 
 
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the 
person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to 
be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of 
force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or 
coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of 
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened 
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative 
decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, 
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be 
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects 
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the 
experiment. 
 
                                                             
36 Pappworth. M.H., ‘Ethical Principles’ in Human Guinea Pigs- Experimentation on Man’ (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd, 1967), 188. Maurice Pappworth’s book was the major catalyst for change in ethics and regulation in 
biomedical research in the 1970s. He suggested a code of principles for human experimentation -a precursor to 
Principlism and basis for current clinical research regulation based on equality: valid consent; prohibited research 
participants; previous animal experiments; experimenter’s competence; proper records. 
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The purpose of the Code was to merge Hippocratic ethics37 and the protection of human rights 
into a single document (Shuster, 1998). However, it has been argued this combination is 
usually unsuccessful in research ethics, due to the non-interventionist and reflective nature of 
the ‘Hippocratic’ physician who sides with life, and pledges  
 
‘…to help or at least to do no harm…’  
(Shuster 1998, p.974) 
 
With Hippocratic ethics, consideration of the patient’s autonomy is not a requisite, unlike the 
physician’s autonomy, which is required in order to act in the patient’s best interest.  
 
However, the Code replaced physician-centred Hippocratic ethics with research participant-
centred human rights. Hippocratic ethics were concerned with a physician’s pledges of 
benefiting patients on a case-by-case basis according to the physician’s ability and judgement 
(Veatch, Mason 1987). It has been noted that such considerations do not take into account 
medical care allocation amongst patients, since the physician focuses on one patient at a time. 
Hence, the Hippocratic Oath does not mention platitudes for issues concerning distribution, 
justice and rights to healthcare (Veatch, Mason 1987).  
 
The Code requires the physician as a researcher (commonly known as the investigator in drug 
development) to protect the life and welfare of research participants (principles 2 through 8 
and 10), declaring that research participants must assert their autonomy to protect themselves 
                                                             
37 Hippocratic ethics are concerned with a physician’s pledges of benefiting patients on a case by case basis 
according to the physician’s ability and judgement (Veatch, Mason 1987). 
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through informed consent and the right to withdraw from the study (principles 1 and 9) 
(Shuster 1998, p.975). Therefore, the research participant’s autonomy becomes as important as 
that of the investigator. 
 
This eventual merge of Hippocratic ethics and human rights into a single code aimed to 
dissuade people from the temptation of subordinating the research participant’s rights to the 
will of the investigator, whilst retaining the beneficent view of the investigator (Hippocratic 
physician-researcher) towards the welfare of their research participants. The Code was also the 
first research ethical guideline to recognise and provide core principles in relation to 
individual rights. However, the subordination of the rights of research participants to the 
investigator's will did become evident, especially when research was perceived as extremely 
important, promising results that could substantially improve the care of future patients. When 
this kind of research was contemplated, efficiency and the perceived need to obtain prompt 
answers to significant research questions have been known to overwhelm the rights and 
welfare of research participants.  
 
An apt illustration of this was observed with the Tuskegee Syphilis experiments, conducted 
between 1932 and 1972 (Curran, 1973). These experiments were performed prior to the 
existence of an effective treatment for syphilis, but ended long after effective antibiotics were 
available. Hundreds of black sharecroppers with late-stage syphilis were never told from 
which disease they were suffering, or of its seriousness. Instead, they were left to deteriorate in 
ignorance, albeit with the prospect of ‘free’ medical care. This was deemed necessary for 
collecting data on the conflicting effects of the disease on blacks and whites (the theory being 
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that whites experienced more neurological complications from syphilis, whereas blacks were 
more susceptible to cardiovascular damage), in addition to observing the natural course of the 
disease.  
   
Therefore, due to the probable oversights inherent in the Hippocratic Oath, the Code was not 
considered as relevant to the physician-as-researcher, who rationalised that experimental work 
was treatment ‘benefiting’ patients (Shuster, 1998). Furthermore, it became apparent that the 
Code was deemed relevant only to Nazi doctors and their associated atrocities; consequently, 
it was ignored for 20 years after its inception (Horner, 1999). Moreover, the Code was 
apparently unconcerned with providing guidance on the burgeoning ethical issues surrounding 
the distribution of healthcare resources, use of research participants, privacy, community 
responsibility and truthfulness (Griffin, O’Grady 2004).  
 
5.2.2 The Declaration of Helsinki 
The Declaration of Helsinki (DoH) (see Appendix (ii)) superseded the Code and was adopted 
initially by the World Medical Association in 1964. As a result of a number of notable 
criticisms (which will be discussed in this section), and the burgeoning core ethical principles, 
as noted in the Belmont report (which now constitute Principlism), the DoH published in June 
1964 has undergone a number of revisions. The most recent of these were made in October 
2013.  
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The DoH emphasised the role of physicians in conducting medical research involving human 
research participants, in addition to medical research on identifiable human material or 
identifiable data, as cited in the introduction: 
 
1. The World Medical Association has developed the Declaration of Helsinki as a 
statement of ethical principles to provide guidance to physicians and other 
participants in medical research involving human subjects. Medical research involving 
human subjects includes research on identifiable human material or identifiable data  
(World Medical Association, 2008) 
 
Furthermore, stringent requirements for the minimal risk standard38 criteria were provided, 
which were applicable to incompetent research participants. However, this raised questions on 
the scope of informed consent for competent research participants, especially when granting 
permission to conduct vaccines research on children (Williams, 2008). These (and many other) 
major criticisms of the DoH, outlined below, became apparent and led to numerous revisions; 
  
 The criticism of the omission of a review mechanism for researchers’ (both 
investigator and non-physician researcher) actions. 
 The criticisms concerned with the distinction between therapeutic clinical 
research (research that provides treatment benefiting the patient-research 
                                                             
38 The minimal risk standard is sometimes known as the ‘best interest standard’; considered to be a guide to 
select what most informed, rational people of good will would regard as maximising net benefits and minimizing 
net harms for less competent research participants (Kopelman, 1997). 
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participant) and non-therapeutic clinical research (research which is purely 
scientific, without direct therapeutic value) on healthy participants39, apparent 
in the following DoH Articles 31 and 32:  
 
31. The physician may combine medical research with medical care only to the extent that 
the research is justified by its potential preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic value, and 
if the physician has good reason to believe that participation in the research study will 
not adversely affect the health of the patients who serve as research subjects. 
 
32. The benefits, risks, burdens and effectiveness of a new intervention must be tested 
against those of the best current proven intervention, except in the following 
circumstances: 
 
 The use of placebo, or no treatment, is acceptable in studies where no current 
proven intervention exists. 
 Where for compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons the use of 
placebo is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of an intervention and the 
patients who receive placebo or no treatment will not be subject to any risk of 
serious or irreversible harm. Extreme care must be taken to avoid abuse of this 
option  
(World Medical Association, 2008) 
 
                                                             
39 A category of voluntary research participant prevalent in phase I clinical trials.  
  
 
144 
 
This implied that therapeutic research is justifiable, since it benefits patients, and that non-
therapeutic research was also tenable due to its social benefit; i.e. it has the well-being of 
society in mind. This suggests that procedures are legitimate if performed for the good of 
persons in general, rather than the patient or society. 
 
The criticism regarding the lack of a review mechanism for researchers was triggered by 
reports of commonplace serious abuses of research ethics, which led to the first revision of the 
DoH in 1975 (Williams, 2008). This amendment added the requirement of an independent 
review committee for the advance review of all research projects, and the prerequisite of 
adhering to the DoH for the publication of results. 
 
5.2.3 The Belmont Report 
During the Thalidomide disaster in 1962, it was revealed that the drug marketed as a mild 
sleeping pill that was safe for pregnant women to take, caused thousands of babies worldwide 
to be born with malformed limbs. As a direct consequence, all previous research legislation 
was consolidated to ensure stricter controls on drug testing, marketing and advertising. 
Furthermore, the ethical principle of respect for autonomy through the practical requirement of 
patients to provide ‘informed consent’ became mandatory before participating in drug studies. 
All these sanctions created a formal regulatory structure, ensuring that legislation was 
adequately and fully implemented (Griffin, O’Grady 2004). The introduction of the Medicines 
Act (1968) in the UK, and the US the National Research Act of 1974, led to the establishment 
of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research (1974-1978). Work from this Commission was then revised and 
  
 
145 
 
expanded on by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in order to formulate 
the Commission’s report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research, named the Belmont Report. 
 
Published in 1979, the Belmont Report was charged with identifying the ethical principles for 
governing research involving human research participants, and the formulation of appropriate 
guidelines. It defined a principle as: 
  
‘…a general judgment that serves as a basic justification for the many particular 
prescriptions for and evaluation of human actions…’ 
 
(National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research (US), 1979)  
 
Principlism was first identified by the Belmont Report as:  
 
‘…general judgments that serve as a basics justification for the many particular 
ethical prescriptions and evaluations of human action…’  
(Jonsen, Veatch et al. 2000). 
 
The three principles identified were:  
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 Respect for persons – ‘The principle…divides into two separate moral requirements [1] 
the requirement to acknowledge autonomy, and [2] the requirement to protect those with 
diminished autonomy’. 
 Beneficence - expressed as two general rules of beneficent actions; ‘[1] do not harm; and 
[2] maximise possible benefits and minimise possible harms’.  
 Justice – ‘…equals ought to be treated equally’ 
  
(National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research (US), 1979) 
 
The report took the position that research involving human participants must not violate any 
universally applicable ethical standards, but should acknowledge the application of the ethical 
principles. For example, for individual autonomy and informed consent, cultural values 
needed to be taken into account, whilst, simultaneously, the ethical principle of respect for 
persons needs to be adhered to. This is quite a challenge for international research ethics, as 
biomedical research is conducted in a multicultural world with a multiplicity of healthcare 
systems that vary considerably in terms of standards. This situation has fuelled the argument 
of moral relativism, whereby ethical statements (not necessarily these principles) can be 
regarded as true for the members of one society or culture, but false for those of another 
(Bullock, Trombley et al. 1999, p.743). Moreover, an argument has been raised about whether 
it is realistic for these principles to be universally recognised (Beauchamp, 2004), especially 
when such focus is placed on the features of differences, such as culture, religion, and 
ideology (to name but a few). However, it has been noted that, if focus could be reoriented to 
  
 
147 
 
recognising in these features aspects that unite humans whilst acknowledging the differences, 
this would indeed move research ethics towards attaining universality (Razis, 1990) and 
achieve coherent and effective research governance. I argue this point further in chapter six, in 
a critique of a global research ethic framework as proposed by David Thomasma (Thomasma, 
1997).  A moral framework that subscribes to a minimal morality which takes into accounts 
both reasons and emotions that are not culturally dependant, providing additional guidance for 
international research governance. 
 
Despite the issues raised on moral relativism and universality, Principlism was enshrined in 
the Belmont Report, and clearly became an ethical guideline for applying ethics to medicine, 
through the authoritative academic text of the first edition of the Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics published in 1977. In this source, Principlism consisted of the following: (1) norms 
intrinsic to medical practice that guide determinations of what the best action is in medicine; 
(2) the fundamental ethical principles; autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, 
that should guide ethical action in medicine; and (3) moral judgements for certain situations 
based on the application of these principles noted in (2) (Emanuel, Wendler et al. 2000).  
 
Today, Principlism has evolved, as noted in the seventh edition of Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (Beauchamp, 2013), from a singular deductive approach of applying medical ethics 
‘principles’, to one that reflects common practice. In other words, progression has been made 
towards a:  
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‘“… [universal] morality theory" by which the four principles are elucidated and justified…’ 
(Emanuel, Wendler et al. 2000).  
 
However, this new direction has attracted criticisms regarding whether Principlism contains 
the correct values for a ‘universal morality’ theory, having ‘no decision procedure’ (Charles, 
2003) due to a mismatch of ethical theories. This has led to the criticism that Principlism lacks 
specific guidance on applying the principles, due to the perception of their prime facie nature, 
and the potential for different interpretations. Furthermore, the notion of a universal morality 
has raised a number of criticisms, with regards to the universality of the framework, which has 
been described as ‘distinctly American in character’ (Holm, 1995). Due to the premise of the 
four principles approach being based on the shared morality of a specific society (i.e. US), and 
in order to establish a universal morality theory, an internal set of norms considered acceptable 
cross-culturally must be evident. 
 
Therefore, current clinical research governance arose from historical abuses and 
misapprehensions of research participants and researchers respectively. This caused moral 
decision making for the ethical conduct of research to be concerned with the safety and rights 
of the research participant. Principlism fits neatly into this requisite, mainly because of the 
principle of respect for autonomy, interpreted as the concept of informed consent, which is 
considered to be the cornerstone of research ethics. However, it is crucial to remember that for 
research to be regarded as ethical, all principles within Principlism must be subscribed to, even 
if the willing, fully informed cooperation of the research participant is gained.  
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5.3 Good Clinical Practice 
At an ethical level, drug development research governance is exercised through the quality 
standard, Good Clinical Practice (GCP)40. By adhering to GCP, regulators and the industry 
believe they have conducted clinical trials in an ethical manner. Compliance with GCP should 
provide public assurance that the rights, safety and wellbeing of trial participants are 
protected.  
 
This quality standard arose in the 1960s, due to widespread concern amongst members of the 
medical profession, the scientific community, regulatory authorities, and the general 
community about the safety and control of investigational drugs and the clinical research 
process, following the Thalidomide disaster in 1962 . This gave rise to the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments in 1962 in the US, which established procedures for the clinical evaluation of 
drugs that required assurance of informed consent of the research subjects, and required 
reporting of adverse drug reactions. Consequently, the entire regulatory system was re-shaped 
in the UK. A Committee on the Safety of Drugs (CSD) was launched in 1963, followed by a 
voluntary adverse drug reaction (ADR) reporting system (Yellow Card Scheme) in 1964. The 
DoH, introduced in 1964, provided ethical underpinning of GCP by acknowledging the 
principles of Principlism for medical research involving human subjects. It was a major 
landmark in recognising GCP as a standard for drug development (Abraham, Grace et al. 
2009). Therefore, how GCP interprets Principlism in the Declaration will be discussed in this 
section. Furthermore, I will argue that there is no emphasis on GCP of serving the common 
                                                             
40 Also referred to as ICH GCP,  ICH referring to The International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, however for the purposes of this discourse the 
term GCP will only be used. 
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good (i.e. of promoting generalised knowledge or providing specific guidance to justice 
concerns), particularly in the area of pharmacogenetic research governance. 
 
GCP processes and procedures set out responsibilities for key organisations and individuals, 
including funders, researchers, organisations employing researchers, and healthcare 
organisations (Shaw, Petchey et al. 2009). These responsibilities are formalised under the EU 
Directive 2001/20/EC, whereby all clinical trials performed in drug development in the 
European Union are required to be conducted under this directive (European Parliament, 
2001) and, therefore, this standard. The directive acts as a form of governance which is 
administrative in nature, concerned with regulating potential risks in clinical trials.  
 
The following definition of GCP is given in Article 1, Clause 2 from the directive 
(implemented in 2004 which governs clinical trials conducted in the UK): 
 
‘…a set of internationally recognised ethical and scientific quality requirements which 
must be observed for designing, conducting, recording and reporting clinical trials 
that involve the participation of human subjects…’  
(European Parliament, 2001) 
 
Therefore, the principles set out in GCP broadly cover the protection of clinical trial 
participants and the scientific approach in design and analysis. GCP is encapsulated in 
guidelines from the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) of technical 
requirements for registration of pharmaceuticals for human use, including: 
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 ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline - Guideline for good clinical practice E6 (R1); 
adopted by the regulatory bodies of European Union, America and Japan. The 
document describes the responsibilities and expectations of all participants in the 
conduct of clinical trials, including investigators, monitors, sponsors and regulatory 
bodies. It covers all aspects of monitoring, reporting and archiving of clinical trials and 
associated essential documentation (ICH, 1996).  
 ICH Topic E 8 - General Considerations for Clinical Trials; describes principles and 
practices and sets out the general scientific principles for the conduct, performance and 
control of clinical trials. The guideline addresses a wide range of subjects in the design 
and execution of clinical trials, and development strategy for new medicinal products 
(European Medicines Agency, 1997). 
 
In the UK, the legislation The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 
(SI 2004 no. 1031) (MHRA, 2004) implements the EU Clinical Trials Directive through the 
regulatory body, The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). This 
legislation replaces the clinical trials component contained within the 1968 Medicines Act.  
 
Despite this background, GCP has been regarded as  
 
‘…rather [a] dry set of regulatory procedures, not a substantive and authoritative 
ethics document…’ 
 (Rennie, 2009)  
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and is considered lacking in moral judgement (Kimmelman, Weijer et al. 2009). The reasoning 
behind such opinions could be due to GCP’s notable focus on regulatory harmonisation rather 
than the expression of ethical commitments. Examination of both GCP and the DoH by 
Kimmelman et al (Kimmelman, Weijer et al. 2009, p.37) noted the following ethical issues, 
which are present only in the Declaration, and not in GCP guidelines: 
 
  Investigators to disclose funding, sponsors, and other potential conflicts of interest to 
both research ethics committees and study participants  
 Study design to be disclosed publicly (e.g., in clinical trial registries) 
 Research, notably that in developing countries, to benefit and be responsive to health 
needs of populations in which it is done 
 Restricted use of placebo controls in approval process for new drugs and in research 
done in developing countries 
 Post-trial access to treatment 
 Authors to report results accurately, and publish or make public negative findings 
 
Such omissions have led to concerns about whether GCP confers adequate protection of 
research participants in international research, especially when GCP is referred to in isolation 
from the DoH (Kimmelman,Weijer et al. 2009). Since the Declaration does seem to cover 
concerns of inequality and social justice applicable to research conducted in populations of 
low socioeconomic backgrounds (Rennie, 2009), further derivation of these opinions could be 
attributed to the GCP being established by the International Conference on Harmonisation. 
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This consisted of voting members from the USA, the EU and Japan, and contrasts with the 
Declaration established by the World Medical Association, which include 85 worldwide 
national medical societies.  
 
GCP contains the ethical underpinnings of Principlism, as enshrined in the Declaration. The 
core principles of Principlism, which appeal to the respect for autonomy, prevention of harm, 
promotion of benefit, and justice, provide an ethical dimension to GCP. These principles are 
considered to inform the duty of care that a researcher owes to research participants, as well as 
the duty that a research institution or sponsor owes to both participants and researchers (Shaw, 
Boynton et al. 2005). However, it is fair to say that the key requirement of these core ethical 
principles is to ensure that the importance of the research objective is in proportion to the 
inherent risk to the participant. Therefore, GCP adheres to a core role of governance; 
managing risk of harm.  
 
Thus, by acting in accordance with GCP, researchers are regarded as appealing to the core 
ethical principles expressed in Principlism. Where the ‘Good’ in GCP is an operative term, it 
is not concerned with the term ‘the integral common good’ (as noted in section 2.4), but the 
general good. Through the requirement of research risk being justified and proportionate to its 
benefit to society as well as providing the belief that no research participant should receive 
less than the prevailing standard of care, as quoted in section 4.3.2. from GCP, as follows: 
 
‘…During and following a subject's participation in a trial, the investigator/institution 
should ensure that adequate medical care is provided to a subject for any adverse 
events, including clinically significant laboratory values, related to the trial. The 
  
 
154 
 
investigator/institution should inform a subject when medical care is needed for 
intercurrent illness(es) of which the investigator becomes aware…’ 
 
However, this highlights that GCP is not absolute and unquestionable, rather it is a working 
guideline for decision making for all agents involved in the conduct of clinical trials. This 
guideline should perhaps be open to questioning in specified cases (Viens, 2008).  
 
In summary, all clinical trials are governed on a national and international scale, in which all 
research governance adheres to GCP (Good Clinical Practice). GCP guidelines ensure that:  
 
 Clinical trials should be conducted in accordance with the ethical principles as stated in 
the DoH (practical interpretation of Principlism).  
 The rights, safety and well-being of patients are most important.  
 Trials are scientifically sound and described in a clear, detailed protocol.  
 Investigational products are manufactured, handled, and stored according to Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP) – an industry standard which ensures that medicinal 
products are consistently produced and controlled to the quality standards appropriate 
to their intended use. GMP is concerned with both production and quality control  
(MHRA, 2010a) 
 
By complying with GCP, regulators and the industry believe they have conducted clinical 
trials in an ethical manner. Therefore, compliance with GCP provides public assurance that the 
rights, safety, and wellbeing of trial participants are protected. There is no emphasis on GCP 
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for promoting the common good; i.e. to promote generalised knowledge or specific guidance 
for justice concerns, such as the prioritising of research projects (in the case of 
pharmacogenetic clinical trials). Instead, GCP focuses predominantly on the principle of 
respect for autonomy and whether this situation (which will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section) is evident for policies that specifically govern pharmacogenetic-based 
clinical trials. 
 
5.4 Pharmacogenetic Research Regulation Policies  
The influential guidelines such as the Position Paper on the Terminology in Pharmacogenetics 
by the CHMP (CPMP, 2002), and the report Pharmacogenetics: ethical issues, published by 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (Nuffield Council, 2003), will be critiqued. Particular 
attention will be paid to whether the outlook of these policies is protectionist.  
 
5.4.1 Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) 
The CHMP has proposed a number of position papers for the use and handling of 
pharmacogenetic tests in clinical trials. The first notable position paper Position paper on 
terminology in Pharmacogenetics (EMEA/CPMP/3070/01), published in 200241 (CPMP, 
2002), outlined an agreed set of working definitions for terminologies and procedures used in 
Pharmacogenetics research. This paper was further updated and incorporated into ICH GCP in 
2007 as the position paper ICH Topic E 15: Establish definitions for genomic biomarkers, 
pharmacogenomics, pharmacogenetics, genomic data and sample coding categories 
                                                             
41 When the CHMP was formerly the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) 
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(CHMP/ICH/437986/2006) (CHMP, 2006). The aim of these papers was to further facilitate 
clarity in communication between regulatory authorities, ethics committees, investigators and 
research participants involved in pharmacogenetic research. This was achieved by presenting a 
definition of terms proposing appropriate levels of protection for the privacy of the research 
participant, when describing how results and samples will be used in pharmacogenetic clinical 
trials. Discussions in these papers were centred on privacy and confidentiality implications of 
the donor subject when affected by the five methodologies proposed. Furthermore, discussions 
were based on the following: assessment of the implications of subject withdrawal of their 
sample from the study; return of information to the subject or subject’s physician; involvement 
of a subject’s sample in future clinical investigations, and use of data for regulatory purposes. 
The five methodologies defined for the handling and collection of genetic samples and data 
are as follows:  
 
Identified samples and data are those labelled with personal identifiers such as name, initials 
or social security number. 
 
Single-coded samples and data are those whereby single specific codes of randomly picked 
numbers/letters are assigned and can only be traced or linked back to the research participant. 
The investigator stores the connecting code of the sample to the individual’s data, separating 
the research participant’s identity from the results of the pharmacogenetic analysis.  
 
Double-coded samples and data, which have a unique second number. The link between the 
clinical study research participant number and the second number is unbeknown to the 
investigator. It is possibly maintained by the sponsoring organisation or an external entity such 
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as a governmental agency or qualified third party not involved with the research (as in legal, 
quality assurance, and clinical statistics).  
 
Anonymised samples and data are double-coded and labelled with the unique second number. 
The link between the first and second code is deleted after the genetic and clinical information 
has been obtained. These may also be previously single-coded samples where the single code 
key is destroyed, or even formerly identifiable samples where the name/identifier is removed.  
 
Anonymous samples and data are those that do not have any personal identifiers or 
identification of the research participant from the time the sample was collected, and no direct 
link exists between the sample and donor. Such anonymous samples may contain population 
information; for example, the samples may come from research participants with diabetes. 
However, there is no additional individual clinical data that might permit the identity of the 
research participant to be traced.  
 
These papers went on to observe that identified and single-coded categories are treated 
similarly to those acquired in medical practice, and provide a low level of privacy protection. 
The sample and the data generated can be traced directly to the research participant; thereby 
enabling easy retrieval of the sample, in the event of the research participant wishing to 
withdraw from the study. Moreover, the traceability of the sample origins helps facilitate 
feedback of research results to the research participant. However, this raises questions about 
the confidentiality of stored data and the lack of privacy. As outlined in the definition of the 
double-coded category, the guardianship of the key to the second code by a third party 
provides more adherence to privacy, as the information is accessed only under certain 
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conditions, such as a medical emergency. Nevertheless, this must be made clear to the 
research participant through informed consent.  
 
With the anonymised category, and due to the deletion of the second key, privacy of the 
individual is fully maintained since it is no longer possible to link the individual to their 
samples or data. However, the data’s usefulness is debatable due to the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies must allow audit and review of all their clinical trial data by 
regulatory bodies, for the basis of libel claims.  
 
Therefore, the coding of samples and genetic data in pharmacogenetic clinical trials was 
regarded as the preferred mechanism for ensuring subject confidentiality and potential 
feedback, as noted by the recent report from the Nuffield Bioethics Committee (which will be 
discussed fully in the next sub-section): 
 
We consider that to protect the privacy of participants in research, the greatest degree 
of anonymity should be imposed on samples, compatible with fulfilling the objectives of 
the research  
(Nuffield Council 2003, p.34, 3.36) 
 
The implication is that full anonymisation of genetic samples acquired during a clinical trial is 
not recommended, and a de-identification procedure, as in the double-coded category, would 
probably be the most applicable category for clinical trials subjected to regulatory review. 
Data from the anonymisation category would be for hypothesis generation and population 
studies, since the sample does not contain any individual identifying data. Furthermore, 
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collection of data that does not link a particular subject’s genotype to his or her response to the 
drug being studied is rendered worthless:  
 
‘…knowledge of a DNA sequence is of no worth without knowledge of what happened to that 
patient when he or she took the medicines studied…’  
(Nuffield Council 2003, p.34, 3.35) 
 
In selecting the most appropriate methodology to serve pharmacogenetic research aims, it 
must be remembered that ethical integrity is essential; in other words, the methodology must 
also recognise the other principles inherent in Principlism. However, it seems that such 
integrity is based solely on the level of protection of privacy and confidentiality afforded to 
the subject. Furthermore, ethical integrity is based on whether a subject can make a truly 
informed choice to participate by assessing fully the risks and benefits (including the level of 
privacy and confidentiality) of utilising their data.  
 
In summary, the definitions from these position papers are mainly descriptive, with 
predominately prescriptive sample category definitions. Both sets of procedural and 
terminology definitions set out to highlight the consequences of the protection of privacy (of 
research participants), without any reference to any ethical implications. Instead, conclusions 
demonstrate different degrees of permitted sample and data anonymity, which depend on the 
different types of pharmacogenetic research; i.e. population studies, or license applications. 
Without no ethical basis for such discourse, only statements of certain research aims are 
adequately served by the various methodologies, regardless of the implications of privacy and 
confidentiality to the research participant, or justice implications of the outcomes of the 
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research. One of the possible reasons for this could be the scientific and regulatory 
community’s reluctance to discuss new ethical consequences regarding new medical 
technology prior to implementation, due to consequences being evident only once studied with 
empirical certainty. 
 
5.4.2 Nuffield Council on Bioethics  
The report Pharmacogenetics: ethical issues, published by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2003), examines pharmacogenetics in terms of its scientific 
background in the context of research and development of new medicines. Moreover, it 
anticipates the regulatory and public policy implications, and ethical issues that could arise 
when (and if) pharmacogenetics emerges into everyday medical practice. The report aims to 
encourage discussion of the issues and make recommendations on the future policy and 
practice of pharmacogenetics. The ethical issues discussed are concerned largely with aspects 
of consent, privacy and confidentiality. However, the report does acknowledge justice 
concerns, considering the importance of equity in pharmacogenetic research governance: 
 
‘Pharmacogenetic information may affect decisions about which treatments to fund, by 
revealing information about the effectiveness of treatments. It is important that 
decisions should take into account considerations of fairness. The National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is responsible for assessing cost-effectiveness in 
England and Wales. We endorse NICE’s approach of reviewing cases on an individual 
basis, considering equity as well as cost-effectiveness.’ 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2003, paragraph summary 4.11-4.32). 
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Furthermore, the report notes that relying on cost-effectiveness criterion of medications should 
not be the only factor when introducing medicine: 
 
‘…it is not the total increase in health which is important, but the fair distribution of 
that benefit among the members of a population. Unless such considerations are set 
alongside those of cost effectiveness, those suffering from rare conditions may be 
overlooked in the allocation of resources because their numbers are not large enough 
to count against the more prevalent conditions…’ 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2003, paragraph summary 4.11-4.32). 
 
Interestingly, the report moves away from issues based on the principle of respect for 
autonomy, to those concerned with breaches of the principle of solidarity. Solidarity based on 
altruism and feelings of compassion and empathy, is interpreted as the principle of reciprocity; 
an awareness of interdependency, and interrelatedness that is the basis of a sense of obligation 
to do something in return (Hoedemaekers, Gordijn et al., 2007). In this case, the participation 
in research is for the common good and the sharing of research benefits (Sutrop, 2004). The 
genetic database is perceived as a common public good; therefore, participation is a duty, and 
a obligation to know and inform others (Sutrop 2004, p.7). Issues of consideration were 
concerned with inequalities in the provision of healthcare where it was noted that the benefits 
of pharmacogenetics would only be available or affordable to the wealthy. 
 
The position paper, therefore still considers moral viability in terms of the principle of 
autonomy. Conversely, the report’s acknowledgement of solidarity, and its strong commitment 
to the justice principle of realisation of shared interests and goals, indicates a move away from 
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this predominant position of individualism and autonomy in relation to pharmacogenetic 
ethical concerns. This is an example of how ethical thinking evolves in line with science; 
thereby illustrating how various ethical principles can be the focus at different times.  
 
5.5 Protectionism as Dogma 
Contemporary research ethical codes in human experimentation, such as GCP and the 
Declaration, are a result of the atrocities performed during Nazi medical research programmes 
in the Second World War. Such a legacy has focused policies narrowly on the protection of 
human research participants, rather than asserting a balance of the moral assessments of risk 
and efficacy. Indeed, compliance with GCP guidelines: 
 
‘…provides public assurance that the rights, safety and well-being of trial subjects are 
protected, consistent with the principles that have their origin in the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and that the clinical trial data are credible…’  
(EMEA, 1996) 
 
Moreover, there is no mention of ensuring social justice and equality for research participants. 
Instead, ‘protection’ of the research participant is considered paramount and is enshrined in 
the concept of informed consent. This has become the:  
 
‘…centrepiece of regulatory attention…’ 
(Rhodes 2005, p.1) 
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The practice of informed consent is used as a tool for ‘ensuring’ this protection of the research 
participant; Rhodes’ article defines informed consent as: 
 
‘…the cornerstone principle of research ethics…’ 
(Rhodes 2005, p.8) 
 
This suggests that informed consent is a practical aspect of the principle of respect for persons 
or autonomy and is a principle in its own right. In other words, the exercising of informed 
consent is the only moral requirement to respect other people’s autonomy42 and is a view also 
accepted by others43. Furthermore, I argue that this has contributed to the predominance of the 
concept of autonomy (a psychological feature) in research. 
 
In Rhodes’s article, the concept of autonomy is described as a first and second-person model 
to present a true understanding of what informed consent should mean in research. As a first-
person model, autonomy is described in Kantian terms, as: 
 
‘… [a] person reflecting on the issues involved in a situation, considering her options 
in terms of her values and moral commitments, and making a choice that reflects her 
priorities and the ethical standards she embraces…’ 
(Rhodes 2005, p.11) 
 
                                                             
42 Noting that the principle of respect for autonomy can also be upheld by ensuring privacy and confidentiality 
are not breached. 
43 David Archard – who equates the taking of informed consent to a principle of respect for autonomy in his 
example of the taking of a mouth swab without consent (Archard, 2008). 
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As a second-person model, it aims are : 
 
‘…to reflect the appropriate moral attitude towards others who are capable of 
autonomous action…’ 
(Rhodes 2005, p.11)  
 
However, Rhodes notes this as a call to respect the autonomy of persons, and further proposes 
that ‘reasonable’ individuals should serve periodically as research subjects in what one would 
term as a sort of ‘national research service’. This suggests that our first-person sense of 
autonomy would be satisfied by being able to choose the research programme in which we 
would like to participate; while the second-person sense would be satisfied by the decision-
making process in which we are allowed to engage. With this in mind, Rhodes states that 
informed consent would have the following four functions: 
 
Asserting Trustworthiness of researcher and research project - perceived by participants as 
part of a trust-affirming exercise. The purpose is to make research more trustworthy, which 
this thesis agrees (as critique in section 3.5) is essential for participant or public acceptance, 
and engagement with research.   
 
Minimizing subjective disclosure of research risks and benefits - if participants choose their 
own research projects, without being asked to volunteer, then it is noted that their own 
judgement on risks and benefits would not be influenced so much by others who have a stake 
in the study, such as the researchers. Researchers are concerned with the outcome of the 
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research project and regulatory bodies; their concern is with the moral integrity of the research 
project.44. 
    
Transparency of research design – this relates to the biomedical community as well as the 
participant. Such an exercise is already underway with the website portal 
http://clinicaltrials.gov/, which provides patients, family members and the public with 
information about current on-going clinical research studies. 
 
Respect for autonomy - defined by Rhodes as:  
 
‘…requires us to presume that others are acting from the values and principles that 
they embrace and to leave them alone and allow them to live by their own lights…’ 
(Rhodes 2005, p.11) 
 
She continues to suggest that informed consent would: 
 
‘…allow individuals to fulfil their research obligations within a framework of 
recognition and respect for their other values, goals, and commitments…’ 
 (Rhodes 2005, p.16) 
 
                                                             
44 In the second function of informed consent, Rhodes notes ‘full disclosure’ of ‘I presume’ information of the 
risks and benefits of research, which suggests that this is not normally done – this is a misnomer. Full disclosure 
of a research project’s risks and benefits are always provided as fully as possible to the participant, but cannot 
always be guaranteed to be the full information since, due to the nature of research, this information is still being 
sought.  
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This implies that those participants who have an input in choosing their research programme 
and in evaluating their own notions of risk and benefits, would not be considered part of the 
current protectionist regime. 
 
These four functions of informed consent are noteworthy, but one would not agree that they 
are all a function of informed consent. For instance, the first function -‘Asserting 
Trustworthiness of researcher and research project’ - could be equated to the principle of 
non-maleficence, which is the moral requirement of avoiding the causation of harm. 
Furthermore, the second function – ‘Minimizing subjective disclosure of research risks and 
benefits’ - could be considered to be the principle of beneficence, which is the moral 
requirement of providing benefits, and balancing these against risks and costs. 
 
Conversely, informed consent, according to Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp, Childress 
2009, p.120), is a temporal process that cannot be defined by a set model; rather, it can be 
addressed in relation to two different conceptions. First, informed consent is the autonomous 
authorisation by individuals of their involvement in research, and occurs only if the subject 
has substantial understanding in the absence of control by others. Second, informed consent is 
assessed in terms of the social rules of consent, in institutions that must obtain legally-valid 
consent from patients or subjects before proceeding with therapeutic procedures or research. 
However, the meaning of informed consent is analysed in terms of autonomous authorisation. 
 
Therefore, informed consent is defined further by a series of ‘elements’, which are divided 
into information and consent components. The information component refers to disclosure of 
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information and comprehension of that information. The consent component refers to a 
voluntary decision and agreement to undergo the recommend procedure (Beauchamp, 
Childress 2009, p.145). These elements are divided into the following analytical components 
that capture the basic notions of informed consent, which, it seems, have not been discussed or 
considered in Rhodes’ article: 
 
IV. Threshold Elements (Preconditions)  
8. Competence (to understand and decide) 
9. Voluntariness (in deciding) 
 
V. Information Elements 
10. Disclosure (of material information) 
11. Recommendation (of a plan) 
12. Understanding (of 3. and 4). 
 
VI. Consent Elements 
13. Decision (in favour of a plan) 
14. Authorisation (of the chosen plan). 
Thus, in recognising only informed consent, I concur with others (Simmerling, Schwegler 
2005) who state that this alone does not constitute sufficient proof that a research project is 
ethical. However, one could go so far as to state that by recognising informed consent 
according to the aforementioned proposed four functions, Rhodes is actually recognising a 
number of principles within Principlism. Indeed, if these ‘consent’ functions are 
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acknowledged, the research project would be ethical according to the Principlism ethical 
framework, but not because they are solely considerations of informed consent. 
 
Therefore, Principlism in current research ethics has been interpreted by some as providing 
ethical guidance based on the assumption that research is inherently dangerous to research 
participants, who need to be protected. This interpretation of protectionism is a result of the 
backlash arising from the research atrocities unearthed following World War II. This led to 
further concerns and increased perceptions of unethical research in terms of research 
participant liabilities. I hope to have demonstrate that this is due, in part, to one aspect of 
Principlism; its focus on the principle of respect for autonomy, to being applied ardently to the 
extent that other normative principles, such as the principle of beneficence and the principle of 
non-maleficence, are interpreted as functions of informed consent (Gillon, 2003).   
 
5.6  Conclusion 
Codes and guidelines in research have emerged as a result of historical atrocities performed on 
research participants. The ethical merit of research involving human research participants 
became based on the application of principles, described initially in the US National 
Commission's Belmont Report, and later expanded upon by Beauchamp and Childress in their 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics. These principles are commonly referred to as Principlism. 
 
The impact of pharmacogenetics in drug development on these, and subsequent, guidelines 
highlighted the shortcomings of Principlism’s current interpretation; notably, its preoccupation 
with autonomy breaches. This is a concern that, I note, is possibly a resultant reaction to 
  
 
169 
 
research participant rights abuses in the past. Moreover, it could be due to the interpretation of 
the other normative principles in Principlism as aspects of informed consent. In the next 
chapter, this argument will be developed further, especially with regards to the principle of 
justice, by noting that this interpretation of the other principles is due to the non-specificity of 
their application. 
 
GCP guidelines, which underpin the governance of current pharmacogenetic clinical trial 
conduct, are yet to propose guidance on the breaches of justice and equity evident in this 
technology. However, pharmacogenetic-specific guidelines are beginning to acknowledge 
these potential ethical issues, but have thus far not provided specific ethical guidance on how 
to resolve these issues. Therefore in the next chapter, I will develop the proposal that we need 
to make the principle of justice within Principlism more specific, in order to address the actual 
pharmacogenetic ethical concerns of the fair distribution of research outcomes. This can be 
achieved by appealing to respect for fairness, as noted in the principle of justice, which 
represents both deontological and utilitarian theories, and the basis of the social contract. On a 
practical note, for regulatory concerns and the moral viability of research policy, the process 
of ‘overlapping consensus’, as advocated by Rawls, will be discussed as a method for helping 
achieve the aim of respect for fairness. 
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6. Chapter Six: Rawls’s ‘Overlapping Consensus’: a possible way 
forward?  
6.1 Introduction 
Issues of justice in healthcare research gave rise to controversies and incidents such as the 
Tuskegee experiment, mentioned previously in section 5.2. This experiment triggered public 
indignation not only because of failures of consent or unacceptable risk-benefit ratios, but also 
because of the distribution of the research outcomes.  In 1997, the Clinton administration 
addressed and recognised this public indignation, and a formal apology to the victims and their 
families was given (see Appendix (iii)). This gesture was indicative of the rising importance of 
the principle of justice as a principle which conferred fair distribution of burdens and benefits 
in a social system, and shows that when considered over time, it is concerned with the 
comparative treatment of persons (Lebacqz, 1981).  
In this chapter, I will argue how the principle of justice in Principlism could be made more 
apparent as a guiding norm for the actual pharmacogenetic research outcome concerns in 
particularly research prioritisation, as outlined in chapter four.  This will lead on to my 
defence of the  argument that ethical issues which arise from pharmacogenetic interventions in 
drug development are more concerned with the fair distribution of pharmacogenetic outcomes 
(such as drugs), and are therefore a matter of justice and not autonomy. My argument will 
develop into the claim that the principle of justice as fairness exercised in an overlapping 
consensus as introduced in Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1999) and fully developed in Political 
liberalism (Rawls, 2005) would provide the appropriate moral guidance system for 
pharmacogenetic ethical issues. Furthermore, the development of such a moral guidance 
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system into a procedural approach known as ‘accountability for reasonableness’ , i.e. a method 
of decision-making given unresolved moral disagreements as put forth by Daniels and Sabin 
(Daniels, Sabin 2002), will be defended. Discussions on these concepts will highlight the 
equal primacy of social justice (exercised within the principle of justice) in pharmacogenetic 
research ethics – interpreted as fair distribution of pharmacogenetic research outcomes – with 
that of the principle of respect for autonomy.  
Chapter three illustrated how the language of emotions or intuition as theorised by Rawls’s  
reflective equilibrium  can be used to underpin moral guidelines to form the basis of a non-
dogmatic normative belief system.  The procedure to express this belief system or take into 
account stakeholder values to develop a moral position would be through the method of 
overlapping consensus (Rawls, 1993).  
 
However, in order to establish whether such a system is really better suited to the justice 
concerns of pharmacogenetic outcomes, we need to establish whether the norm of the 
principle of justice within Principlism is currently sufficiently exercised. Previous chapters 
suggest that norms such as the principle of respect for autonomy and, to a lesser extent, the 
principle of beneficence and non-maleficence seem to come to the fore in pharmacogenetic 
ethics, as illustrated by the predominance of privacy, confidentiality and rights of access 
issues. Yet, it has been argued in chapter four that, rather than relying on the current 
interpretation of the protection of autonomy (in which all ethical problems are seen to result 
from breaches of autonomy), pharmacogenetic research governance guidelines need to provide 
specific guidance for the actual ethical issues which are concerned with justice. These ethical 
issues include the distribution of research benefits, research prioritisation discrimination 
manifested as an increase in social risk (such as racially-based genetic categorisation), and 
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increased liability of the researcher due to the deterministic interpretation of research 
outcomes.  
 
Therefore, in section 6.2, I will first turn to how the moral norm of the principle of justice 
from Principlism is currently exercised, in order to investigate the deficiencies in application 
of this ethical norm in pharmacogenetic clinical trials. These discussions will lead onto section 
6.3, where the basic requirements of an effective principle of justice model for 
pharmacogenetic research governance will be analysed. The type of principle of justice model 
I will uphold should promote the ethical requirement of achieving the ‘common good’ and that 
this requirement should be considered to be as equally important as the concept of protecting 
the individual research participant. In this instance the common good is concerned with 
societal value exercised as research that is based on a needs-driven logic as well as the 
reduction of the inequality of accessibility of pharmacogenetics research outcomes as already 
noted in chapter four. In my analysis I will appeal to Susan Cozzens45 notable position on how 
the principles of distributive justice can support science and technology policy (Cozzens, 
2007) .Cozzens’s assessment of justice models provides key points on how the common good 
in research governance can be realised through the reduction of inequity and inequality. The 
key theory critiqued from Cozzens’s work is identified as the egalitarian justice model of 
Rawls, which provides an illustration of how inequality in research outcomes can be 
minimised in research governance by removing unfairness observed as removing ideas that 
provide advantage to one culturally defined group over another. Cozzens further notes that 
Rawls’ theory permits the growing gap between rich and poor and suggests that to 
                                                             
45 Professor in the School of Public Policy and Georgia Tech Vice Provost for Graduate Education and Faculty 
Development at Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts Georgia Institute of Technology, US. 
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counterbalance this effect a communitarian perspective is required which would ensure the 
upholding of the essential respect of human rights as well as the acceptance of social 
responsibility. Such communitarian considerations will be addressed with the critique of 
David Thomasma46 ‘global research ethics framework’ (Thomasma, 1997). Thomasma puts 
forth the question, ‘Could bioethics worldwide be based on some other principle than patient 
rights?’ (Thomasma, 1997, p.295), thus supporting the stance of a more robust justice 
principle for research governance. The framework provides moral guidance within an 
international setting that subscribes to a minimal morality that is not necessarily culturally 
dependant, a criticism which has been levelled at Principlism. 
 
Both Cozzens’s work and Thomasma’s rules address the actual ethical concerns of fair 
distribution of research outcomes and discrimination and, to a lesser extent, liability, providing 
ethical guidance for the community (with the help of Thomasma’s framework) as well as the 
individual research participant. They provide additional key elements to the principle of 
justice required for pharmacogenetic research governance which I uphold to be that of the 
Rawlsian justice model. Furthermore in this section, discussions will turn to an example of 
how the issue of research prioritisation can be alleviated with consideration of promoting the 
common good by appealing to Thomas Pogge’s Global Justice Fund.  Pogge47, a former 
student of Rawls, argues that the Theory of Justice does not take into account the power of 
external parties prevalent in supranational governance (Nili, 2010) who play a pivotal role in 
determining a nation’s economic fate. These parties in turn have a bearing on the current 
                                                             
46 Editor Emeritus Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics 
47 Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale 
University. 
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market-driven approach prevalent in drug-development. Therefore, this section will discuss 
how the principles that underlie Pogge’s fund can add specification to the Rawlsian justice 
model. This would lead me to my last point, a proposal in section 6.4, of a possible application 
of the Rawlsian Justice model for pharmacogenetic research governance. I will propose to 
utilise the principle of justice as fairness and overlapping consensus from Rawls to provide a 
coherent systematic framework based on the ‘accountability for reasonableness’ proposed 
procedural–substantive model for regulatory policy decision making in pharmacogenetic 
research governance. 
 
6.2 Justice in Principlism 
Within the research context, Justice is interpreted in distributive terms as the principle of 
justice, concerned with the requirement of fair access to research participation and access to 
the results of research. In this section, I will analyse whether this aspect of justice is exercised 
through the application of Principlism in pharmacogenetic research governance.  
 
Since the inception of Principlism, the ethical principles of most prominence have so far been 
the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of beneficence. These are principles 
which are concerned with the protection of rights of the research participant, and harm being 
avoided by doing only research which subscribes to the concept of the balancing of harms and 
benefits. As noted in Chapter four, the actual ethical issues arising from pharmacogenetic 
research are concerned more with breaches of justice than autonomy. These ethical issues are 
due to the stratification of the research participant population into genetic groups, making it 
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apparent that pharmacogenetic technology creates issues of equitable distribution of research 
knowledge and research priorities rather than ethical issues which point to the inference of 
disease knowledge as implied by autonomy concerns of privacy, confidentiality and 
discrimination. Such inference is due to the mistaken role of pharmacogenetics in drug 
development as outlined in chapter three. This chapter clarified pharmacogenetics’ role in 
obtaining risk assessment information for the effectiveness of a drug in a given patient 
population, and not of obtaining disease susceptibility information. 
 
The current liberal, individualistic model of the self has become dominant in Principlism 
(Gillon, 2003), and is enshrined in the principle of respect for autonomy in Principlism. This 
dominance, seen with the principle of respect for autonomy, has led to the overshadowing of 
other principles in Principlism (in this case, the principle of justice) as discussed in chapter 
five.  Such overemphasis on the principle of respect for autonomy has manifested itself as 
‘protectionism’ of the research participant, where research ethics in research governance is 
considered mainly in terms of the protection of autonomy. This has resulted in much effort 
being invested in securing the informed consent of individual participants, while often 
ignoring the broader issues of justice in places where the research takes place. It has thus 
(perhaps inadvertently) reduced the value of Principlism to the principle of respect for persons, 
a principle which has further been narrowly understood as a respect for autonomy, as critiqued 
in chapter five. The use of the minimal risk standard in research governance, as discussed in 
chapter three, was referred to as a ‘normative approach to risk-benefit assessment’ for 
assessing the probability and psychosocial risks of harm, but mainly with regard to breaches of 
informed consent, confidentiality and threats to privacy. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
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the factual, value-laden content of the minimal risk standard is belief-dependant. This means 
that the beliefs are held by ‘experts’, such as regulatory body members, reiterating that risk 
assessment is more of a measurement of utility, than something concerned with informing 
what ought to be done in research, or whether the research (in this case, pharmacogenetic 
assessment) is acceptable and should be utilised in a clinical trial. As a result, research 
governance is seen to be concerned with the language of emotions when assessing risk, which 
is in turn based on the principles of uncertainty as discussed in chapter three. All of these are 
ultimately subjected to mental dispositions or attitudes which have led to various 
interpretations of the minimal risk standard, and inconsistent application of regulatory 
assessment and subsequent approval. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a moral assessment 
which critically takes into account these mental dispositions and aims for coherence between 
moral judgements of the experts, as well as considering principles, and background theories. 
Such moral assessment is the overlapping consensus approach by Rawls, which will be 
critiqued further in section 6.4. 
 
Concluding from this, I argue that the minimal risk standard reduces all ethical problems to 
breaches of autonomy. To coin a phrase: if the only ‘tool’ you have is a hammer, then 
everything looks like a nail (London, 2005). The ‘tool’ in this context is, of course, the 
protection of autonomy through the central requirement for informed consent in research 
ethics, and the ‘nail’ is all ethical problems resulting from breaches of autonomy (Azétsop, 
Rennie 2010). This has led to autonomy-focused bioethics which is concerned with procedures 
that protect choice, with consent itself rather than what is consented to, being the main focus, 
rather than more substantive issues. Moreover, agency, benefit, participation, risk, and 
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vulnerability are all understood from the standpoint of individually-focused disease 
management, whether in the clinical setting or the research site. This highlights that 
Principlism, in its current form and exercised in pharmacogenetic governance, is therefore 
concerned with individual protections at the expense of providing ethical guidance for issues 
concerned more with the fair distribution of research outcomes, which are a matter of justice.  
 
6.3 Common Good and Justice 
The position I would like to advance is that normative ethical theory should also promote the 
pursuit of ‘the common good’ in research, rather than being concerned solely with providing 
modes of conduct to ensure non-exploitation of the research participant. The feature of the 
common good, I will uphold is as important as Principlism in the moral underpinning of 
pharmacogenetic research governance.  The ‘common good’ in this context, refers to the 
requirement of pharmacogenetic-based clinical research to produce ‘generalisable knowledge’ 
regarding drug responses, with the aim of improving health by developing diagnostics for drug 
response and/or increasing understanding of human biology. To provide an illustration of the 
common good in research governance I will appeal to Susan Cozzens’s assessment of the 
egalitarian distributive justice model of Rawls when utilised in science and technology policy 
(Cozzens, 2007) , which emphasises the aim of achieving ‘the common good’.  But first I will 
begin with substantiating why I have considered Rawls’s justice model as appropriate, by 
discussing the basic requirements or elements that constitute a distributive justice model as put 
forth by Hervé Moulin, in Fair Division and Collective Welfare (Moulin, 2004). Elements 
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which I uphold provide the required specificity for a principle of justice in similar vein to 
elements which constitute the principle of autonomy as noted in chapter four. 
 
6.3.1 Principles of a distributive justice model 
All theories of justice have a minimal requirement attributed to Aristotle who noted (in his 
celebrated maxim) that equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated 
unequally; 
 
‘…things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated 
unalike in proportion to their unalikeness…’ 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics V.3, 1131a-b (Blunt, 1991). 
 
Furthermore, in the classical Latin tag definition of justice - ‘suum cuique tribuere’ (to 
allocate to each his own), it is suggested that justice has always been concerned with the idea 
of deserving and equality (Barry, Mattraver 2000, p.429). In the modern rendition of the 
Aristotelian maxim, however, it is the formal definition of distributive fairness, known as 
‘formal’ since no criterion is attributed to the constitution of equality, or equality for more 
than two individuals, meaning the relevant factors for comparing individuals or groups has not 
been set. Equal treatment of equals is a clear-cut principle - if two persons have identical 
characteristics in all dimensions relevant to the allocation problem at hand, they should receive 
the same treatment; the same share of goods, of decision power, or whatever is being 
distributed. On the other hand, the phrase ‘unequals must be treated unequally’ is not as clear-
cut, and is therefore open to interpretation (Moulin, 2004). However, an Aristotelian 
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interpretation (Smith, 1999) notes that the appropriate criterion for differentiating among 
various functions, and thereby justifying the unequal treatment of citizens in certain cases, is 
to be found in reference to one’s contribution to the common good of society.  
 
In essence, as some contribute more to a morally good life, so too should they receive 
proportionately more in return. This is a concept which is difficult to put into practice when 
comparing the contribution of vocations which have different remits, such as a good farmer 
compared to a good skilled craftsmen (Wiser, 1986).The notion that  
 
‘… [all should be treated] in proportion to their unalikeness…’ 
 
means that all ought to be treated in proportion to the relevant similarities and differences, in 
which ‘relevance’ refers to the following defined elements or principles of distributive justice : 
compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness as put forth by Susan Cozzens (Cozzens, 
2007). These four principles guide the definition of ‘relevance’ and are not exclusive of one 
another; all belong to the principle of fairness (Moulin, 2004). 
 
Compensation  
Some of us require more resources than others—and the compensation principle would justify 
this inequality in order to restore equality (or at least, diminish inequality) of the shares of the 
essential commodity in question. For example: those of us who cannot metabolise a key 
vitamin from their food deserve a free supply of pills; those who lose their home to a natural 
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disaster deserve assistance. The common feature in these instances of compensation is the 
justification of unequal shares of certain resources. 
 
Reward 
Merit by extraordinary achievement calls for reward: prizes to a creator, an athlete, a 
peacemaker, and other outstanding individuals. However, a central question is the fair reward 
of individual productive contributions: the familiar Lockean argument entitles  
 
‘one to the fruit of my own labor’ 
(Olivecrona, 1974) 
 
but this hardly leads to a precise division rule, except when the production of output from the 
labour input unambiguously separates the contributions of the various workers. Separating the 
fruit of my labour from that of your labour is easy only when your labour creates no 
externality on mine, and vice versa. If we are fishing in the same lake, cutting wood from the 
same forest or sharing any other kind of exhaustible resources, this separation is no longer 
possible; hence, the fair reward of one’s labour is not a straightforward concept. The same 
difficulty arises when sharing joint costs or the surplus generated by the cooperation of 
individuals or bodies with different input contributions: some bring capital, some bring 
technical skills. Furthermore, we reward an employee for their contribution to the profit of the 
firm, an athlete for their contribution to the success of the team, an investor for the risk they 
took in financing the project. In each case, a larger share of the pie is justified by a larger 
responsibility in making the pie (Uzgalis, 2014).  
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Exogenous rights 
Equal treatment of equals is the archetypal example of an exogenous right. Consider the 
democratic principle ‘one person, one vote’, expressing the basic requirement that voting 
procedures must not be biased in favour of particular electors, and implemented by the simple 
device of anonymous ballots (I can’t tell who casts which ballot; hence, I can’t give more 
weight to the vote of a particular citizen). Certain principles guiding the allocation of 
resources are entirely exogenous to the consumption of these resources and to the 
responsibility of the consumers in their production. 
 
One example of exogenous rights is the Fairness Principle of Equality in the allocation of 
certain rights, such as political rights, the freedom of speech and of religion, or access to 
education. Examples of unequal exogenous rights, beside private ownership, are the difference 
in status brought about by social standing or by seniority. Furthermore, when the beneficiaries 
of the distribution are institutions or represent groups of agents, inequality in their exogenous 
rights is commonplace: shareholders in a publicly traded firm, or political parties with 
different sizes of representation in the parliament, ought to have unequal shares of decision 
power. 
 
Fitness 
As noted by Moulin resources must go to whoever makes the best use of them (Moulin 2004, 
p.23). Thus, fitness justifies unequal allocation of the resources independently of needs, merit, 
or rights. Formally, fitness can be expressed in two conceptually different ways; sum-fitness ( 
a utility measurement) and efficiency-fitness (concerned with efficiency) (Moulin 2004, p.24).  
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An example of the interplay of these principles is illustrated in the allocation of organs for 
transplant. Here, compensation gives priority to those who will survive the shortest time or 
whose life is most difficult without a new organ; reward gives priority according to seniority 
on the waiting list (first come, first served); exogenous rights enforces strict equality of 
chances (lottery) or priority according to social status, or wealth (if the donation of the wealthy 
patient does not increase the availability or organs); fitness maximises medical fitness, namely 
chances of success of transplant.  
Therefore, each individual principle cannot alone address all the problems of justice, but 
collectively are acceptable minimal requirements of the formal principle of justice, specifying 
relevant characteristics for equal treatment by identifying substantive properties for 
distribution. Employing this process of deliberation to the principles as a formal requirement 
of the principle of justice would avert the limitation of access to therapeutic applications due 
to income, gender, and race. Systems of governance would instead need to be set up to ensure 
that society as a whole benefitted from the biotechnology (in this case, pharmacogenetics), and 
not just specific individuals or groups. Susan Cozzens’s assessment of Rawls’s egalitarian 
justice model considers these key elements and will be turned to next. 
 
6.3.2 The Egalitarian Model 
The egalitarian model has centrally the concept of equality of all persons and its aims are for 
individuals to be as much equal as each other (Wetmore 2007, p.345). Although egalitarian 
models of justice note that persons should receive an equal distribution of certain goods - in 
this case healthcare – no egalitarian theory advocates the sharing of all possible social 
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benefits. An egalitarian theory must therefore, allow at least some basic equalities amongst 
individuals and in effect permitting inequalities which still have some benefit to the least 
advantaged (Cozzens, 2007).  
 
An example of the egalitarian justice model is described in the classic A Theory of Justice by 
John Rawls (Rawls, 1999). Rawls wanted to develop a theory that could account for the 
different moral background theories people hold, whilst maintaining that they could morally 
agree on certain issues (Doorn, 2010). 
His approach does not take one of the extreme positions of giving authority to either moral 
theory or the empirical data; instead, both moral theory and empirical data are integrated to 
reach a normative conclusion for moral practice; 
‘…My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a 
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found , say, in 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant..’  
(Rawls 1971, p.11) 
Within Rawls’s later work Political Liberalism, he acknowledges that agreement on principles 
of justice, even among reasonable and rational citizens, is difficult to achieve and puts forth 
the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’. This idea allows agreement on liberal justice amongst 
reasonable people on the basis of citizens’ moral sense of justice grounded in their different 
reasonable comprehensive views (Rawls, 2005, p.144). 
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In the A Theory of Justice, two main goals are pursued: the first is a methodology for deriving 
principles, and the second is an account of what would be derived were we to follow that 
method; 
‘…The theory of justice may be divided into two main parts (1) an interpretation of the 
initial situation and a formulation of the various principles available for choice there, 
and (2) an argument establishing  which of these principles would in fact be 
adopted…’  
(Rawls 1971, p.54) 
Rawls describes the method for deriving principles as Contractarian; rational agents who 
choose principles for a hypothetical situation in which they are free and equal (Graham 2007, 
p.9). Cozzens’s notes further that under such a contract theory ‘a fair system of distribution is 
one that rational individuals would freely agree to after deliberation’ (Cozzens, 2007, p.89). 
 
Rawls noted that the negotiation of a contract is influenced by the starting point of an 
individual, e.g. if you are affluent, one set of rules will be more appealing than if you are poor. 
Consequently, he introduced into these hypothetical situations a moral system or social 
cooperation, in which the negotiating of the contract by individuals is done behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’, known as ‘the original position; where individuals would not know what their 
starting position was (Cozzens 2007, p.89).  As noted by Rawls  
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‘…the original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that the fundamental 
agreements reached in it are fair…’ 
(Rawls, 1999, p.17)  
 
For healthcare, basic questions are thus not based on considerations of utility or the market 
respectively, but on the appeal to those principles of justice which would have been chosen in 
the original position. 
 
The original position relies on the idea of the stability of a well-ordered society. One of the 
features of a well-ordered society is that its regulative principle of justice is publicly known 
and regularly appealed to as a basis for deciding and justifying laws.  In effect, there is a 
criterion of justice that would be agreed upon by all under conditions that are fair to all, and 
not distorted by the particular features and circumstances of the existing basic structure of 
society. 
 
Rawls states that the persons in the original position would adopt two principles, which would 
then govern the assignment of rights and duties, and regulate the distribution of social and 
economic advantages across society; 
 
‘…They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their 
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the 
fundamental terms of their association. These principles are to regulate all further 
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agreements: they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and 
the forms of government that can be established. This way of regarding the principles 
of justice I shall call justice as fairness…’  
(Rawls 1999, p.11) 
 
The first principle, also known as ‘the equality principle’, is concerned with each person 
having an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties, compatible with the idea of a 
similar kind of liberty for all. The second principle (or the Difference Principle) notes that 
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of equality of opportunity. This situation allows for the unequal distribution of 
some primary goods, as long as these inequalities benefit all members of society (especially 
the worst-off members). These principles are to be lexically ordered: the first must be satisfied 
before we can try to satisfy the second; trade-offs are prohibited.  
 
Such a model is based on the assumption that members of a well ordered society have an 
effective sense of justice and are normal, cooperative members who would not normally 
violate just laws. It is further based on an ideal of a society of free and equal citizens who take 
responsibility for their ends and cooperate with one another based on reciprocity and mutual 
respect. In this context, ‘reciprocity’ means that each person engaged in cooperation should 
not simply benefit, but should benefit on terms that are fair. It is the moral requirement on 
citizens and officials that they should reasonably believe the terms of cooperation (policy, 
laws etc.) they propose to be reasonable accepted by others as free and equal citizens, and not 
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as manipulated, dominated citizens subject to social or political inferiority. Here, citizens are 
able to live together despite conflicting moral values and ideals as long as they share a moral 
commitment to society’s basic structure. Citizens who are naturally handicapped are allowed 
to have partial compliance to these terms of cooperation, and for persons whose capacity is not 
impaired, ‘strict compliance’ is expected (Graham, 2007). 
 
In the Rawlsian model benefits are conferred to all persons, more so than in a utilitarian model 
of justice where, despite the increase in total well-being, this would be at the expense of 
someone else’s well-being. Rawls refers to his model of conferring benefits to all as ‘justice as 
fairness’ (Rawls, 1999, p.20). He proposed a distributory system from which the worst-off get 
at least some benefit in this case non-responders or the orphan population48 (known as the 
‘social minimum’), even if some are permitted more benefit than others. This ‘social 
minimum’ is the basic social entitlement to enabling resources such as wealth and income, yet  
at the same time it permits inequalities in income and wealth in order to maximally promote 
the effective exercise of providing the social minimum to the worst-off. For example, growing 
state economies such as the US, produce tangible benefits for the least well-off, whilst 
producing more benefits for the most well-off (as observed in the improvement of wages in 
the bottom 20% of households between 1990 and 2000), but at the same time a growing 
inequality was observed in the income gap between the top 20% and bottom 20% (Larin, 
McNichol 1997). The ‘social minimum’ is enabled by the principle of equality of opportunity, 
which implies that the basis for obtaining this minimum should be based on factors within 
                                                             
48 As noted in section 4.6.2; a patient group with a rare genetic profile where there is currently no 
pharmacogenetic-based drug available. 
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each person's control, such as  motivation, character, and merit. Racial profiling for example, 
therefore thwarts fair equality of opportunity by making inclusion to a clinical trial dependent 
on one's parentage, a factor that is morally arbitrary (as previously critiqued in chapter four). 
Concluding that under ‘justice as fairness’ there is no tolerance for ‘culture-based’ patterns of 
unequal distribution.  
 
Furthermore the ‘justice as fairness’ principle promotes a distribution system in which the 
least advantaged get at least some benefit, but this morally permits a growing gap between rich 
and poor. To which I agree with Cozzens’s does not gives rise to a sustainable society  
 
‘…rising inequality is the most dangerous social trend of our time…A high degree of 
inequality causes the comfortable to disavow the needy. It increases the social and the 
psychological distance separating the haves from the have-nots…’ 
 (Cozzens, 2007, p.91) 
 
In order to reduce such inequalities Cozzens’s therefore suggests appealing to 
Communitarianism which notes that an action is moral when it strengthens community life. 
Both individual freedoms and society –wide values are considered as equally important, since 
to maintain community it is essential to respect human rights, and I agree with Cozzens’s who 
notes that to respect human rights one must also accept social responsibilities (Cozzens 2007, 
p91).  The introduction of communitarian considerations would ensure that social 
responsibility would be taken as seriously as economic growth. This could be achieved by 
appealing to a minimal morality which would exercise the social minimum. In the context of 
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this discourse where key elements are being derived to specify and add to the principle of 
justice in Principlism for research governance, the key element of minimal morality would 
need to be exercised globally due to the international remit of clinical trial governance. David 
Thomasma’s ‘global research ethics framework’ (Thomasma, 1997) could be considered since 
it features ethical rules for the consideration of the community. Rules which acknowledge 
features of existence and culture that unite human beings without overruling the real 
differences, that aim to keep within the principles of an egalitarian model of justice – where 
individuals have equal access to goods and services which is a required feature for research 
governance. 
 
6.3.3 Thomasma’s ‘Global research ethics framework’ 
David Thomasma’s analysis of human rights and bioethics gave rise to a proposed set of 
international rules for the governing of free social intercourse; (Thomasma 1997, p.303) 
acknowledge universal human experiences in a multicultural setting, such as illness, suffering 
and death. These rules are considered to be the basis for international multicultural bioethics a 
‘global research ethics framework’, and note that the basis for morality lies in our capacity to 
understand these experiences and obligations to respond to them. However, Thomasma notes 
that if 
 
‘…this process proves too philosophically cumbersome…’ 
(Thomasma 1997, p.299), 
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then an ethical framework based on modern contractarian theory could be used. Contractarian  
theory is based on rational agents choosing principles in a hypothetical situation in which they 
are free and equal (Sugden, 1990), and includes such theories as those by John Rawls, which 
necessitate that no moral (or legal) norm can legitimately violate human rights. In other words, 
human rights are non-negotiable goods. Rights violations are illegitimate in all moral and 
political frameworks and their illegitimacy is not dependent on the norms of any moral or 
legal framework (Baker 1998, p.235).  
 
Thomasma’s rules for setting up a ‘global research ethics framework’ aims for research ethics 
to incorporate the pursuit of the ‘common good’, which is interpreted as the promotion of 
equal distribution of health needs to a diverse population, without unfairly placing the burden 
of research participation on those who are unable to benefit from the knowledge outcomes. 
These aims are in keeping with the principles of the egalitarian model of justice – a model 
such as Rawls. 
 
The ethical framework is an example of Rawls’s overlapping consensus since it has features 
that are interpreted as rules and are moral guidelines considered to be derived from coherence 
between moral judgements, principles and background theories that would create a non-
dogmatic framework of normative beliefs.  
 
Thomasma’s rules are as follows: 
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1. The rule of peaceful dialogue; that is, appealing to the human capacity to be open to 
new experiences whilst maintaining one's own cultural and religious traditions 
(Thomasma 1997, p.300). 
2. Rule against xenophobia; noting that ‘…No individual is an island; no culture or 
community is the only true society. The truth lies in the mean…’(Thomasma 1997, op 
cit 54). It is also noted that as a matter of survival, cultures should not be closed to one 
another or at least myopic. They should have the illusion of being open to other 
viewpoints. 
3. Rule of respect for cultural pluralism: the type of tolerance observed in world trade and 
open markets is cited as an example, due to the element of self–interest observed  
together with knowledge ( as a power), gained from the use of technology such as the 
internet. The presence of tolerance diffuses the notion of power, and a cited example is 
that of patients’ use of the internet for direct information about their diseases and 
possibly treatments, thereby bypassing the traditional authority of their physicians 
(Thomasma 1997, p.301). 
4. The rule of the common good: as an alternative to the predominance of the concept of 
autonomy as a basis for human rights. In this instance, autonomy works together with 
communitarian ethics where individual good and rights coincide with the community’s 
good, noting that one cannot be without the other. As observed from ethical and 
religious sources of morality which stress the fact that reality is transactional; that it 
requires individuals to rub shoulders with one another and to be influenced by one 
another.  
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5. The rule of cultural apprehension; by appreciating another culture, one ought not to 
abandon one’s own cultural beliefs by supplanting one’s beliefs with that of another 
culture; instead one ought to suspend total abandonment and perceive this as 
appreciation. 
6. The rule of respect for persons in context; in which Thomasma notes that international 
bioethics ought not to be concerned with just autonomy or community (Thomasma 
2001, p.306), but also with persons and their cultural values. Thomasma considers the 
use of overlapping consensus as a method of balancing values without topping one 
with another a priori (Thomasma 1997, p.302). Therefore, this would mean the 
allowance of values and issues of individuals and communities, without the 
abandonment of their cultural traditions. 
7. The rule of existential ‘a prioris’; which considers the requirement for some a priori 
commitments that have arisen from cultural history and experience, as opposed to 
metaphysical enquiry.  He suggests two such a priori commitments; the rule of respect 
for healing, and the rule of protecting the vulnerable49  from harm 50, noted as ‘…the 
goal of assisting individuals to enhance their autonomy in the context of their family, 
to enhance their moral personhood in healthcare decisions…’(Thomasma 2001, p.307)  
 
                                                             
49 Thomasma notes that people are subjected to vulnerability due to the clash of western and non-western values, 
in which the western values concern of objectification of ‘persons and materials’ to the extent of that these 
objects can be manipulated  to supplant “the highest power or God in some cultures and religions”. 
50 This a priori commitment rests on the notion of consent and the assumption that medicine's intention is to heal, 
and without patient consent, no other interventions can be contemplated. Furthermore, this is derived from 
historical experiences of biomedical research done without consent, where the goal of medicine (to heal) was 
distorted when consent was not present. 
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These rules highlight the appreciation and tolerance of the differences between cultures, and 
the recognition of individual human rights (Thomasma 2001, p.307). They would be an 
appropriate feature for international governance considerations of pharmacogenetic-based 
clinical trials since they allow the acknowledgment of the following conditions noted to be 
essential for effective international intercultural bioethical discourse (Marshall, 1994). 
 Minimal agreement being reached on the cultural context of the meaning and value of 
ethical concepts and processes of moral reasoning. 
 Commitment to the understanding of cultural context, which may require the 
acceptance of pluralism. 
 Recognition of transcultural structures in human behaviour and existence, for example  
the theoretical acceptance of fundamental human rights around the world 
 Priori commitments must be present in discourse about biomedical ethics; such 
commitments might be the goal of assisting individuals to enhance their autonomy in 
decisions to be made, or commitments that emerge from consensus of actions to be 
taken through ethics committee deliberations or governing policy committees. 
 
Thus Thomasma’s framework allows the values and issues of individuals and communities to 
be heard and acknowledged without the abandonment of their cultural traditions or beliefs. 
The theoretical underpinnings of this framework maybe communitarian in outlook but the 
essence of this framework is that of a collection of principles with considerations to  transcend 
specific cultural and ethical beliefs. The aim of these principles is to promote a solid 
intercultural foundation for bioethics, one that is not just based on the ethical remit of 
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autonomy and self –determination, but on international human rights which can be expressed 
through Rawls’s overlapping consensus. Thomasma notes that 
 
‘…the individual is identified as the locus of decisional capacity for informed consent, even 
though in many of these countries indigenous populations use a communal or family model of 
decision making…’ (Thomasma 2001, p.298) 
 
This highlights how our sense of personhood and the principle of autonomy in the West 
informs current medical decision making, including how consent and confidentiality is 
conducted in the patient –physician relationship. Furthermore, noting that decisional capacity 
may only be socially expressed in societies that stress the overriding importance of an 
individual's relationship with family and community thereby rendering the concept of 
informed consent as meaningless. Thomasma’s rules would act as a supportive framework for 
the Rawlsian model of justice in pharmacogenetic research governance. The framework’s 
focus on respecting human rights would ensure that the aspect of social responsibility noted to 
be lacking in Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ would be upheld, providing in governance a focus  
on economic freedom and avoidance of discrimination. Research outcomes such as drugs 
would therefore be ethically reviewed by governance in light of how they contribute to social 
responsibility, with a focus on promoting health and economic rights in all countries through 
the recognition of global social justice freedom.  
 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus would be applied as the ethical framework for structuring 
discussion and debate with the aim of coming to a justified agreement. Overlapping consensus 
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would be in line with Thomasma’s substantive rules on the respect for persons in context, the 
rule of cultural apprehension and the rule of the common good. All of these rules would allow 
the values and issues of individuals and communities to be heard and acknowledged without 
the abandonment of their cultural traditions or beliefs. The method could be used, for example, 
as a means of attaining a coherent basis for decision-making by regulatory bodies, and to gain 
support for particular decisions in the context of public policy. A Rawlsian model of justice 
exercised within Thomasma’s global ethical framework would allow for stratification in 
healthcare provision, which would arise through pharmacogenetic drug profiling. This would 
be allowed as long as the resulting inequalities were (a) to everyone's advantage, and (b) do 
not undermine fair equality of opportunity or equality of liberty. Behind the veil of ignorance 
(exercised as an anonymous genetic sample with limited validity information), the rational 
individual would not be categorised by gender, race, tribal affiliation or nationality. 
Distributed services principles would not be based on characteristics which are outside 
individual control, since justice as fairness does not tolerate ‘culture-based’ patterns of 
unequal distribution (Cozzens 2007, p.90).  The Rawls model of justice is therefore aptly 
applicable to the pharmacogenetic situation where it has been noted earlier that racially 
profiled prescribing is subject to significant scientific limitation, questioning whether ethnic or 
racial categories have any relevance to the understanding of drug response.  
 
As a result a Rawlsian theory has the potential to answer questions on integrating the interests 
of multiple stakeholders, and - within Thomasma’s global ethical framework- of performing 
justice in different cultural and moral traditions in international settings. All of the above is 
required for effective research governance for international clinical trials. The added aspect of 
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Thomasma’s framework provides the key element of social responsibility to the Rawlsian 
procedural concept of overlapping consensus. A key element required to ensure that research 
is based on societal value rather than a market-driven logic which in turn would promote 
research committed to the common good.  An example of how this key aspect of social 
responsibility would be applied I will examine in the following section, with reference to the 
actual pharmacogenetic drug development ethical issue of research priorities and to a lesser 
extent equitable distribution of research knowledge 
 
6.3.4 Research Prioritisation and Thomas Pogge 
As mentioned in section 3.2, governance in health is concerned with utilitarian initiatives, 
which increase population health gains and promote actions that maximise welfare. Informing 
this approach, the alleviation of health concerns has benefited corporate interests at the 
expense of innovative and affordable medicines. This impedes both health gains and economic 
development in developed and developing countries. The existing global patent system 
(discussed in section 4.6) will clearly not answer global population health needs, by diverting 
pharmaceutical research from the health needs of developing countries whose economies 
cannot secure sufficient financial returns to recoup industry investments in pharmaceutical 
research, since a market monopoly incentive is irrelevant when market prospects are absent 
(Trouiller, Olliaro et al. 2002).  
 
Knowledge, a pharmacogenetic outcome as established in Section 2.4, is commonly regarded 
as a common good which can be described as a global public good (Smith, Thorsteinsdottir et 
al. 2004), and is defined as: 
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 ‘…a good which it is rational, from the perspective of a group of nations collectively, 
to produce for universal consumption and for which it is irrational to exclude an 
individual nation from its consumption, irrespective of whether that nation contributes 
to its financing…’ 
(Smith, Thorsteinsdottir et al. 2004) 
 
Patents alter the character of knowledge, by permitting the exclusion of knowledge from 
others, yet this is justified on the one hand, since the public receives benefits to compensate 
for this loss of access such as further knowledge creation, all of which are based on national 
economies and national public goods. On the other hand, the patent system is designed to 
provide incentives to develop genomics knowledge in those countries where there is a health 
economy. Being reliant on market forces, patents are therefore unable to work where there is a 
non-existent or weak market, and where it is unlikely that the cost of R&D of a drug is 
unlikely to be recouped. Such a system is therefore unable to encourage innovation in areas 
targeted at low-income countries. So in order for research to serve the common good 
interpreted as the promotion of generalised knowledge or providing specific guidance to 
justice concerns, this market driven logic in R&D needs to be shifted towards a needs-driven 
logic, based on societal value. This could be done by adding a neglected disease research 
obligation to pharmaceutical research, manifested as reinvestment of pharmaceutical sales into 
neglected disease R&D either directly or through public programmes such as a global fund  as 
first introduced in section 4.6. 
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A global fund based on a proposal by Thomas Pogge (Oprea, Braunack-Mayer et al. 2009) 
rewards global pharmaceutical research based on community health gains measured in terms 
of decreased morbidity and mortality.  It is an international financing organisation which is 
based on a human rights framework. Pogge notes that such a framework provides the main 
political tool to assess policy from an ethical perspective at the international level and where  
 
‘…the object of a human right is whatever this human right is a right to…’ 
(Pogge 2005, p194) 
 
The ‘right’ in this case would be the right to research outcomes i.e. knowledge, and the 
violation of this right is seen as the denial of access. Pogge proposed that through ensuring 
improved access to medical treatments and thereby upholding the common good, this would 
greatly reduce severe poverty by enhancing the ability of the poor to work, and to organize 
themselves, for their own economic advancement. This in turn would provide medical 
innovators stable and reliable financial incentives to address the medical conditions of the 
poor (Pogge 2005, p190), support human rights in all countries and in turn promote social 
justice as well as the common good.  
 
The Global Fund has been seen to be beneficent since its aim is to improve global health 
through rewarding the development of innovative, effective and affordable therapies in all 
countries (The Global Fund, 2015). However, the limitation of the Global Fund is that it is 
more suited to supporting large purchases of medicines. Thus more suited to the large –scale 
health concerns such as Malaria and Aids and less so with orphan or medical conditions which 
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affect smaller populations or sub-populations as derived from pharmacogenetic differentiation. 
Its set-up also does not aim to incentivise innovation. However, one might say that its 
purchases do have an incentive effect: innovators can now expect that, if they develop a high-
impact medicine for AIDS, TB or malaria, they will earn money from mark-ups on sales 
supported by the Global Fund in behalf of poor patients. 
 
Further to the initiative of the Global fund, Pogge has since developed the Health Impact Fund 
(HIF) which is similar in that it is financed mainly by governments. Its main difference turns 
out to be that HIF develops and distributes internationally, medicines for typically neglected 
diseases at low prices. By limiting prices of already registered medicines to the lowest feasible 
cost of production and distribution. It rewards a new medicine only for the improvement 
relative to the treatment that patients would otherwise have had. This incentivises innovators 
to concentrate their efforts to where they can realise the largest incremental health benefit. HIF 
works in collaboration with the Global fund where medicines produced by the HIF are 
available for purchase by the Global fund without the mark-up. However, the HIF has not 
been without its critics, such as Jorn Sonderholm who perceives the  HIF as a ‘free ride’ given 
to developing countries by developed countries on the basis of Pogge’s51 controversial 
assumption that the developed world is significantly causally responsible for the public health 
problems in the developing world  (Sonderholm 2010). 
 
                                                             
51 Pogge actually notes that ‘…the question is not whether affluent countries should subsidise advanced 
medicines for the poor. Rather , the question is whether affluent countries may promote the enforcement of 
temporary monopolies that  make advanced medicines to the majority of humankind (Pogge 2011, p2) 
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 The HIF together with the Global Fund could promote social justice at a global level by 
shifting international relations away from an emphasis on national interests (which restrict 
international cooperation to humanitarian assistance of vulnerable groups whose needs are not 
met by the market economy) and toward shared economic and health values via increased 
solidarity between countries. Such shared values would improve global health through the 
promotion of rewarding industry for drugs based on the actual impact on health, resulting in 
the encouragement of developing more innovative, effective and affordable drugs that would 
re-orientate the market to focus on improving community health. The facts above would lead 
to the introduction of the concept of shared health and economic value as a common good. 
Combining market and community incentives, such focused interest on resource poor settings 
would prompt the industry to concentrate on affordable therapeutic solutions, such as 
pharmacogenetics, which promises to decrease R&D. Furthermore, this would focus the 
business interests of industry towards incorporating the health needs of low-income countries 
into global research agendas, whilst continuing to support the health needs of high-income 
countries. Research outcomes would therefore be reviewed by governance with a focus on 
social responsibility. This aspect has been partly achieved (McCoy, Kembhavi et al. 2009) by 
developing global fund programmes to reward worldwide pharmaceutical research based on 
community health gains, measured in terms of decreased morbidity and mortality. Such an 
approach offers the greatest benefits to the worst-off social groups within countries, and 
reduces global inequalities in health. 
 
Therefore Pogge’s HIF and the Global fund has the requirement of introducing the concept of 
shared health and economic value as a common good, in addition to the access of knowledge 
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as a common good. It has the potential to support research for neglected diseases as a research 
priority at a global level. Providing the introduction of a more integrated global approach to 
drug development, since the business interests of industry would incorporate the health needs 
of low-income countries into global research agendas, whilst still continuing to support the 
health needs of high-income countries. The key elements of the common good together with 
other key elements such as that of minimal morality and social responsibility noted from 
Cozzen’s assessment of Rawls’s justice model and Thomasma’s global ethics framework 
would provide additional ethical guidance for pharmacogenetic research governance. This 
ethical guidance would support and uphold the Rawlsian procedural concept of overlapping 
consensus which has been shown to best deliver the required specifications of justice for 
pharmacogenetic research governance, and to which I will now discuss. 
 
 
 
6.4 Rawls’s ‘Overlapping Consensus’: a possible way forward? 
How would the egalitarian Rawlsian model be applied in pharmacogenetic research 
governance? As I argue in this section, would be through Rawls’s method of overlapping 
consensus. As noted in chapter three, mental dispositions such as intuition seem to play an 
important role in genetic governance discourse, and the aim of Rawls’s overlapping consensus 
is the harnessing of the mental dispositions into a coherent systematic framework of normative 
beliefs. I will use Daniel and Sabin’s (Daniels, Norman 2002) procedural approach to 
healthcare resource allocation to illustrate how overlapping consensus could be applied in the 
moral assessment of pharmacogenetic based research protocols by governance levels such as 
  
 
202 
 
regulatory and policy makers. Daniel and Sabine proposed ‘accountability for reasonableness’ 
framework for priority setting of decisions in healthcare in the face of widespread 
disagreement about values.  Accountability for reasonableness is the idea that the reasons or 
rationales for important limit-setting decisions should be publicly available (Daniels, Norman 
2002, p.44) and that such a framework is an attempt at providing rules or conditions for a 
procedure for ensuring that resulting decisions are fair, reasonable, and legitimate to the point 
where even those who would be adversely affected will have a reason to abide by them. 
 
6.4.1 Overlapping consensus 
The Rawlsian method of overlapping consensus seeks to find a balance between considered 
judgements and intuitions of particular cases, providing an approach which enables decision- 
making in a pluralist context with different stakeholders who often endorse different or 
possibly conflicting cultural and moral frameworks.  The concept was introduced in his later 
work ‘Political Liberalism’ (Rawls, 2005) and arose due to Rawls’s recognition of the plurality 
of incompatible and irreconcilable moral frameworks within a democratic society. In other 
words, people are able to live together despite conflicting moral values and ideals as long as 
there is a sharing of moral commitment to society’s basic structure.  The focus of overlapping 
consensus is that people with divergent comprehensive doctrines can overlap in their 
acceptance of a conception of justice. They do not have to agree on everything but they do 
have to agree on ‘principles of fairness’ which specify the fair terms of cooperation among 
citizens and the conditions under which a society’s basic institutions are considered as just 
(Doorn, 2010). Therefore, overlapping consensus is the justificatory basis for principles of 
justice and in this context of providing specification to the principle of Justice in Principlism 
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for pharmacogenetic governance; overlapping consensus will be used in a procedural way as a 
framework for structuring discussion and debate with the aim of coming to a justified 
agreement. 
 
 
Overlapping consensus is aimed at the convergence of three different levels of moral 
viewpoints namely (1) considered moral judgements about particular cases or situations, (2) 
moral principles, and (3) descriptive and normative background theories. Instrumental to the 
success of such a method of providing procedural justification and dealing with moral issues is 
the achievement of reflective learning, which is open and inclusive. 
 
Central to the application of overlapping consensus to pharmacogenetic research governance 
is the review of the differences in risk perception by the various agents involved, such as 
society, science and industry. As highlighted in chapter three, in application, one must focus 
firstly on the descriptive or conceptual issues concerned with semantic or empirical 
disagreements. Focus thus shifts to one or more normative issues on what ought to be done in 
research, or what should be done to make the research acceptable and appropriate. Finally, 
collective cooperation is encouraged through the convergence of viewpoints or overlapping 
consensus. 
 
Descriptive concerns 
Descriptive concerns are considered judgements which are a response to moral issues at hand. 
As noted earlier in chapter three, they are value judgements based directly on emotions which 
can be unreliable, which are also considered to be the moral voices within a person (Barilan, 
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Brusa 2011). These ‘voices’ tend to come with supportive reasons and are not just confessions 
of mere feelings. For example, the statement ‘I am sure we must not do this’ is not a 
considered judgement, unlike the statement ‘It seems to me that the proposal is too similar to 
deception’, which is a considered judgement. However, the latter statement lends itself to 
further inquiry and reason exchange, which is a requisite for deliberation. The concept of 
uncertainty previously discussed in chapter three examines examples of such descriptive 
concerns, where the language of compassion and empathy become tools in standard policy 
generation, helping to link genomics and the public through the language of reflection. For 
regulatory agents using the concept of uncertainty for assessing risks, the precautionary 
principle would still be appealed to - that of society not waiting until it knows all of the 
answers before attempting to protect against significant harm. Focus will however also be on 
the benefits of this technology and normative outcomes, rather than just epistemic information 
(i.e. facts concerning what we should believe in as derived from the minimal risk standard). 
Emphasis of risk assessment could be based partly upon the principle of solidarity, as noted in 
chapter five, where, for example, the report ‘Pharmacogenetics: ethical issues’ from the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics notes issues concerned more with breaches of the principle of 
solidarity, and moves away from issues based on the principle of autonomy apparent from the 
minimal risk standard assessment. In this instance, solidarity is based on altruism and feelings 
of compassion and empathy, and is interpreted as the principle of reciprocity; an awareness of 
interdependency and interrelatedness that is the basis of a sense of obligation to do something 
in return as aforementioned, this is an important feature of Rawls’s egalitarian justice model. 
The participation in research is assessed along the lines of the common good (generating 
knowledge) and the sharing of research benefits. Furthermore, the genetic database is 
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perceived as a common public good. The principle of reciprocity would therefore be a 
structural vehicle in the overlapping consensus model for bringing to the fore such considered 
judgements. 
 
Normative concerns 
Normative concerns are derived from the different normative background theories that the 
various agents subscribe to. In the case of current pharmacogenetic governance, normative 
concerns as expressed by regulatory bodies seem to be limited to the interpretation of risk 
through the minimal risk standard. This is a standard that assesses the potential benefits of 
research projects, in terms of knowledge gained in proportion to the potential physical and/or 
psychological harm it might cause to the research participant during drug interventions, 
associated tests and monitoring procedures encountered in a clinical trial. For industry, 
normative concerns are seen as breaches of GCP and risk perception is more of a scientific 
assessment of risk as probabilities of harm (as noted in chapter three). Industry focuses their 
normative concerns on the application of Principlism (notably the practical application of the 
principle of respect for autonomy that is informed consent) to ensure the protection of research 
participants’ privacy, confidentiality and non-discrimination, as highlighted in chapters four 
and five. However, these normative concerns need to widen to breaches of justice and equity 
apparent for this technology. Equal access to the benefits of this technology and solidarity (as 
social responsibility through benefit sharing as discussed earlier in this section) should be 
considered in regulatory discourse, as well as considerations of consent, privacy and storage 
(confidentiality). 
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Convergence of viewpoints 
For research governance Van de Poel and Zwart (van,de Poel, 2010) argue that learning about 
one’s value systems is a prerequisite for arriving at an overlapping consensus, as only then do 
people become aware of the legitimacy of other people’s opinions and normative background 
theories. In order to encourage these learning processes, the overlapping consensus approach 
firstly acknowledges the differences in meanings attached to the notion of risk for different 
agents, in order to constructively work toward a justified outcome. These differences are 
derived as noted from the different background theories from which the different notions of 
risk are derived. For example, regulatory bodies see risk as physical, moral and emotional 
harm related to drug interventions, associated tests and monitoring procedures encountered in 
a clinical trial as noted. The industry sees risk as probabilities of harm, while users of the 
outcome of this technology see risks in relation to its acceptability, whereby the elements of 
determinism and reductionism come to the fore (as discussed in chapter three). 
 
 
Moral reflection occurs due to the examination of moral judgements in particular matters or 
layers when applying the concept of an overlapping consensus,. This is as follows: 
(1)descriptive and normative background theories as previously discussed with more general 
or (2) broader beliefs and principles on similar issues (obtained from considered moral 
judgements about particular cases or situations), and (3) moral principles.  In order to come to 
a decision on  how to respond to moral issues, agents move back and forth between these 
beliefs and considerations, reflect on them, revise them if necessary, and attempt to achieve an 
acceptable coherence between their moral judgements on particular matters, and more general 
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or broader beliefs and principles on similar issues. Overlapping consensus in effect becomes a 
process of facilitating the integration of scientific objectivity and the non-scientific view (or 
some aspects of the regulatory body view and the introduction of the user’s view) by 
recognising the different rationalities of both approaches. This is achieved by noting that an 
agent’s personal normative background theory (or ‘ethics position’) influences their 
judgements, actions, and emotions in morally laden situations, in which their judgements can 
be traced back to or are informed by their different ethical positions. 
 
 
6.4.2 ‘Accountability for reasonableness’ framework 
Accountability for reasonableness is the concept that uses reasons or rationales for important 
limit-setting decisions, and that these reasons are ones that a person would use to seek 
cooperation with others through justification (Daniels 2002, p.44). Daniels and Sabine 
proposed ‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework as an acceptable fair process for 
priority setting decision making in healthcare when agents were faced with widespread 
disagreement about values. The framework is an attempt at rules or conditions of a procedure 
for ensuring resulting decisions are fair reasonable and legitimate to the point where even 
those who would be adversely affected will have a reason to abide by them. It sets limits 
through the application of meeting four conditions and these conditions makes decision 
makers ‘accountable for the reasonableness’ of their decisions (Daniels 2002, p.10). The 
proposed four conditions necessary for a legitimate decision-making process regarding health-
care limits are: 
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1. Publicity Condition: limit-setting decisions must be public. Both the grounds for 
making direct and indirect limits to care as well as the decisions must be made publicly 
available. 
2. Relevance Condition: the grounds for the decisions must be ones that fair-minded 
people can agree are relevant to meeting health care needs under restraint. The 
deliberation of these grounds are focused on a shared goal, in this case the common 
good, and these grounds provide  reasonable explanation of how the organisation seeks 
to provide ‘value for money’ in meeting the health needs of a defined population under 
resource constraints. Such grounds or rationale are considered reasonable if they 
appeal to evidence, reasons and principles that are relevant to mutual justifiable terms 
of cooperation (Daniels 2002, p.12). 
3. Revision and Appeals Condition: limit-setting decisions must be subject to revision 
and appeal and the process for this must meet the first two conditions. Furthermore, 
these decisions must be revised in time in light of new evidence.   
4. Regulative Condition: some form of regulation must be put in place to ensure that 
conditions 1-3 are met. This could either be voluntary of public regulation. 
 
This four conditioned approach connects health-plan decisions to a broader educative and 
deliberative democratic process (Daniels 2002, p.46). In summary transparency of reasons for 
a decision is through the Publicity Condition. The Relevancy Condition sets justification of the 
decision. The Revision Condition makes learning from experience and responding to 
disagreements central to the decision-making, and the Regulative Condition provides the 
backbone to the other conditions.  
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I will be critiquing the application of the conditions for pharmacogenetic governance at the 
governmental level, and will be appealing to the analysis by Michael Schlander of the real-life 
performance and robustness of NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) 
technological appraisal process using ADHD ( Attention Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder) as a 
case study (Schlander, 2007). I will also evaluate how NICE could have applied overlapping 
consensus for  technological appraisal no. 295 of breast cancer drug, Everolimus (trade name,  
‘Afinitor’, Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK), which has the pharmacogenetic biomarker HER2 
negative for hormone-receptor-positive advanced  breast cancer, and was rejected for such 
treatment in August 2013. The reason for such analysis is due to NICE’s importance  in 
pioneering technology assessment outside of the UK with other foreign governments as well 
as on behalf of the Department of Health for England and Wales, and how such an analysis 
could be used as an example of the application of overlapping consensus in a global research 
governance setting. 
 
Schlander compared NICE’s technology appraisal process with the ‘accountability for 
reasonableness’ framework. The technology appraisal is a recommendation for the use of new 
and existing medicines and treatments within the NHS in England and Wales, such as:  
 medicines 
 medical devices (for example, hearing aids or inhalers) 
 diagnostic techniques (tests used to identify diseases) 
 surgical procedures (for example, repairing hernias) 
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 health promotion activities (for example, ways of helping people with diabetes manage 
their condition). 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2014) 
 
The process of the technological appraisal consists of four phases; 
1. Scoping; experts and stakeholders are identified as ‘consultees’ and ‘commentators’, 
together with an independent academic group to assist in the appraisal. A draft remit is 
set –up and discussed at a scoping workshop which outlines the clinical problem, the 
patient population, the technology and its comparators (if applicable), treatment 
setting, health outcome measures and costs, timelines. A final remit is prepared by 
Ministers for formal appraisal by NICE. 
2. Assessment; the main activity is the evaluation of the evidence (noted in an evaluation 
report) relating to the technology in question to produce an assessment report. 
3. Appraisal; comprises of four elements which are carried out by a standing advisory 
committee (AC) who comprise of members drawn from the NHS, patient and care 
giver organisations, relevant academic disciplines and the pharmaceutical (and medical 
devices if applicable) industry. The elements are; (1) AC considers evidence in the 
assessment report to (2) develop an Appraisal Consultation Document (ACD) (3) 
distribution of the ACD to ‘consultees’ and ‘commentators’ (4) review of the ACD in 
light of comments received during the appraisal committee consultation and 
preparation of the Final Appraisal Determination (FAD) document which forms the 
guidance for NICE on the use of the appraised technology. 
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4. Appeal; FAD is distributed and published as NICE guidance unless consultees lodge 
an appeal within 15 working days from receipt of the FAD. 
 
A summary of these phases as applied to the technological appraisal of Everolimus; 
Scope 
Draft scope issued for initial review in January 2012, the objective of the scope was to provide 
clinical and cost effectiveness data of Everolimus. Consultees (experts) were Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals UK (Everolimus); patient/carer groups - Breakthrough Breast Cancer and 
Breast Cancer Care. Professional groups such as Cancer Research UK, Royal College of 
Nursing, Royal College of Pathologists and Royal College of Physicians. The Department of 
Health and Welsh Government were also consulted. The following commentators who had no 
right to submit an appeal were British National Formulary, Commissioning Support 
Appraisals Service, Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety for Northern 
Ireland and Healthcare Improvement Scotland. A number of scopes were issued and reviewed 
by the consultees until 31 October 2012, and  all scopes were published on the NICE website 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2014).  
Assessment 
The Assessment group provided the final evaluation report in 21 March 2013 which was 
published on the NICE website on 30 April 2013. The report provided evidence based data 
from the consultees on Everolimus, and gave rise to an assessment report which was produced 
on 3 July 2013. 
Appraisal 
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Appraisal Committee meetings were held on 3 February 2013 and 23 April 2013, the first 
meeting published the Appraisal Consultation Document (ACD) which summarised the 
evidence and views of the consultees and resulted in setting out draft recommendations made 
by the Committee in the final appraisal determination (FAD) published on the NICE website 
on the 5 July 2013. The FAD was then used as the basis for NICE's guidance on using 
Everolimus in the NHS in England and Wales in which Everolimus was not recommended 
since it was found  not to provide enough benefit to patients to justify its high cost. 
Appeal  
No appeal was lodged. 
In comparing Everolimus technological appraisal NICE process with the ‘Accountability for 
Reasonableness’ conditions we find that the first condition; Publicity, was fully being met, and 
that there was a good level of transparency in the overall process. Key features of which were 
the publication of assessment reports, FAD, and ACD to the publically accessible NICE 
website, public appeal hearings and the publication of appraisal committee meeting minutes. 
The second condition; Relevance, it was noted for Everolimus assessment that the issues were 
mainly concerned with clinical and cost effectiveness data, which was considered (by 
Novartis) to not produce the required evidence for the treatment. Novartis noted that evidence 
was based on18 months trial data instead of the provided twenty-two months therefore there 
were limited data points for analysis such as disease free survival data. Furthermore, I note 
that if bioethical input was employed via inviting bioethicist to be a part of the ‘consultees’ 
and ‘commentators’ then considerations of effectiveness , equity , and patient choice would be 
apparent in the assessment. As noted by ‘accountability for reasonableness’ , these factors ( 
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consideration of effectiveness, equity and patient choice) constitute a values framework which 
is implicit in resource limit deliberations This values framework further breaks down the 
consideration of effectiveness into four elements; 
 
1. Effectiveness – ‘does the treatment achieve a desired effect? 
2. Value to the patient relative to the value of other treatments 
3. Impact – value weighed for degree of effectiveness 
4. Efficiency – impact per unit cost 
(Daniels 2002, p.162)  
 
All of which Daniel and Sabine had envisaged that NICE would adopt, but notes that there is a 
way to go with the decision –making process which is seen primarily as the task of experts. 
 
The third condition – Appeal and revision, even though no appeal was lodged it was noted 
from Schlander’s critique (Schlander, 2007) on ADHD that NICE’s appeal process was more 
restrictive than what Daniel and Sabin’s ‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework 
envisaged especially with regard to timelines, where there was only 15 business days to lodge 
an appeal against the FAD for example, not enough time to instigate a legal review deemed 
necessary. Moreover, ‘accountability for reasonableness’ recommends that a broad scope of 
stakeholders are engaged in the process of deliberation (Daniels  2002, p.58), a 
recommendation that cannot be upheld if limited timeframes are set-up. The fourth condition- 
Enforcement, Schlander notes that implementation of the NICE guideline may be enforcement 
itself. Also he noted that a quality assurance system should be included in which currently one 
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does not exist for the NICE technology assessments. Such a system would ensure the adoption 
of the three previous conditions (Publicity, Relevance and Revision) without legal recourse. 
Regulation under accountability for reasonableness could therefore be voluntary private 
enforcement or public regulation, in which either would be sufficient to ensure the facilitation 
of the review on matters of fairness without fear of legal reprisal (Daniels 2002, p.60). 
 
The example of the NICE technology appraisal process setting shows how accountability for 
reasonableness can be employed as a means of ensuring that the principle of justice can be 
exercised. The appraisal process did adhere to A4R with regard to showing a high level of 
transparency fulfilling the publicity condition. However, the Relevancy condition was an issue 
with regard to the agreement on the type of data that was assessed as well as the imposition of 
cost constraints. Furthermore the Appeal and Enforcement condition were observed to need 
improvement such as further guidelines for quality review and explicit enforcement. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
With the advent of international research collaborations, and the centralisation of regulations 
and laws associated with scientific and technological developments as noted in chapter three, 
participating countries in research programmes will not be able to decide which ethical issues 
will be of most concern for them when partaking in pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials. As 
a result, the debate on prominent ethical issues will become more of a centralised issue – a 
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constituent of the global research agenda. The supply of drugs is one example where 
regulation is on an international scale, but the demand and reimbursements are more 
regionally and locally organised; therefore, ethical issues arise in areas of supply and demand, 
concerned with the inequity of distribution. These differing tendencies in the development of 
new drugs also exacerbate research prioritisation issues as discussed in section 4.6, 
particularly between economically rich and poor countries. Developed countries, for example, 
are more concerned with drugs for subgroups, whilst developing countries which make up 85 
per cent of the world’s population (Oprea, Braunack-Mayer et al. 2009) are more concerned 
with generic and affordable drugs which are economically suitable for large populations. 
Hence, essential drug lists should take into account the genomic variations between 
populations in these countries, and there should be an emphasis on research that looks at 
whole populations, rather than subpopulations. This would be done in order to further 
understand and harness global genetic diversity, as well as to enable a move away from 
concentrating on protecting the individual, thus collectively ensuring the distribution of access 
to pharmaceutical outcomes. 
 
As noted in the concluding remarks in chapter five, Principlism puts the individual in focus 
due to the principle of respect for autonomy, in which breaches of Principlism in the research 
setting are interpreted as autonomy violations. These bring the language of individual rights to 
the fore. However, this individualism is challenged in pharmacogenetic based research, due to 
genetic information not being solely for the individual. Pharmacogenetics as a risk assessment 
tool gives rise to ethical issues which in reality are more concerned with fair distribution of 
research outcomes (i.e. justice) than autonomy. Furthermore, the stratification of the research 
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participant population into genetic groups brings about issues relating to equitable distribution 
of research knowledge and research priorities, rather than the inference of disease knowledge.  
 
These ethical issues arising from the use of genetic information in pharmacogenetic-based 
clinical trials are not just concerned with the individual, but with the community at large, 
especially when a genetic database is used. This emphasises that the risks and benefits of a 
pharmacogenetic project require assessment at different levels to cater for the varied 
participatory agencies, such as the research participants and their families, or particular groups 
and their communities. So, as well as ethical considerations being based on liberal individual 
rights, where individuals’ rights and resources determine their access to goods and services, 
communitarian ethical considerations where individual rights need to be balanced with social 
responsibilities may also be useful. These communitarian considerations are noted to be 
concerned with participation in research for the common good, and the sharing of research 
benefits (known as solidarity) (Sutrop, 2004).  
 
Therefore it is an ethical challenge for pharmacogenetic-based clinical trial programs to 
acknowledge liberal considerations such as an individual’s rights to privacy, confidentiality, 
and right to know/not to know, together with communitarian considerations concerned with 
collective rights and solidarity (where the genetic database is perceived as a common public 
good, and it is seen as a duty to participate in research, to know, and to inform others) (Sutrop 
2004, p.7). Similar questions arise when evaluating the use of population–based genetic 
databases or Biobanks. 
  
 
217 
 
When taking into account both liberal and communitarian sets of considerations, or the 
balancing of these considerations (and in turn reducing ethical conflict), it is vital to 
acknowledge the cultural setting of these rights, especially for a global research ethics.  
 
 From this discourse Rawls’s justice model has therefore been found to be an appropriate 
liberal model for the specification of the principle of justice inherent in Principlism. This 
model addresses the issue of inequitable distribution of research knowledge outcomes, 
allowing for benefits for the disadvantaged as well as the advantaged due to the principle of 
justice as fairness which ensures that benefits are attributed to everyone regardless of their 
background moral or otherwise. Such a model is however not morally robust enough to 
operate within research governance on an international setting which is required due to the 
global nature of pharmacogenetic clinical trials. Rawls’s theory minimises inequality in 
research outcomes by removing unfairness observed as removing ideas that provide advantage 
to one culturally defined group over another, however the theory would permit the growing 
gap between rich and poor i.e. developed and developing countries, thereby perpetuating 
‘morally’ unsustainable societies. Therefore, the introduction of communitarian considerations 
as noted by Cozzens would ensure that social responsibility would be taken as seriously as 
economic growth. Thomasma’s rules exercised within the global ethics framework would 
provide the additional key element of social responsibility lacking in Rawls’s justice as 
fairness principle by appealing to a minimal morality which would ensure the maintenance of 
social cohesion by keeping socioeconomic inequality within bounds - which is a moral issue 
for many societies. But such reduction of inequalities would only be observed if inequality is 
seen in light of its effect on societal relationships.  Issues of research prioritisation can also be 
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addressed by appealing to the societal value of research but within a socioeconomic context as 
exampled by Pogge’s HIF and the Global Fund which promotes research committed to the 
common good. Lastly,  the principle of justice as fairness as exercised in the Rawlsian method 
of overlapping consensus would be applied to reconcile pluralism of ethical views by allowing 
for moral decision making in a pluralist context with different stakeholders, without giving a 
priori priority to any of them. Emphasis is placed on analysis of the agents in this ethical 
assessment, their agendas, considered moral judgements, and belief and value systems, when 
applying this approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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7. Chapter Seven: Overall Summary and Conclusion 
In this thesis, the main research question, Research governance in pharmacogenetic-based 
drug development: why the principlist approach?, was addressed by assessing critically 
whether the ethical framework of Principlism underpinning current research governance is too 
broad to address specific ethical justice issues for drug development involving 
pharmacogenetics. Arguments made throughout the research were based on the following 
claims: 
 
1. There is an overriding deference to the principle of respect for autonomy, as 
witnessed in the current ethical interpretation of the management of risk. 
2. The principle of justice needs to be specified when applied to genomic concerns. 
Its current non-specificity may be a reason for the over-compensatory application 
of the principle of respect for autonomy.  
3. Current interpretations of Principlism represent moral values that are culturally 
dependent. Pharmacogenetic research outcomes have a global impact, ergo 
Principlism or another moral guidance framework ought to be representative of 
common moral values which are culturally neutral. 
 
The arguments presented answered the main thesis question by highlighting that Principlism 
fulfils the remit of current research ethics by providing guides of conduct on a commensurable 
ethical scale, on the steps that need to be taken in the management of ethical research. In 
effect, Principlism simplifies bioethical decision-making; a feature that has popularised this 
ethical approach. Moreover, the constituent principle of respect for autonomy has proposed 
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(questionable) entrenched concerns and increased perceptions of unethical research in terms of 
research participant liabilities within the current ethical guidelines on pharmacogenetic 
governance. Such concerns emanate from the legacy of research participants being subjected 
to physical atrocities, and which, I argued, have highlighted the current predominance of the 
execution of the principle of respect for autonomy at the expense of the other principles; in 
particular, the principle of justice, within the pharmacogenetic governance setting. 
Furthermore, I have maintained that the expression of such concerns is made at the expense of 
the required research ethics remit of serving the common good (the facilitation of the 
production of knowledge concerned with improving health and/or increasing understanding of 
human biology). 
 
Moreover, my critique highlighted that the multi-layered regulations inherent in research 
governance are based on assessing risks of harm in research projects. However, I argued that 
this assessment was precautionary in its approach and potentially prohibitive for the 
development of pharmacogenetics-based drug development. Research governance’s aim of 
managing risk was noted to be perceived as calculable, but it was established to be value 
driven or influenced by belief states. Furthermore, this was argued as the reason for the rise of 
the variability of regulation interpretation. Moreover, it was contended that the presence of 
these value-laden risk perceptions presented considerations on whether these perceptions 
should be taken into account when establishing robust regulatory mechanisms; especially in 
the assessment of the genomic technologies, such as pharmacogenetic drug development 
regulation.  
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From the analysis of the minimal risk standard, it has been demonstrated that this 
methodology, as an example of current research governance risk assessment (albeit for 
paediatric research and research that involves vulnerable populations), proved inadequate for 
providing information on what ought to be done in research involving pharmacogenetic 
information. However, as a methodology based on ‘measurement of utility’, it does provide 
indicators of what we should believe in; i.e. an epistemic interpretation. Indeed, since it has 
been established that risks remain present but are inherently unknown in pharmacogenetic 
research outcomes, the view that uncertainty is a prevalent concept in this type of research was 
made apparent. This highlighted the need to test for the options or features selected for 
regulatory assessments which highlight the benefits of this technology in the governance of 
pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials, rather than focusing on detecting the hazards. 
Furthermore, I introduced the idea that a possible test option for consideration would be 
Rawls’s ‘overlapping consensus’, since this approach takes into account the aspect of mental 
dispositions. This was established as a feature when genomics was introduced in research.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that pharmacogenetic ethical issues are not concerned 
solely with autonomy. I further contended that pharmacogenetics - in terms of drug 
development - is used as a risk assessment tool, and that ethical issues that arise are more 
concerned with the outcomes of this research tool; namely, ethical issues concerned with 
equity, fair distribution and research prioritisation, resulting from the differentiation of patient 
categories according to genotype in these clinical trials. These ethical issues were noted as 
matters of injustice rather than autonomy, and arose due to an  inappropriate use of patient 
differentiation or through failure to use such differences, especially when pharmacogenetic-
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based clinical research is employed on a multicentre, global scale. Furthermore, I argued that 
the perception of pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials as being inherently exploitive to 
research participants was based on the concept of pharmacogenetics as a disease susceptibility 
tool; thereby raising ethical concerns relating to breaches of autonomy. These implied that 
ethical concerns for pharmacogenetics were demonstrated as illustrating how the current 
interpretation of Principlism has entrenched concerns and  increased perceptions of unethical 
research in the field of pharmacogenetics, in terms of research participant liabilities. 
 
This led to the conclusion that Principlism, with its current interpretation focused on autonomy 
concerns, is not a robust ethical framework for pharmacogenetic drug development research 
governance. Therefore, I proposed that further specification of the principles of Principlism, 
namely the principle of justice, is required and incorporated into the Principlist ethical 
framework for pharmacogenetic research governance. I argued that this ‘improved’ 
Principlism ethical framework must take into account international genetic governance 
considerations, since pharmacogenetic outcomes are globally operational. Moreover, such an 
ethical framework does not necessarily need to be culturally dependent, but should subscribe 
to a minimal morality; thereby counteracting criticisms levelled at Principlism for its 
tendencies towards American values. 
 
 
I proposed the incorporation of Thomasma’s established rules as worthy additional moral 
guidelines in the establishment of a ‘global research ethics framework’. Rules which subscribe 
to a minimal morality to further ensure that social responsibility is incorporated in research 
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governance. These rules, which are not necessarily culturally dependent, take into 
consideration the pursuit of the common good as one of the aims of research ethics. These 
rules, together with the ‘improved ‘or ‘enhanced’ Principlism framework provide more insight 
into treatment options for conditions that seriously impair autonomous and social functioning, 
without placing the burden of research participation on those who are unable to benefit from 
these knowledge outcomes.  
 
Furthermore, I contended that the current market-driven logic in research and development, 
based on the patent system (inherent in the current research governance structure), needs to 
make a shift towards a needs-driven logic, in accordance with societal value. It was 
established that research based on societal value would promote research committed to the 
common good, expressed as shared health and economic values, as well as generating 
information or knowledge for the improvement of clinical practice. The Global Fund and the 
Health Impact Fund, has the potential to support research for neglected diseases as a research 
priority at a global level, was proposed as an example of the common good and social 
responsibility, based on justice requirements (as in the commitment to improve health and/or 
increase understanding of human biology under the remit of achieving equality or reducing 
inequality).  
 
Further to establishing that the variability of the interpretation of the minimal risk standard 
was due to value-laden risk perceptions, I argued that these perceptions ought to be considered 
when developing regulatory mechanisms for the assessment of genomic technologies, such as 
pharmacogenetic drug development regulation. Therefore, Rawls’s ‘overlapping consensus’ 
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was identified as a means of integrating the aspect of intuitions and these value-laden risk 
perceptions into pharmacogenetic research governance. However, it was noted that, for 
research governance to integrate this approach, an active role would be required to provide 
connections between the introduction of new technologies such as pharmacogenetics, and the 
moral concerns of citizens. The role of research governance would, thus, be in the alleviation 
of the cultural and moral basis of societal unease concerning this biotechnology by integrating 
public, industry and regulatory body discourse into the governance process. The role of the 
bioethicists could be utilised to effect this integration through the procedural approach 
developed by Daniels and Sabine of the ‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework. This 
would undertake the role of employing the medium of ‘overlapping consensus’ into the 
research governance process. I hope to have highlighted that the presence of Rawlsian 
considerations in governance assessment promotes the assurance that research benefits would 
be attributed to everyone, regardless of their economic, racial, cultural or moral background. 
This is due primarily to the principle of justice as fairness, taken from Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice. Therefore, a Rawlsian justice model was analysed principally for its readiness for 
incorporation into current ethical guidelines on a global level, which were lacking in 
specificity of the principle of justice.  
 
Therefore, moral guidelines for research governance of pharmacogenetic-based clinical trials 
would be derived from the non-dogmatic framework of normative beliefs, such as Rawls’s 
‘overlapping consensus’. Coherence would be achieved between moral judgements, principles 
and background theories, as well as the principle of justice as fairness. This principle would 
provide specification for the principle of justice inherent in Principlism, which would ensure 
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that benefits are attributed to everyone, regardless of their background. I argued further that 
greater specification for the principle of justice would ensure that this principle could be 
exercised effectively in order to alleviate pharmacogenetics’ actual ethical issues. These relate 
to the equitable distribution of research knowledge and research priorities, rather than 
inferences of disease knowledge (as implied by ethical concerns regarding informed consent, 
privacy and confidentiality).  
 
Due to the requirement of establishing my arguments within the extensive knowledge arena of 
the subject matter, I was unable (but would have liked) to provide an analysis of how 
overlapping consensus would be disseminated specifically through the various research 
governance layers; in particular, following its inception at the clinical trial application stage, to  
the ethical committee level. Furthermore, more analysis could have been performed on the 
development of employing uncertainty as the concept of permissiveness in research 
governance, an alternative or option to overlapping consensus. This is where the introduction 
of test options in drug regulation would be assessed in a quantitative manner using a practical 
reasoning framework (i.e. a non-normative approach) and an underlying risk-benefit 
assessment, such as virtue ethics, that would ask the question ‘what is good research?’, rather 
than what we ought to do in light of the facts.  
 
Finally, since informed consent is a prominent feature in current research ethics, the analysis 
of the consent model known as ‘informed request’, based on a contractarian ethical model, 
would have been beneficial in highlighting the current failings of informed consent for 
genomic research. Informed request places the research subject at the centre of responsibility 
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for decision making by redirecting responsibility away from the researcher and towards the 
individual in contract-based consent; thereby providing an ideal consent model for the global 
ethical framework based on egalitarian justice values. Thus, the issue of participation in a 
research project is decided by the subject, rather than the researcher. The decision to 
participate in a research project by the subject is based on the ‘stewardship’ concept of 
property; i.e. subjects possessing their bodies in a trust rather than as outright owners (Rao, 
2007). This is a concept that was further developed by David Winickoff’s Charitable Trust 
Model, which aimed to create partnerships between researchers and subjects in the context of 
genomic biobanks (Winickoff, 2007). 
 
In conclusion, I have answered the thesis main research question and discussed the fact that 
Principlism’s ease of use and appeal to rights-based concerns has made it the ethical 
framework of choice for current pharmacogenetic research governance. By evaluating 
critically whether Principlism could continue to be the dominant ethical framework for 
research governance in pharmacogenetics-based drug development, I have argued that there is 
room for further harmonisation and clarity of regulatory frameworks. I have proposed a 
solution based on the ethical evaluation of pharmacogenetic drug development, in terms of a 
Justification model within recognised ethical parameters. A solution that is not overtly 
concerned with ethical evaluation based on safety and efficacy or a matter of choice, but, 
rather of need. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1; 'Genetic testing' is used in a number of different settings. p 107 
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Appendix (i) The Nuremberg Code. 
 
NUREMBERG CODE 
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person 
involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free 
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, 
or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and 
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an 
understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an 
affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, 
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person 
which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.  
 
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who 
initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be 
delegated to another with impunity. 
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by 
other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature. 
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a 
knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated 
results will justify the performance of the experiment. 
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and 
injury. 
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling 
injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve 
as subjects. 
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6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance 
of the problem to be solved by the experiment. 
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental 
subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death. 
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill 
and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in 
the experiment. 
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to 
an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to 
him to be impossible. 
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the 
experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior 
skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in 
injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject. 
(National Institutes of Health) 
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Appendix (ii) The Declaration of Helsinki. 
WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI 
Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
Adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly, Helsinki, Finland, June 1964, and amended by the: 
29th WMA General Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, October 1975 
35th WMA General Assembly, Venice, Italy, October 1983 
41st WMA General Assembly, Hong Kong, September 1989 
48th WMA General Assembly, Somerset West, Republic of South Africa, October 1996 
52nd WMA General Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland, October 2000 
53rd WMA General Assembly, Washington 2002 (Note of Clarification on paragraph 29 added) 
55th WMA General Assembly, Tokyo 2004 (Note of Clarification on Paragraph 30 added) 
59th WMA General Assembly, Seoul, October 2008 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The World Medical Association (WMA) has developed the Declaration of Helsinki as a 
statement of ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects, including 
research on identifiable human material and data. 
 
The Declaration is intended to be read as a whole and each of its constituent paragraphs 
should not be applied without consideration of all other relevant paragraphs. 
 
2. Although the Declaration is addressed primarily to physicians, the WMA encourages 
other participants in medical research involving human subjects to adopt these 
principles. 
 
3. It is the duty of the physician to promote and safeguard the health of patients, including 
those who are involved in medical research. The physician's knowledge and conscience 
are dedicated to the fulfilment of this duty. 
 
4. The Declaration of Geneva of the WMA binds the physician with the words, “The 
health of my patient will be my first consideration,” and the International Code of 
Medical Ethics declares that, “A physician shall act in the patient's best interest when 
providing medical care.” 
 
5. Medical progress is based on research that ultimately must include studies involving 
human subjects. Populations that are underrepresented in medical research should be 
provided appropriate access to participation in research. 
 
6. In medical research involving human subjects, the well-being of the individual research 
subject must take precedence over all other interests. 
 
7. The primary purpose of medical research involving human subjects is to understand the 
causes, development and effects of diseases and improve preventive, diagnostic and 
therapeutic interventions (methods, procedures and treatments). Even the best current 
interventions must be evaluated continually through research for their safety, 
effectiveness, efficiency, accessibility and quality. 
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8. In medical practice and in medical research, most interventions involve risks and 
burdens. 
 
9. Medical research is subject to ethical standards that promote respect for all human 
subjects and protect their health and rights. Some research populations are particularly 
vulnerable and need special protection. These include those who cannot give or refuse 
consent for themselves and those who may be vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence. 
 
10. Physicians should consider the ethical, legal and regulatory norms and standards for 
research involving human subjects in their own countries as well as applicable 
international norms and standards. No national or international ethical, legal or 
regulatory requirement should reduce or eliminate any of the protections for research 
subjects set forth in this Declaration. 
 
B. PRINCIPLES FOR ALL MEDICAL RESEARCH 
 
11. It is the duty of physicians who participate in medical research to protect the life, health, 
dignity, integrity, right to self-determination, privacy, and confidentiality of personal 
information of research subjects. 
 
12. Medical research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted 
scientific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature, other 
relevant sources of information, and adequate laboratory and, as appropriate, animal 
experimentation. The welfare of animals used for research must be respected. 
 
13. Appropriate caution must be exercised in the conduct of medical research that may 
harm the environment. 
 
14. The design and performance of each research study involving human subjects must be 
clearly described in a research protocol. The protocol should contain a statement of the 
ethical considerations involved and should indicate how the principles in this 
Declaration have been addressed. The protocol should include information regarding 
funding, sponsors, institutional affiliations, other potential conflicts of interest, 
incentives for subjects and provisions for treating and/or compensating subjects who are 
harmed as a consequence of participation in the research study. The protocol should 
describe arrangements for post-study access by study subjects to interventions identified 
as beneficial in the study or access to other appropriate care or benefits. 
 
15. The research protocol must be submitted for consideration, comment, guidance and 
approval to a research ethics committee before the study begins. This committee must 
be independent of the researcher, the sponsor and any other undue influence. It must 
take into consideration the laws and regulations of the country or countries in which the 
research is to be performed as well as applicable international norms and standards but 
these must not be allowed to reduce or eliminate any of the protections for research 
subjects set forth in this Declaration. The committee must have the right to monitor 
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ongoing studies. The researcher must provide monitoring information to the committee, 
especially information about any serious adverse events. No change to the protocol may 
be made without consideration and approval by the committee. 
 
16. Medical research involving human subjects must be conducted only by individuals with 
the appropriate scientific training and qualifications. Research on patients or healthy 
volunteers requires the supervision of a competent and appropriately qualified physician 
or other health care professional. The responsibility for the protection of research 
subjects must always rest with the physician or other health care professional and never 
the research subjects, even though they have given consent. 
 
17. Medical research involving a disadvantaged or vulnerable population or community is 
only justified if the research is responsive to the health needs and priorities of this 
population or community and if there is a reasonable likelihood that this population or 
community stands to benefit from the results of the research. 
 
18. Every medical research study involving human subjects must be preceded by careful 
assessment of predictable risks and burdens to the individuals and communities 
involved in the research in comparison with foreseeable benefits to them and to other 
individuals or communities affected by the condition under investigation. 
 
19. Every clinical trial must be registered in a publicly accessible database before 
recruitment of the first subject. 
 
20. Physicians may not participate in a research study involving human subjects unless they 
are confident that the risks involved have been adequately assessed and can be 
satisfactorily managed. Physicians must immediately stop a study when the risks are 
found to outweigh the potential benefits or when there is conclusive proof of positive 
and beneficial results. 
 
21. Medical research involving human subjects may only be conducted if the importance of 
the objective outweighs the inherent risks and burdens to the research subjects. 
 
22. Participation by competent individuals as subjects in medical research must be 
voluntary. Although it may be appropriate to consult family members or community 
leaders, no competent individual may be enrolled in a research study unless he or she 
freely agrees. 
 
23. Every precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of research subjects and the 
confidentiality of their personal information and to minimize the impact of the study on 
their physical, mental and social integrity. 
 
24. In medical research involving competent human subjects, each potential subject must be 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of 
interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential 
risks of the study and the discomfort it may entail, and any other relevant aspects of the 
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study. The potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to participate in the 
study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. Special 
attention should be given to the specific information needs of individual potential 
subjects as well as to the methods used to deliver the information. After ensuring that 
the potential subject has understood the information, the physician or another 
appropriately qualified individual must then seek the potential subject’s freely-given 
informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be expressed in writing, 
the non-written consent must be formally documented and witnessed. 
 
25. For medical research using identifiable human material or data, physicians must 
normally seek consent for the collection, analysis, storage and/or reuse. There may be 
situations where consent would be impossible or impractical to obtain for such research 
or would pose a threat to the validity of the research. In such situations the research may 
be done only after consideration and approval of a research ethics committee. 
 
26. When seeking informed consent for participation in a research study the physician 
should be particularly cautious if the potential subject is in a dependent relationship 
with the physician or may consent under duress. In such situations the informed consent 
should be sought by an appropriately qualified individual who is completely 
independent of this relationship. 
 
27. For a potential research subject who is incompetent, the physician must seek informed 
consent from the legally authorized representative. These individuals must not be 
included in a research study that has no likelihood of benefit for them unless it is 
intended to promote the health of the population represented by the potential subject, 
the research cannot instead be performed with competent persons, and the research 
entails only minimal risk and minimal burden. 
 
28. When a potential research subject who is deemed incompetent is able to give assent to 
decisions about participation in research, the physician must seek that assent in addition 
to the consent of the legally authorized representative. The potential subject’s dissent 
should be respected. 
 
29. Research involving subjects who are physically or mentally incapable of giving 
consent, for example, unconscious patients, may be done only if the physical or mental 
condition that prevents giving informed consent is a necessary characteristic of the 
research population. In such circumstances the physician should seek informed consent 
from the legally authorized representative. If no such representative is available and if 
the research cannot be delayed, the study may proceed without informed consent 
provided that the specific reasons for involving subjects with a condition that renders 
them unable to give informed consent have been stated in the research protocol and the 
study has been approved by a research ethics committee. Consent to remain in the 
research should be obtained as soon as possible from the subject or a legally authorized 
representative. 
 
30. Authors, editors and publishers all have ethical obligations with regard to the 
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publication of the results of research. Authors have a duty to make publicly available 
the results of their research on human subjects and are accountable for the completeness 
and accuracy of their reports. They should adhere to accepted guidelines for ethical 
reporting. Negative and inconclusive as well as positive results should be published or 
otherwise made publicly available. Sources of funding, institutional affiliations and 
conflicts of interest should be declared in the publication. Reports of research not in 
accordance with the principles of this Declaration should not be accepted for 
publication. 
 
C. ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH COMBINED WITH 
MEDICAL CARE 
 
31. The physician may combine medical research with medical care only to the extent that 
the research is justified by its potential preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic value and if 
the physician has good reason to believe that participation in the research study will not 
adversely affect the health of the patients who serve as research subjects. 
 
32. The benefits, risks, burdens and effectiveness of a new intervention must be tested 
against those of the best current proven intervention, except in the following 
circumstances: 
• The use of placebo, or no treatment, is acceptable in studies where no current 
proven intervention exists; or 
• Where for compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons the use of 
placebo is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of an intervention and the 
patients who receive placebo or no treatment will not be subject to any risk of 
serious or irreversible harm. Extreme care must be taken to avoid abuse of this 
option. 
 
33. At the conclusion of the study, patients entered into the study are entitled to be 
informed about the outcome of the study and to share any benefits that result from it, for 
example, access to interventions identified as beneficial in the study or to other 
appropriate care or benefits. 
 
34. The physician must fully inform the patient which aspects of the care are related to the 
research. The refusal of a patient to participate in a study or the patient’s decision to 
withdraw from the study must never interfere with the patient-physician relationship. 
 
35. In the treatment of a patient, where proven interventions do not exist or have been 
ineffective, the physician, after seeking expert advice, with informed consent from the 
patient or a legally authorized representative, may use an unproven intervention if in the 
physician's judgement it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating 
suffering. Where possible, this intervention should be made the object of research, 
designed to evaluate its safety and efficacy. In all cases, new information should be 
recorded and, where appropriate, made publicly available. 
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Appendix (iii) Remarks by the president in apology for study done in Tuskegee. 
 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of the Press Secretary 
For Immediate Release  May 16, 1997 
 
 
 
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT 
IN APOLOGY FOR STUDY DONE IN TUSKEGEE 
 
 
The East Room  
 
2:26 P.M. EDT 
THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, on Sunday, Mr. Shaw will celebrate his 95th 
birthday. (Applause.) I would like to recognize the other survivors who are here today and 
their families: Mr. Charlie Pollard is here. (Applause.) Mr. Carter Howard. (Applause.) Mr. 
Fred Simmons. (Applause.) Mr. Simmons just took his first airplane ride, and he reckons he's 
about 110 years old, so I think it's time for him to take a chance or two. (Laughter.) I'm glad he 
did. And Mr. Frederick Moss, thank you, sir. (Applause.) 
I would also like to ask three family representatives who are here -- Sam Doner is represented 
by his daughter, Gwendolyn Cox. Thank you, Gwendolyn. (Applause.) Ernest Hendon, who is 
watching in Tuskegee, is represented by his brother, North Hendon. Thank you, sir, for being 
here. (Applause.) And George Key is represented by his grandson, Christopher Monroe. 
Thank you, Chris. (Applause.) 
I also acknowledge the families, community leaders, teachers and students watching today by 
satellite from Tuskegee. The White House is the people's house; we are glad to have all of you 
here today. I thank Dr. David Satcher for his role in this. I thank Congresswoman Waters and 
Congressman Hilliard, Congressman Stokes, the entire Congressional Black Caucus. Dr. 
Satcher, members of the Cabinet who are here, Secretary Herman, Secretary Slater, members 
of the Cabinet who are here, Secretary Herman, Secretary Slater. A great friend of freedom, 
Fred Gray, thank you for fighting this long battle all these long years.  
The eight men who are survivors of the syphilis study at Tuskegee are a living link to a time 
not so very long ago that many Americans would prefer not to remember, but we dare not 
  
 
253 
 
forget. It was a time when our nation failed to live up to its ideals, when our nation broke the 
trust with our people that is the very foundation of our democracy. It is not only in 
remembering that shameful past that we can make amends and repair our nation, but it is in 
remembering that past that we can build a better present and a better future. And without 
remembering it, we cannot make amends and we cannot go forward.  
So today America does remember the hundreds of men used in research without their 
knowledge and consent. We remember them and their family members. Men who were poor 
and African American, without resources and with few alternatives, they believed they had 
found hope when they were offered free medical care by the United States Public Health 
Service. They were betrayed.  
Medical people are supposed to help when we need care, but even once a cure was discovered, 
they were denied help, and they were lied to by their government. Our government is 
supposed to protect the rights of its citizens; their rights were trampled upon. Forty years, 
hundreds of men betrayed, along with their wives and children, along with the community in 
Macon County, Alabama, the City  
of Tuskegee, the fine university there, and the larger African American community. 
The United States government did something that was wrong -- deeply, profoundly, morally 
wrong. It was an outrage to our commitment to integrity and equality for all our citizens.  
To the survivors, to the wives and family members, the children and the grandchildren, I say 
what you know: No power on Earth can give you back the lives lost, the pain suffered, the 
years of internal torment and anguish. What was done cannot be undone. But we can end the 
silence. We can stop turning our heads away. We can look at you in the eye and finally say on 
behalf of the American people, what the United States government did was shameful, and I am 
sorry. (Applause.) 
The American people are sorry -- for the loss, for the years of hurt. You did nothing wrong, 
but you were grievously wronged. I apologize and I am sorry that this apology has been so 
long in coming. (Applause.) 
To Macon County, to Tuskegee, to the doctors who have been wrongly associated with the 
events there, you have our apology, as well. To our African American citizens, I am sorry that 
your federal government orchestrated a study so clearly racist. That can never be allowed to 
happen again. It is against everything our country stands for and what we must stand against is 
what it was. 
So let us resolve to hold forever in our hearts and minds the memory of a time not long ago in 
Macon County, Alabama, so that we can always see how adrift we can become when the 
rights of any citizens are neglected, ignored and betrayed. And let us resolve here and now to 
move forward together. 
  
 
254 
 
The legacy of the study at Tuskegee has reached far and deep, in ways that hurt our progress 
and divide our nation. We cannot be one America when a whole segment of our nation has no 
trust in America. An apology is the first step, and we take it with a commitment to rebuild that 
broken trust. We can begin by making sure there is never again another episode like this one. 
We need to do more to ensure that medical research practices are sound and ethical, and that 
researchers work more closely with communities.  
Today I would like to announce several steps to help us achieve these goals. First, we will help 
to build that lasting memorial at Tuskegee. (Applause.) The school founded by Booker T. 
Washington, distinguished by the renowned scientist George Washington Carver and so many 
others who advanced the health and well-being of African Americans and all Americans, is a 
fitting site. The Department of Health and Human Services will award a planning grant so the 
school can pursue establishing a center for bioethics in research and health care. The center 
will serve as a museum of the study and support efforts to address its legacy and strengthen 
bioethics training. 
Second, we commit to increase our community involvement so that we may begin restoring 
lost trust. The study at Tuskegee served to sow distrust of our medical institutions, especially 
where research is involved. Since the study was halted, abuses have been checked by making 
informed consent and local review mandatory in federally-funded and mandated research.  
Still, 25 years later, many medical studies have little African American participation and 
African American organ donors are few. This impedes efforts to conduct promising research 
and to provide the best health care to all our people, including African Americans. So today, 
I'm directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, to issue a report in 
180 days about how we  
can best involve communities, especially minority communities, in research and health care. 
You must -- every American group must be involved in medical research in ways that are 
positive. We have put the curse behind us; now we must bring the benefits to all Americans. 
(Applause.) 
Third, we commit to strengthen researchers' training in bioethics. We are constantly working 
on making breakthroughs in protecting the health of our people and in vanquishing diseases. 
But all our people must be assured that their rights and dignity will be respected as new drugs, 
treatments and therapies are tested and used. So I am directing Secretary Shalala to work in 
partnership with higher education to prepare training materials for medical researchers. They 
will be available in a year. They will help researchers build on core ethical principles of 
respect for individuals, justice and informed consent, and advise them on how to use these 
principles effectively in diverse populations. 
Fourth, to increase and broaden our understanding of ethical issues and clinical research, we 
commit to providing postgraduate fellowships to train bioethicists especially among African 
Americans and other minority groups. HHS will offer these fellowships beginning in 
September of 1998 to promising students enrolled in bioethics graduate programs.  
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And, finally, by executive order I am also today extending the charter of the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission to October of 1999. The need for this commission is clear. 
We must be able to call on the thoughtful, collective wisdom of experts and community 
representatives to find ways to further strengthen our protections for subjects in human 
research. 
We face a challenge in our time. Science and technology are rapidly changing our lives with 
the promise of making us much healthier, much more productive and more prosperous. But 
with these changes we must work harder to see that as we advance we don't leave behind our 
conscience. No ground is gained and, indeed, much is lost if we lose our moral bearings in the 
name of progress. 
The people who ran the study at Tuskegee diminished the stature of man by abandoning the 
most basic ethical precepts. They forgot their pledge to heal and repair. They had the power to 
heal the survivors and all the others and they did not. Today, all we can do is apologize. But 
you have the power, for only you -- Mr. Shaw, the others who are here, the family members 
who are with us in Tuskegee -- only you have the power to forgive. Your presence here shows 
us that you have chosen a better path than your government did so long ago. You have not 
withheld the power to forgive. I hope today and tomorrow every American will remember 
your lesson and live by it.  
Thank you, and God bless you. (Applause.)   
 
Clinton, W.J. 1997 
 
 
